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ABSTRACT
This study is an attempt to analyse British interests in 
Egypt during the twenty-three years before the French expedition 
of 1798, and centres around George Baldwin, the only permanent 
English resident in the oountry at that time, who foresaw its 
importance to Britain in the event of a war with France, Although 
much stress is placed on Baldwin* s promotion of the Red Sea route 
to India, a proper evaluation of British activity necessarily en­
compasses a comprehensive survey of Anglo-Egyptian relations during 
the period.
Chapter I deals with the first four years of Baldwin*s residence, 
from 1775 to 1779 $ when he was primarily concerned with his work as 
a merchant; his trade was carried on concurrently in Suez, Alex­
andria and Cairo, and he was also involved in expediting the East 
India Company* s dispatches to and from India, In 1779» he was forced 
to flee the country after a major clash with the ruling beys; it 
became clear to him then that any further activity in Egypt would 
only be possible with the establishment of official consular re­
presentation. Chapter II is concerned with the years 1779 to 1786 
during the absence of Baldwin, when the French were busily involved 
in securing the right to navigate the Red Sea; this resulted in 
the Truguet agreements of 1785- Chapter III concentrates on the
British reaction to the agreements, and points to the fact 
that Henry Dundas, the senior member of the newly-created 
Board of Control for Indian Affairs,was instrumental in appoint­
ing Baldwin as Consul-General in Egypt, Chapter IV is an exam­
ination of the seven years, from 1786 to 1793 > of the British 
consulate, at the end of which the post was discontinued. The 
last chapter shows how Baldwin remained in Egypt until March 
1798 when ill-health and poverty obliged him to leave, and how, 
finally, it was to him that the commanders of the Mediterranean 
forces turned in preparing plans for the British landings in 
Egypt in March 1801.
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INTRODUCTION
iny account of the British in Egypt during the eighteenth 
century must start from a consideration of the commercial inter­
ests involved, for the basis of political development stemmed 
directly from the desire to promote better trading conditions and 
greater profits* This study is primarily concerned with the poli­
tical ramifications of one merchant*s desire to establish a secure 
foothold for himself and his countrymen in Egypt, George Baldwin 
was alone in his efforts during the last quarter of the century 
to bring about British recognition of the importance of Egypt; 
he first saw it as a great economic advantage, and later tried 
to point out its invaluable strategic value. The reasons for his 
failure to successfully convince the authorities in London of the 
validity of his ideas are many, aid far from simple to understand*
Throughout the period of his stay in Egypt, indeed in some 
cases considerably before, it is possible to discern certain forces 
strongly opposed to one another and in constant action and re­
action against nne another; the resulting friction caused a peculiar 
state of political lethargy in which very little development occurred. 
Eor example, the beys of Egypt were repeatedly in a state of oppo­
sition with the Porte; the mamluks themselves were hopelessly 
divided; the Levant Company strongly disapproved of the govern­
ment in India and its. desire to promote a trade route through Suez;
the commercial considerations of the Levant Company and occasion­
ally those of the East India Company clashed with the national 
interest; moreover, Ainslie, the ambassador in Constantinople, 
was torn between his dual responsibilities as representative of 
the Levant Company and of the Crown; he was also personally and 
ideologically a sworn enemy of Baldwin; the convictions of Bald­
win the merchant necessarily clashed with those of Baldwin the 
consul-general; and, of course, Prance and Britain remained eager 
and often bitter rivals for positions of strength within the 
Ottoman Empire,
Baldwin* s activities in Egypt must be seen within the con­
text of these conflicting elements; without the necessary back­
ground he would seem fc> have circulated in a vacuous world of little 
evolution, and an account of his life would be a series of meaning­
less events. It is doubtful whether he was fully aware of the im­
plications of the predicament he had chosen for himself when he 
first set out to settle in Egypt, or whether, as he became more 
familiar with the country, he closely analysed his static position.
He rarely admitted the apparent futility of incomplete! missions and 
unreached goals, but remained firmly convinced of the truth and 
validity of his arguments, and manifested his single-mindedness 
to the best of his abilities. While it would be impossible and even 
slightly nonsensical to attribute the course of events during the 
period under study to a pattern so simply described, it is nonetheless
important to be aware of such a pattern* It is by no means an 
all-embracing explanation of the outcome of Baldwin* s actions, but 
rather one that can be used to understand the recurrent episodes 
that ended in deadlock, and did little to encourage London to ex­
tend its influence to Egypt*
The second half of the eighteenth century in Egypt saw the 
disparity between the ruling beys and the Porte reach unprecedented 
proportions. Constantinople was clearly unable to command events 
in Cairo, and was very often forced to ignore the occurrences
i
there rather than suffer an embarrassing loss of face. The fifteen- 
year rule of ‘Ali Bey al-Kabir probably did much to strengthen 
the position of the beylicate. After assuming the title of shavkh 
al-balad in 1757* *AlI Bey strengthened his position by ridding 
himself of all dissenting Mamluks in his entourage. The inevitable 
withdrawal to Upper Egypt of his enemies caused him a year of exile 
in 1766, but he was soon back in full command and with even greater 
strength. His position of unopposed dictatorship brought him the 
mingled regard of awe and terror from the populace. With his in­
ternal power consolidated, *Ali then turned to extending his in­
fluence abroad. In 1770, he was instrumental in installing a 
Hashimi protege as amir of Mecca; he thereafter assumed considerable
1Or principal bey, the acknowledged senior grandee of Cairo.
sway over the affairs of the gijaz. It was also his wish to con­
trol Syria, as Egyptian rulers of strength before and after him 
were wont to do. In 1771* his forces captured Damascus, and he 
would have been able to become master of the entire country if the 
general commanding his expeditionary force, Mufcammad Bey Abu*l- 
Dhahab had not gone over to the Ottoman side. In April 1772,
*Ali was defeated by Abu’l-Dhahab, and his lease of power was at 
an end. The next year Abu’l -Dhahab became shavkh al-balad. and 
ruled over Egypt for two years.
Throughout the rule of *Ali Bey, and later under Abu*l - 
Dhahab and his successors, Ibrahim and Murad, the r61e of the 
pasha in the Citadel was reduced to insignificance. As the symbol 
of the Porte*s authority, he had little to say about the affairs 
of Egypt. He became a puppet dn the hands of the ruling beys, 
and lived in the shadow of his nominal subordinates.
Although the beys were able to assume complete control of 
Egypt and reduce the authority of the Porte to a nominal one, it 
is significant that there was rarely an extended period of unopposed 
rule by a shavkh al-balad. The history of the government of Egypt 
during the last half of the eighteenth century is a complicated 
and anarchic mixture of factinnal opposition, last-minute desertions, 
and sporadic coups d*etat. These were the methods by which the beys 
were able to strengthen themselves to the point of disassication 
from the Porte; the example of ‘Ali Bey*s rise to power may be hens
15*
cited. But these methods were, ironically, the means by which 
the inherent weakness of the system exposed itself, and ulti­
mately brought about its downfall; once again, the defeat of ‘All 
Bey serves as an example.
The last quarter of the century was dominated by the duum­
virate of Murad and Ibrahim. Although at times opposed to one 
another, they reached a compromise for the sake of expediency, 
Ibrahim as shavkh al-balad and Murad the effective ruler. They 
remained in power for the entire period except for a five-year 
interim during which the Ottoman Empire sent a punitive expedition 
and established an obedient mamluk, IsmVil Bey, in the position 
of authority. The rule of the duumvirate was characterised by im­
mense and totally irrational extortions from all sectors of the 
population, both foreign and indigenous, and arrogant demonstrations 
of authority that caused the two beys to be hated and feared. With 
the increase of their internal strength came a diminution of sub­
serviences and obedience to the Porte. The annual tribute began to
1fall short of its requirements, and the conditions for the ha.i.1 
were not fulfilled.
Given these conditions of government, it is not surprising 
that the Levant Company always had a rather apprehensive attitude
t
Gr pilgrimage. A pilgrimage caravan left annually from Egypt for 
the Holy Cities, and the amir al-hai.i. the second in command after 
the shavkh al-balad. organised and led this. He was responsible 
for the safety of the pilgrims, and carried a financial contribu­
tion ,as well as the Holy Curtain, to the Holy Cities.
14*
about Its representation in Egypt, Its ventures in the country-
had never been particularly successful. In the latter part of
the sixteenth century, there had been sufficient trade with Alex-
1
andria for the first consul to be appointed. But high duties
and the fluctuating prices of the Egyptian market made the efforts
commercially unprofitable. Furthermore, the already established
French and Venetian merchant communities proved to be too strong
in the field of competition. The activities of English merchants
began to be concentrated on shipping goods from Alexandria to
eastern Mediterranean countries rather than on importing home
products into Egypt. Thus, early in the seventeenth century the
consulate was regarded as unworthy of expense and effort. But in
1689, there was sufficient pressure by the merchants who continued
to trade in Egypt to obtain the re-establishment of the office.
Nine years later, the first in a relatively long line of consuls
2
arrived in Cairo.
At first, the representation proved fruitful, for many com­
mercial transactions took place: coffee, gum arabic, senna, cotton
3
wool and sal ammoniac were sent to England in regular shipments.
Harvey Millers, the first consul, was appointed in 1583. Wood,
A History of the Levant Company, p.32.
^His name was Miles Fleetwood. Ibid.. p.125.
^Ibid.. p.165.
However, the problem of foreign competition still existed, and 
the merchants found little market for their own products; most 
important was the fact that French woollen cloth had captured the 
Egyptian market. This was only one of many reasons that led the 
Company in 1754 to decide to close the consulate and have its 
books transferred to Cyprus*
It has already been stated that the beys openly defied the 
Porte. Not the least evidence of their disregard for orders laid 
down for them was their sporadic waiving of the capitulations, 
the only protection for foreigners living in any of the dominions 
of the Sultan. The unexpected and ruthless avanias left the English 
merchants of Egypt sadly hereft of what otherwise would have been 
regarded as hard-earned profits. Norse of all, they were power­
less to protest to any higher authority than the very beys who were 
pressing the exorbitant demands. The insecurity of the consulate 
became intolerable; its isolation and consequent vulnerability to 
the whims of the Mamluks rendered the office worthless to the lev­
ant Company.
Richard Harris, the consul in 1754, remained in Egypt until
1757, when he left Robert Hughes, the representative of Holland,
2in charge of British affairs. Despite the official end of British
*1
Demahds for loans which were enforced by the beys.
2
Wood.- op.cit.. p.166.
representation, individual traders continued to be attracted to 
opportunities in the Egyptian market. There must have been a 
sufficient number of merchants to have made John Murray, the am­
bassador in Constantinople, appoint a vice-consul in Cairo in 
1767* There are further indications of commercial transactions 
with Egypt, m  1772, %rray protested to the Porte about the 
murder of the captain and three members <f the crew of the English
brig, "Elisabeth',' which was laden with goods and on its way from
2leghorn to Alexandria. The next year Murray appointed Constantine
Maori as British agent in Alexandria against the wishes of the 
3Levant Company and in 1774 the chancery register in Constantinople
indicates a frequent trade route between Alexandria and Constantin- 
4
ople*
But the Aiterest in Egypt would certainly have petered out 
had not an entirely new aspect of trade attracted a handful of 
speculators. The desire to open a direct route between India and
1
His name was Marion. Ibid.
2The ship was cast away on the coast of Candia on January 9, 1772.
SP 97/48.
•"wood, on.cit.. p. 166, says that the Levant Company acquiesced the 
appointment. This does not seem to be quite accurate. Maori was 
appointed in June, 1775* SP105/120, Lev* Co. to Macri, Feb. 22,
1774* The Company protested the appointment, and warned Macri that 
he had no right to act as consul. Ibid* The company also reproached 
Murray. SP 105/120, Lev. Co. to Murray, March 1, 1774*
4SP 105/1S6, Chancery Register.
Egypt via the Red Sea was far from being a new idea for adventurers
and geographers, but probably the first Englishman to become actively
interested in it was Henry Tistew, the English consul in Tripoli,
in 1698. He went through Egypt, down the Red Sea and on to Surat,
1hoping to work out a plan for English trade. But little came of 
his voyage, and the plan was temporarily laid to rest. Almost sev­
enty years later, it was taken up again with a view to having a 
regular commercial communication from India to England.
However, a major impediment stood in the way of the new route: 
the Ottoman Empire regarded the Red Sea as a Muslim lake because 
of its proximity to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. Christian 
vessels were officially not allowed to navigate in the waters that 
were carrying the pilgrims to the ha.i.i ♦ But the independence of 
the beys of Egypt from the Borte made it possible for those inter­
ested in promoting the new route to attempt direct negotations with 
the shavkh al-balad. His authority could give them permission to 
unload at Suez, and would at the same time provide for himself a 
new and unexpected source of revenue. ‘All Bey was the first ruler 
to be contacted*
The exact procedure for the negotiations does not seem to
2be very clear. It is known, however, than when James Bruce was
 ^Charles-Roux, L«Angleterre et LfEgynte au Xyill siecle. p.7*
^James Bruce (1730-1794) the Scottish explorer and Arabist. He 
was British consul in Algiers in'1763f but his real interest lay
in Egypt in 1768, ha approached ‘All Bey onlhe subject, and the 
latter encouraged the idea. He was no doubt influenced in his 
decision by the Carlo Rosetti, a Venetian merchant resident in 
Cairo, who was to prove himself one of the staunchest supporters
n
of the trade; he was also one of ‘All Bey*s advisors* hater, 
in Jedda, Bruce met with Captain Cuthbert Thornhill, an Englishman 
who traded between India and Jedda, Thornhill declared himself 
ready to embark on the new branch of trade as soon as it seemed 
safe enough* When, in 1770, the influence of <Ali Bey was extended 
to Jedda, it seemed as if the venture would soon begin. But it 
was decided that an Englishman of authority would also be needed 
to endorse the plan. It was to Warren Hastings of Bengal that
2the position of "founder and father of our cause" was offered,
Hastings approved of the venture, and remained a supporter 
despite the opposition of the Bast India Gompany. Thus, on 18
in discovering the source of the Wile, which he was convinced was 
in Ethiopia. His travels to prove this took him in 1768 to Egypt 
Prom Cairo he went to Qugayr, and then on to Jedda where he arrived 
in May 1769. He went back across the Red Sea, and then on to 
Abyssinia where he remained for two years. He returned to Cairo 
in early 1773.
1Bruce, Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile, vol. I, p.30,
^Add. Mss. 29210, f.428, "Proposals for a trade to Suez", 1773 , 
(anon.) Hoskins, British Routes to India, p.7, claims that the 
writer was Bruce.
^In 1798, after the French invasion of Egypt, he wrote to King 
George: "My official situation in India led me, many years ago,
to contemplate Egypt as affording by the position... of Suez... 
greater commercial advantages than any other land upon the globe..." 
Add. Mss. 29234* Hastings to the King, 1798, n.d.
November 1773, be addressed a letter to the Court of Birectors 
announcing the forthcoming voyage to Suez of Thornhill and two
•i
other men, Halford and Killiean. He stated that he was going 
to send a schooner to ^ accompany the merchant vessel so that it 
could survey the Red saw ^wo important outcomes of the
voyage: it would be a general improvement for commerce? and it 
would be able to provide an excellent route for dispatches to and 
from England, He asked for the Court's approval of the voyage, > 
and added that the three men were going to pay half the cost of 
the ship and all the charges at Suez. This first voyage was un­
successful, however; a violent gale destroyed the schooner, and 
■badly damagM the ship.2
In the meantime, the position of shavkh al-balad having gone 
to Muhammad Bey Abu’l Dhahab, it was necessary to obtain approval 
once again to send English ships to Sues. When Bruce returned to
Egypt in 1773, he began negotiations with the new ruler of the
3 —country. He was able to procure from the Mamiuk a ferman which
attested to the right of English merchants to unload at Suez. It 
was also arranged that English goods would be subject to 8°/o customs
 ^Egypt and the Red Sea, vol. 5 (henceforth, Egypt 5), Extract of 
Bengal Public Consultation, Nov. 18, 1773#
^Egypt 5, Extract of General Letter from Bengal, March 15, 1774.
^Egypt 5, British vice-consul in Alexandria to Court of Directors, 
Sept. 20, 1773*
1 2 duties, and have the protection of the government.
Murray sent a translation of the fermaa to London, asking
for advice on how to deal with the matter. He confessed to being
uat a loss11. He realised that in his capacity as representative
of the Levant Company he should oppose the trade, yet as British
ambassador, his duty was to protect British subjects from the anger
of the Porte. He also thought that the trade would be of great
value to the Hast India Company, but certainly detrimental to the
4Levant Company who refused tocuhear of a consul in Cairo11. O^ here
is little doubt that Murray wished to encourage this new branch
of India trade, for once again he asked the Levant Company for a
5consul in Egypt; once again, the reply was negative. Rochford, 
the secretary of state in London, had not at this time a very clear 
idea of how to act. He told Murray to caution English captains 
going to Suea to avoid any embarrassing situations, and added that 
the ambassador*s duty was always to protect British subjects in
the Ottoman Empire, whether or not the Levant and East India Com-
6panies approved.
^The duties at Jedda were usually 14°/o.
2Charles-Roux, op.eit.. pp. 38-9*
3SP 97/49, Murray to Rochford, Dec. 17, 1773.
4Ibid.
5SP 105/120.
®SP 97/58, Rochford to Murray, Reb. 25, 1774.
When the Porte learned of the new trade plans that had 
been endorsed by Abu*l Dhahab, it issued a f erman in 1774* which 
spoke of the treachery of Christians who had disguised themselves 
as merchants and who later reduced the inhabitants of the countries 
they penetrated to slavery; India was cited as an e&ample of this 
Christian infiltration. The form an also said that the same kind of 
people had recently slipped into Egypt with the encouragement of 
the beys; they had already made maps of the country and would pro­
bably return to conquer it. Warning had already been given to the 
British ambassador at the Porte that if English boats dared to go 
to Suez, their cargoes would be confiscated and the passengers im­
prisoned.
It must be noted that the Porte lad another reason for its 
adversity to the Suez trade than the principle of the sanctity of 
the Red Sea; this was founded on economic considerations. The 
trade, and consequently the customs duties, at Jedda would be ser­
iously jeopardised if English ships were to bypass it for the more 
attractive market of Suez. Since the death of ‘All Bey restored 
Ottoman influence to Jedda, the Porte and the Sharif of Mecca would 
be deprived of the steady income of dues.
The content of the ferman was transmitted to London. There
1 *Testa, Bibliotheque Diplomatique, vol. 2, p.71.
the government of Lord North^ decided that the trade must not 
he allowed to cfevelop, It took a very firm stand on this, and for­
bade English ships to go to Suez, It did not wish to defy the 
orders of the Porte, Furthermore, it bowed to the pressure of the 
Levant Company that saw any trade in the Ottoman Empire that was 
not a part of the Company as detrimental to its interests, The 
new trade threatened to compete with the Company* s factors, for 
it would certainly sell the merchandise at a much lower price 
than if it were coming from London,
TJhdaunted, Warren Hastings sent John Shaw as his represent­
ative to Cairo in 1775 to work out a written agreement with Abu1! 
Dhahab Bey, Shaw concluded a convention on < ,7: March 1775- It 
gave trading privileges to English merchant ships arriving at Suez,
and allowed for a regular system of communication with Egypt and 
2England, It granted reciprocal and completely free navigation 
and commerce .between Great Britain and Egypt in all dominions and 
provinces in India and Egypt, It also gave special immunities to 
the subjects of both countries. Ihe duties were fixed as follows; 
6 7 2 %  on Bengal and Madras goods, and 8°/o on Surat and Bombay 
goods. It is noteworthy that the agreement, which was signed by 
Muhammad Bey, ''Uthman the qadl^ of Cairo and four Silama*^   ^ -
i ■ -- ----  - - -.- i . . - ---
^Lord Worth (1752-92) was Prime Minister, 1770to\1782.
p
Ihe complete text may be found in ^esta, on. cit.. vol. 2, pp. 71-5* 
It is also to be found in Egypt 5a*
^Judge.
4 Learned m©A*
did not include a provision for its ratification by the Porte.
This agreement formed the basis of legitimacy of the trade to 
Suez for the next four years.
The Levant Company and the East India Company voiced immediate 
disapproval of the agreement. They both saw it as a threat to their 
respective monopolies. The Levant Company wanted to remain in com­
plete control of the trade in the Ottoman Empire; the East India 
Company was afraid that the goods going straight to Egypt from In­
dia would deprive it of its import duties in Londnn. Both were 
ultimately worried about the effects the new trade would have on 
their own prices; Indian goods arriving from Suez would obviously 
be much cheaper than from London, Murray disagreed with the reason­
ing of the Levant Company and saw in the Suez trade an excellent 
opportunity to boost the waning sales of British goods in the Otto­
man Empire. Hastings disagreed with the East India Company, claim­
ing the new form of trade to be of incalculable advantage; it 
would open an advantageous route for dispatches to and from England, 
and at the same time would have great commercial benefits.
Thus the renewed interest in Egypt centred around a struggle 
of two adamant and opposed points of view concerning the advantages 
and disadvantages of the Red Sea route. The beys saw it as profit­
able to their income; the Porte regarded it as a distinct and 
flagrant disregard for the sanctity of the sea that was so close 
to Medina and Mecca, as well as being harmful to the trade of Jedda.
Murray and Hastings approved of a new impetus to improve British 
trade; the Levant Company and the East India Company violently 
feared any move that endangered their respective monopolies. The 
situation was further aggravated by the position of the government 
in London, which bowed to the pressure of the Levant Company and 
forbade the trade to take place.
Two new developments in the struggle occurred almost sim­
ultaneously, and added to the confusion of the situation. The 
first was the departure of John Murray from Constantinople, and 
the arrival of a new ambassador whose viewpoint on the subject 
strongly diverged from that of his predecessor. The second was 
the arrival in Egypt of an English merchant who was firmly convinced 
of the value of the new trade, and who was to shape the activities 
of the British in Egypt for the next twenty five years.
In 1775 John Murray received permission to visit England*
On his way home he fell ill and died in the Lazaretto of Venice. 
Anthony Hayes, the consul at Smyrna, was charge d1affaires until 
Murray* s successor, Sir Robert Ainslie, arrived in Constantinople 
on 2 October 1776. The new ambassador* s policy was clearly differ­
ent from that of his predecessor in the matter of Egypt. Where 
Murray had always wished for an official representation in the 
country, Ainslie entirely disapproved of such a venture. The new 
ambassador was also extremely loathe to cause any displeasure to 
the Porte; his invariable identification with Ottoman interests
throughout his period of residence in Constantinople was to
become one of his strongest characteristics* His personality
as gleaned from his correspondence reflects a prim, righteous,
1
and meticulous official; he also had a fiery temper and an 
unforgiving nature. His stand against any form of British pene­
tration into Egypt, more especially when it concerned the India
/
trade, remained apart of his thought and work until the end
/
of his stay in the Ottoman Empire.
Almost concurrently with the announcement of Ainslie’s 
appointment to Constantinople in September 1775, another English­
man with a totally different viewpoint had ;}ust arrived in Cairo 
with the intention of settling there. George Baldwin was bom 
in 1745, the son of a London hop merchant. Little is known of 
his life until 1760 when he sailed to Cyprus as a merchant. Three 
years later, he moved to Acre where he remained until 1767- Dur­
ing his years in Acre, he travelled up and down the Syrian coast, 
buying and selling silk. His early travels in the Levant acquainted 
him with the political structure of the area, and awakened in his 
mind ideas of the commercial potential it held, especially if it 
could be made to serve as a link with the lucrative Indian market.
i
Choiseul-Gouffier, the French ambassador in Constantinople, 
horrifiedly reported one incident in which Ainslie attacked 
his personal secretary so violently in a fit of anger that 
he almost strangled the unfortunate man, Gorr. Pol., Turquie,
176, Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, June 22, 1788.
The possibility of exchange between, the produce of Syria and 
Egypt, with all the richesdthey brought from neighbouring countries, 
and the wealth of the India market began to appeal to him.
It was with this idea in mind that he returned to England, 
and applied for leave to go to India as a free mariner. He wanted 
to explore the possibilities of a connection between India and 
Egypt. But as he was preparing to leave, he received word of the 
death of his brother, William Baldwin, British consul in Cyprus.
He went instead to the island to clear his brother*s effects. While 
there, he was asked to become the new consul; he accepted the 
position and remained in Cyprus until 1771* But he did not relin­
quish his earlier plans to explore a possible trade route through 
Egypt. It is perhaps significant that since the books of the Cairo 
consulate had been sent to Cyprus, Baldwin was provided with ample 
opportunity to acquaint himself with the conditions and general 
state of trade in Egypt. Furthermore, he had, engaged in the silk 
trade with Constantine Maori, and probably learned a good deal 
about Egyptian affairs from him.
In the middle of 1775, he went to Cairo where he managed to 
have an interview with Muhammad Bey Abu*l Dhahab. It has already 
been stated that the Shavkh al-Balad gave Bruce his approval of 
the Red Sea trade; to Baldwin he repeated the encouragement, and 
said: "If you bring the India ships to Suez, I will lay an aeque-
27.
duct from the Kile to Suez, and you shall drink of the Kile 
X
water." Baldwin wished to go to Suez then, hut it was the wrong 
season for a journey to India. Instead he decided to go to Con­
stantinople in order to let Murray know of his plans. The am­
bassador unhesitatingly approved of Baldwin's plans, and so did
2"everybody in the mercantile order of men".
In March 1774, Baldwin returned to Egypt, and this time 
went to Suez. There he waited in vain for thirty days to find a 
local vessel to carry him to Jedda. Greatly disappointed, and 
bitterly realising it would be easier to go to India by way of 
England, he decided to turn back. The hai.i was passing by Suez 
bn its return from Mecca at the time, so Baldwin mounted a camel 
and accompanied it to Cairo. From there he returned to England, 
convinced of the failure of his plans. But shortly after his ar* 
rival in London, he heard of the conclusion of the March 1775 agree­
ment with Abu*l Dhahab. He immediately changed his plans, and de­
cided to leave for Egypt as soon as possible. He freighted a 
ship, and set sail; he reached Alexandria in July 1775.
Before leaving England, he wrote to the Court of Directors 
of the East India Company, informing them of his plans to live in 
Cairo, and offering to be their agent there. They accepted the offer,
Baldwin, Political Recollections (henceforth, Pol. Rec.), p.4. 
2Ibid..
28.
and granted him a small salary. Another contact he made before 
sailing was of a different order. The University of Oxford com­
missioned him to collect manuscripts and information about the 
Syriac and Coptic languages and how they related to any Indian 
language.^
Baldwin had had considerable commercial experience before
he settled in the Levant. He claimed to have traded in all the
2
cities of Europe, as well as having been involved in the Levant 
trade. He therefore was able to argue on logical and rational 
terms to fellow merchants and officials regarding the values of 
the Bed Sea venture. To begin with, he argued that the insecurity 
Englishmen had previously encountered in Egypt would disappear 
once the Beys were assured of a regular addition to their income. 
Furthermore, he pointed out the fact that the India goods which
r?D _
were being sold in Jedda had a much better market in Cairo. if 
these were not reasons enough to encourage the new form of trade, 
Baldwin presented yet another argument; fortunes that had been made 
in India would seriously endanger the economy if they were trans­
mitted in bullion ±o England. If the men concerned invested their
1This he did assiduously, for be later sent seven volumes of philo­
sophical and moral writings of the languages to Hastings. Add.
Mss. 29198, Substance of George Baldwin's letters from Cairo, Dec. 
15, 1775.
2
Add. Mss. 29210, f.422, "A view of the advantages and the practi­
cability of carrying on a trade by the navigation of tie Red Sea 




money in the Red Sea venture, they would be able to transfer 
their fortunes to Europe, for the money they would earn in Egypt 
would be paid to them in Leghorn or Marseilles.
* Baldwin’s first efforts in Egypt were concerned with set­
ting up a direct form of trade to England. In this he claimed 
to have "succeeded very prosperously"He was at the same time 
actively engaged in encouraging the Red Sea trade by appointing 
agents in Smyrna and Constantinople, and collecting capital from 
India and other places.
Although Baldwin in 1775 was primarily a merchant, and a 
very ambitious one at that, he was able to foresee the political 
advantages of opening the Red Sea to British navigation. The 
voyage from London to India around the Cape took about five months 
via Suez it would be a little over two months. Thus any communi­
cation would be sizeably reduced on the "overland" route to India. 
Furthermore, Baldwin, in an astonishing display of political in­
tuition, was able to see the strategic value of Egypt when few 
Englishmen were concerned with it; he realised the valuable link 
it provided with India, especially at the crucial time when France 
and England were fiercely competing with one another. But unfoiv 
tunately his political thought had not crystallised beyond the
^Baldwin, Pol. Rec.. p. 6*
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point where it could be used to strengthen his arguments to 
promote the new trade; consequently his opinions were disre­
garded, most especially by Ainslie, as being those of a profit­
eering merchant. It was his position as a trader that tended 
to destroy any political argument he put forward, for it was 
then only regarded as a means to further commercial benefits,
Ainslie was firmly convinced of Baldwin* s cupidity, and 
at no time was he willing to swerve from this manner of thinking. 
Baldwin was genuinely perplexed at the attitude the ambassador 
seemed to take on matters that should have pleased 1 him enormously. 
The tension between the two men began to grow; enforced polite­
ness gave way at first to bitter sarcasm and finally to open 
enmity. The characters of the two men further aggravated’ the 
tension. Baldwin* s impetuous and often childlike enthusiasm did 
not appeal to the orderly and rational Ainslie/; Baldwin was un­
ashamedly eager to make money, and Ainslie was most disdainful 
of this; Baldwin took an extraordinary and very vital interest 
in everything around him,whereas the ambassador preferred to con­
fine his energy for a few well-defined matters; Baldwin very soon 
adapted himself to the soeiety he was living in, learning to speak 
Arabic and expressing himself in the manner best suited to his 
environment; Ainslie, because of the responsibility of his posi­
tion, remained acutely aware of his rdle and the dignity that went 
with it. The only common point between the two men was their aware-
ness of the French threat for preponderance in the Ottoman Empire*
England and France, as the main economic powers of Europe, 
had been in constant competition for colonial expansion since the 
beginning of the eighteenth c entury. Their main centres of inter-
't
est in the first half o f the century had been India and North 
America. But Clive’s victories in India, and the Declaration of 
Independence of the thirteen .American colonies caused a change 
in the field of rivalry; the first established British dominance 
in the north-east coast of India and paved the way for further 
British penetration of the country, and the second proved to be 
an indirect victory for France and a major set-back for Britain. 
With the future development of these two areas definitely ensured 
by the latter part of the century, Britain and France turned their 
attention to the Ottoman E&npire.
The power and prestige of the Ottoman Empire had begun to 
wane after the Treaty of Carlowits in 1699. The authority of 
the Sultan had also weakened considerably, and the Porte became 
vulnerable to the intricacies of foreign pressure. A marked rise 
in European power within the Empire was first brought to light in 
the Treaty of KttchUk Kaynarga signed in 1774 following the Russo- 
Turkish War of 1768-1774* The treaty accorded Russia the navi­
gation of the Black S©a, as well as a certain access to the inter­
nal affairs of the Empire. France showed great interest in the 
possibility of sharing Russia’s influence in the Empire, especially
since it could claim long cultural, religious, and economic ties 
with the Levant.
The thriving merchant communities in Egypt have already 
been mentioned; they provided an impetus to political consider­
ations regarding the value of the country. The French were aware 
of the importance of Egypt first as a means of checking British 
growth in India, and second as an invaluable source of wealth 
in itself. As far back as the reign of Louis XIV, they had at­
tempted political negotiations in.Constantinople to open the Red 
Sea to French shipping; in 1665 and 1669 missions were sent from 
Paris to attempt to cnnvince the Porte of this. When the missions 
failed, it was decided to have direct talks with the Pasha of 
Egypt; in 1674, Nointel, the French ambassador to Constantinople, 
was on his way to Cairo to do this, but was stopped in Jerusalem 
and never reached his destination. In 1685, yet another mission 
was concerned with a proposal to open a canal in Egypt that would
i
connect the Mediterranean with the Red Sea.
Ainslie and Baldwin were both aware of the growing threat 
of France; the former was acutely conscious of its presence in 
the Eapire as a whole, the latter most specifically with its ris­
ing preponderance in Egypt. Both men realised that it was neces­
sary for Britain to counteract French development, but needless to
1Charles-Roux, op.cit.. p.10.
say, they disagreed on the methods to do this. Ainslie, view­
ing the situation from a greater perspective, believed that 
the wisest course open to him was to maintain the status quo 
of the position of the Sultan and the Porte, thereby assuring 
a check on any foreign pressure. Baldwin, on the other hand, 
was very closely involved with his French rivals; he believed 
it was his duty as the only Englishman in Egypt, to emulate every 
action, of the French, no matter how it undermined the position 
of the pasha in the Citadel, so he could gain equal advantages 
for Britain whenever possible.
The odds against which he was fighting were often far too 
much for him to cope with. let,'despite the many defeats he suf­
fered during his residence in Egypt, he seemed to have a remark­
able resilience. It was this quality that carried him through 
the difficult years when he was desperately hoping for official 
British recognition of his efforts and ideas; it was this ability 
to remain undaunted by all the enmity that grew around him that 
became one of the strongest features that characterised British 
activity in Egypt from 1775 to 1798*
Chapter 1
BALDWIN’S FIRST PERIOD OF RESIDENCE:
1775 -1779
When he arrived in July 1775 for his first period of resi­
dence in Egypt, Baldwin was the only English merchant in the
country. He had already acquired the freedom of the Levant Com- 
1
pany, and immediately set about trying to establish what he later 
termed a prosperous trade between England and Egypt, The East 
India Company had named him their agent for the purpose of aiding 
the dispatch route from Suez to Alexandria, so he took it upon 
himself to act as an unofficial consul for his countrymen who were 
passing through Egypt, He also took advantage of his position 
to contact merchants in Bombay, Constantinople, Smyrna and London 
for the sale of India goods coming to Suez,
His involvements were almost too many and complicated for 
one man alone. His position as sole English merchant caused him 
much trouble amongst the rival European traders who stood together 
in national blocks; his unprotected political status was abused 
by the Customs Master who constantly extorted large and exorbitant 
sums of money from him; his involvement in the Red Sea trade 
brought on the anger in turn of the Porte, the British ambassador,
4
SP 105/170, Governor to Humphreys, March 14, 1775*
the Levant Company and the East India Company. Thus his ambitions 
for personal gain overshadowed his serious efforts to encourage 
an efficient dispatch route from the East Indies to London; his 
far-reaching political insight was overlooked in the face of his 
determined trade. Moreover, his recognition of the strategic im­
portance of the country in which he lived was totally disregarded 
by Robert Ainslie, the ambassador, who clearly distrusted Baldwin.
The “Swallow” incident
He remained in Egypt, except for a brief visit to Constantin­
ople in 1778, until 1779* Of the first year of his residence, 
little is known except that he was engaged in his private commercial 
activity. The first political incident in which he was directly 
implicated occurred at the beginning of 1777.
On 5 January 1777, the “Swallow” sloop arrived in Suez from
Madras with three passengers who had urgent dispatches for the
1King’s ministers and the Court of Directors in London. The pass­
engers were Dalrymple, Capper, and Light on. , They brought news of
p
the revolution in Madras, and of the deposition of Lord Pigot.
Capper carried letters from the men who had replaced Pigot* s admini-
^SP 97/55, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), Jan. 22, 1777.
2Sir George Pigot (1719-1777) was Governor of Madras. His own 
council turned ag&inst him becauee he wished to restore the ruler 
of Tanjore. He was arrested, and later died in prison.
stration; Dighton had dispatches from the nawab who favoured 
the new government; and Dalrymple, who had been deposed, had 
his own as well as Pigot*s vindications.
When Ibrahim Bey, the shavkh al-balad. heardd of the im­
pending arrival of the vessel, he decided to allow it in, despite 
the ferman of 1774* Two days later, Baldwin visited him, and re­
ceived further letters of recommendation for the passengers;
Ibrahim also sent his own dromedaries to bring them to Cairo.
But the Pasha, Muhammad <Iazat, gave orders that seals be placed 
on the luggage of the Englishmen at Suez.
The men made their way to Cairo where they stayed at Bald­
win* s house. It had been raining, and by the time they were in 
the house, they were so wet and uncomfortable that they decided to 
break upon the sealed luggage. Local suspicion was by now aroused, 
especially as the men seemed in a great hurry to continue their 
journey, having claimed that they were not carrying any merchandise. 
As the men were preparing to leave Cairo to make their way to 
Alexandria, they received orders that Ibrahim wished to see them.
The interview was cordial enough. 3?hey were served coffee, 
asked about world news in general, gently reproached for not stay­
ing longer in Egypt, and then finally dismissed. In the meantime, 
Baldwin was made tovunderstand that the Bey was angry because he 
had received no thanks for the civility shown the men from India. 
After much deliberation, they agreed to buy Ibrahim a present; per-
mission was then granted them to depart.
But more impediments stood in the way. After the interview, 
Ibrahim had been told by his advisers that the Englishmen had 
come from diamond country and must have been smuggling untold 
treasures in their baggage. The Pasha was very angry that the 
seals he had ordered, to be put on the luggage had been opened with­
out his permission. So the Bey sent his officers to inspect the 
effects of the Englishmen, in spite of the fact that they produced 
a letter of introduction from the Hawab of Arcot. To add insult 
to injury, the dispatches addressed to the King and his ministers 
were opened &hd read.
Baldwin was helpless in any effort to defend his country­
men since he had no official title whatsoever. He was able to 
procure the r el ease of the three men when the Egyptians were finally 
convinced there was no hidden booty; he then assisted in their de­
parture from the country on 24 January.
He protested in very strong terms to Ainslie. Dispatches 
addressed to the King of England had been opened, and Englishmen 
had been put to an unfair ordeal out of which the only escape had 
beeen “presents” to officials.
On 28 February, the Ambassador accordingly presented a Memorial
1 2 to the Grand Vezir complaining of the incident. The Reis -Effendi
^SP 97/55, Ainslie to Weymouth, March 4, 1777. 
2
The Ottoman equivalent of a Foreign Minister.
answered by giving the strongest assurances that he would punish 
the offenders and return all confiscated articles to the Am­
bassador, but confidentially admitted to the anarchic conditions 
of Egypt and the minimal influence o f the Porte there.
An imperial command was issued, however, in March, and an
1
officer was sent to Egypt to discipline the responsible officials.
Ainslie did not see fit to ask the Grand Vezir f<x an official apology;
he could not find a precedent for such a case, and was obviously
uneasy about possible repercussions.
Throughout the “Swallow11 crisis, Ainslie behaved with great
propriety, cautioning Baldwin about the illegality of the Red Sea
trade, yet firm with the Porte about the indignities suffered by
Englishmen. He was careful, however, not to aggravate the Ottoman
officials, convinced that neither the English nor the French capi-
2
tulations allowed for navigation in the Red Sea. He was anxious 
for England to retain its growing strength in the Ottoman Empire 
in spite of the subversive foreign elements at work to destroy it.
He sent a verbal message to the Reis Efendi stating his 
personal uneasiness about the fact that ships flying the English 
flag as a flag of convenience for Ottoman subjects, namely Greeks
^The Command was issued to ‘izzat Muhammad Pasha, the Governor of 
Cairo, and to the shavkh al-balad and all the beys. SP 97/55*
BP 97/55f Ainslie to Baldwin (copy), March 14, 1777. Ainslie was 
to admit French rights of navigation later.
and Armenians, were continuing to arrive at Suez* The Reis Efendi
sent back a ucivil message11, and the next day a Memorial addressed
1io Ainslie arrived.
The trade to Suez was condemned as obstructive to the holy 
route of Medina and Mecca. Other reasons for the banning of the
p
route were attributed to the danger due to the "TJrianu tribes 
(numbering over one hundred thousand men) whose hostility to the 
Franks the Ottoman Etapire would ultimately be responsible for; also, 
the income of Jedda would be affected since the Sharif of Mecca was 
totally dependent on it.
Reactions to the use of the Red Sea route
3
By now there were five English ships at Suez. They had 
arrived around 22 March, and had come from two different areas of 
the East Indies. They were rich in merchandise: the first vessel
carried 650 bales of muslin; the second, tie seme, valued at 150,000
4
piastres; the third brought goods for merchants of Philopoppoli;
5
the fourth and fifth had unspecified "India goods". A sixth ship
^SP 97/531 Translation enclosed in Ainslie to Weymouth, May 17, 1777. 
S^ee Appendix I for complete text.
A corruption of the word *urban. i.e. nomads.
3The Memorial claimed to have knowledge of only three, but further 
notice from Egypt reported more.
4
The modern town of Plovdiv .
^SP 97/539 Letter from Egypt to Ainslie, enclosed in his to Weymouth 
(May 3f 1777) n.d. Information attributed to Khalil Aga, a Turkish 
merchant.
was expected. The cargo had been allowed to be landed, although 
the Pasha asked for a 20°/o tax in order to discourage more ships 
from arriving.
Whenihe vessels arrived, Baldwin was called up to the 
Citadel of Cairo to see the Pasha who reminded him of the Porte* s 
command to force back Prank ships to Jedda. Baldwin firmly in­
sisted that no command could force back English ships, so a ferman 
should be issued allowing the cargo to be unloaded. When the Pasha 
resisted, Baldwin used the best argument available to convince him: 
he told him the value of the merchandise, '*... which proved the 
most powerful argument..." The Pasha issued the ferman. and agreed 
to do so for successive vessels.
3Ainslie sent a copy of the Porte *s Memorial to Weymouth 
and asked him for advice in how to deal with it. The answer was 
definite. The Court of Directors had already sent out orders to the 
presidencies forbidding trade beyond Mukha and Jedda; the Ambassador 
was told to be firm in discouraging the illicit traders. Since there 
would not be sufficient time to warn the merchants, Weymouth asked 
Ainslie to have the Porte allow the ships in the Red Sea until 1 May
1The official residence of the Pasha.
2SP 97/53, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), Aug. 10, 1777.
Thomas Thynne, 3rd Viscount Weymouth, 1st Marquis of Bath (1734- 
1796). Prom 1768 to 1770 he was Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department, and was "succeeded by Rochford. In November 1775, he 
was re-appointed to the same position. In March 1779, he was also 
Secretary for the Northern Department. He resigned the latter 
position in October of the same year, and the former in November.
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11788* But the dispatch route had to remain open at all costs.
Consequently, Ainslie addressed a Memorial to the Grand 
2
Vesir on 26 August.* ’ although he realised the great difficulty 
in obtaining a pass for packet boats with dispatches. The answer 
was long in coming, because, as the Reis Efendi told the dragoman 
of the Ambassador, there were more important affairs at the Porte 
to be discussed.
But the real reason for the delay, as Ainslie realised, 
was different; the Porte was hesitant about any commitments vis- 
a-vis Egypt, especially as a revolution in Cairo was in progress, 
and its outcome was still unclear. The fighting amongst the Beys 
during which Isma‘il successfully claimed Ibrabdmfs position had 
great potential for the Ottomans; the disorder would ultimately 
weaken the Egyptians and give more power to the Pasha in Cairo.
The British Ambassador feared, however, that if the Ottoman govern­
ment in Egypt were to be strengthened, the Porte would be over- 
generous in its permission of English ships to go through the Red 
Sea, after which other countries would clamour for the same right, 
and then there would be no effective stop to the trade being resumed.
The reply to the Memorial was put off for so long that the 
Ambassador contemplated seeking an audience with the Grand Vezir,
1SP 97/53* Weymouth to Ainslie, July 11, 1777*
^SP 97/53* Translation of memorial to the Grand Vizier, Aug. 26, 
1777.
%he fighting had started when Murad Bey deliberately incited
especially since a number of verbal messages to the Reis Efendi 
seemed to have been of no avail*1 Ramadan was first given as 
an excuse for the delay; later, it was that the Divan would 
have to decide on the problem, and it was at present occupied 
with other affairs.
The answer finally arrived on 30 November. The Porte could 
not allow free passage for English dispatches, but "*.. that when­
soever it shall be necessary to send any person from the Coasts 
of India with dispatches of importance for the English Court, on 
the messenger* s arrival at the port of Judda, the Pashaw of that 
place shall take care to send him with his dispatches Suez
on board some Turkish vessel trading to that Port, where the Custom 
Master and the other officers shall be careful to forward him on
2
his way either to Cairo, or to wherever else he may be going.*.1 
The Grand Yezir at the same time informed the Pasha in Cairo of 
the agreement reached with Ainslie regarding English ships coming 
from India; these vessels were forbidden to go to Sues. Mention
Isma^Il to great anger by having a barge full of grain consigned 
to the latter stolen. 0nl4 Jumada II 1191/20 July 1777, Isma‘il, 
after a futile attempt to resolve his differences with Murad 
in a peaceful manner, was obliged to leave his home when he heard 
of a plot against him. The mamluks immediately split into two 
warring groups, one around Isma/ll, the other around Ibrahim and 
Murad. On 20^Jumada Il/26 July, Isma‘il emerged victorious;
Murad andlbrahim were consequently forced to flee to Upper Egypt. ^ 
On 22 Jumada li/28 July, Isma*il was named shavkh al-balad. Jabarti, 
‘Aiafib al-Athar. vol. 2, pp. 10-13.
1SP 97/53, Ainslie to Weymouth, Oct. 3, 1777.
2E*gypt 5, Translation of the Porte*s answer to... Memorial of 
August 26, 1777.
was not made of all Frank boats? the;;reference specifically in—
dicated those of the English.^
But there was no mention of permission to navigate until
May 1778, so once again Ainslie applied to the Reis Efendi. this
time threatening to go to the Grand Vezir if his request were rot
granted. He was finally promised that u... all ships belonging
to His Majesty*s subjects, who arrive at Sues, mtil the end of
2next summer will be permitted to enter there...* The orders 
sent to Egypt could not be revoked; they would( therefore only 
be suspended for the time being.
Ainslie* s position from the beginning was clears he was 
definitely hostile to Red Sea traffic. When he arrived in Con­
stantinople in October 1776, he saw that Anthony Hayes, the charge 
d*affaires, had already received complaints from the Reis Efendi 
concerning British ships at Suez. Hayes had made some attempts 
to argue the question, but actually did little more than report 
the prevailing attitudes to Weymouth.
The Ambassador*s antagonism to the trade route was based 
on a number of considerations. Probably the mo&t significant was 
the realisation of the critical position it would place the Levant 
Company in, whose trade was at a low ebb and to whom he felt ulti-
1SP 97/54, Translation of letter from Grand Vizier Derendeli 
Mehemet Pasha to the Governor of Cairo (Italian), Dec. 21, 1777. 
It distinctly refers to navliinglesi.
i
2SP 97/53, Ainslie to Weymouth, Dec. 17, 1777.
mately responsible. Ho less important was the desire to maintain
and encourage the ascendancy of Anglo-Turkish relations which
Ainslie felt he had done much to improve; he knew there would not
be ’’people wanting” who would take advantage of any situation to
set the Porte against England, and so wanted to weigh every measure 
1carefully. He also feared to incur the wrath cf the rival East 
India Company which coMemned the trade as injurious to its own 
market. Finally, he was not anxious to place the affairs of a 
country so remote and so politically anarchic as Egypt under the 
aegis of his Embassy.
The India products that were being sold in the Ottoman Empire 
by the Red Sea ’’adventurers” seriously jeopardized the Levant Com­
pany. It depended very much on the export of the same goods from 
England to the different parts of the Empire; if the illicit trade 
were to continue, sales would diminish in size, and prices would 
have to be lowered competitively. Furthermore, since the merchants 
who conducted this trade were not freemen, they were able to evade 
the duties the Company levied on goods that were consigned for sale 
to its factors. The Governor of the Company was also anxious to 
avoid the anger of the Porte, a natural consequence to the persist­
ent trade, since the factors would be subject to countless hindrances 
in their commercial and personal lives.
1SP 97/53, Ainslie to Weymouth, May 17, 1777
45.
Opposition to the re-establishment of a British consulate
The Levant Company had had no official ...representation in 
1Egypt since 1757 because of the uncertain political situation,
and the exorbitant avanias levied on English traders. A few
merchants continued to inhabit the country, however, for in 1775
John Hurray appointed Constantine Macri as Consul in Alexandria.
The Company protested against the appointment despite Murray’s
determination, and disclaimed all responsibility and interest in 
2Egypt. Contrary to his predecessor, Ainslie saw no reason to 
revive the posiiaon and pointedly ignored mentioning the existence 
of Baldwin to the Company. Confident of the latter1 s viewpoint, 
he was able to assure Baldwin that if he could convince London
3of the importance of a consulate in Egypt, he would "gladly concur".
Erom the beginning, Ainslie seemed to have taken a dislike 
to Baldwin’s authoritative and often presumptuous tone. Aside 
from the obvious disapproval of the merchant’s activities, he showed 
a marked distrust of Baldwin that he often scarcely disguised. The 
Ambassador’s letters to the latter were always written in a very 
sarcastic, aloof fashion, not characteristic of his otherwise dip­
lomatic writings.^ He half-heartedly offered to protect Baldwin
1
In 1754, it ordered the closing of the consulate in Cairo. But it was not 
until 1757 that the Consul left Egypt. Wood, op.cit.. p.166.
2SP 105/120, Company to Murray, Aug. 17, 1773* Also, ibid.,
March 1, 1774.
5SP 97/55, Ainslie to Baldwin (copy), Jan. 27, 1778.
An example of the Ambassador's almost hypocritical attitude is
when the latter asked for it, hut quickly and sharply censured 
him when reports of a conversation with the ^ asha of Cairo 
reached Constantinople in which the merchant had referred to 
himself as the British Consul.'*'
Since the establishment of a consulate in Cairo was un­
necessary to the Ambassador, he did not concern himself with the 
subject beyond the realisation th$t a paid agent there would be
able to keep him informed of local events. For this purpose he 
2
employed Brandi of Alexandria despite Baldwin’s repeated offers 
for the same services. But Baldwin felt the strong necessity for 
an official British delegation in Egypt. He was not beyond re­
cognising the political importance of such an estalishment; how­
ever, it was not until a later date that he formed a definite opin­
ion of the strategic position of the country he was living in. His 
motives at first were to a large extent personal and based on com­
mercial considerations.
One of the main stumbling blocks to his practice as a merchant 
in Cairo was the tyranny of the Chief Customs Officer, An tun Kassls
seen when, writing to a third person, he referred to the Consul 
in Smyrna, to whom he addressed himself with great respect, as 
”a dirty fellow, ... over-run with the vice of this country11.
FO 261/3, Ainslie to Keith, July 3, 1777.
1Baldwin assured Ainslie that the Pasha misunderstood; he had merefcr 
mentioned his consulship in Cyprus.
2An Italian tailor who, lived in, tjde. former Bnglish factory in 
Alexandria, and who occasionally acted as agent for the British.
Fir‘awn, who apparently had been designated by John Murray to
act as protector to the English traders.3" He obviously took
great advantage of thi^position, acting in a most ’’unfair and
tyrannical way” towards Baldwin and those members of the Levant
2Company that traded with him.
Baldwin asked Ainslie more than once to relieve Fir4 awn 
of his functions as protector. The Customs official insisted that 
the British Ambassador alone could ask him to discontinue his ser­
vices since it was a British Ambassador who requested and author­
ized these duties* Ainslie refused to do anything without first 
consulting the Levant Company, since there must have been a good 
reason for the arrangement. He was reluctant to admit that Bald­
win had any authority, for, while he wrote to Fir4awn at intervals, 
requesting the alleviation of certain taxes, he did not mention 
the Customs Master’s protective rights. Baldwin continued to 
insist that someone else be granted the privilege of ^ritish pro­
tector in Egypt, for Fir‘awn was a ruthless and uncooperative 
official whom Ainslie would never be able to censure. uIf he takes 
the least disgust, he excites people to disputes, and judges of them
There is no evidence today of a letter Murray might have written 
Fir‘awn.
^SP 9l/53f Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), Jan. 22, 1777.
^FO 261/3, Ainslie to Kassis (Italian), Jan. 27, 1778• Fir‘awn 
was referred to as ICassis by Baldwin and Ainslie.
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himself,”1 His representative in Alexandria was even worse, 
extorting extraordinary amounts from the English captains, The 
only person one could complain to would he his superior in Cairo; 
in short, the situation was intolerable.
Thus Baldwin was made to suffer a great deal which he was 
willing to put up with not, as he said, because of his ”tameness 
or degeneracy of spirit”, but to prove his ability to stand in 
opposition to those who disapproved of English trade in Egypt,
If his commercial activity were able to prosper under such difficult 
conditions, it would undoubtedly thrive if it were properly sup­
ported, So he resigned himself to the fact that with patience
21 must give up my freedom to a Creek”.
But his spirit remained undaunted. ”1 shall go on in the 
same prudential line that I have adopted from the beginning, and 
at my retreat give up the establishment to the most fallacious 
notion that ever was conceived: of the impossibility of est&blish-
ing an advantageous commercial intercourse with Egypt,”
97/53, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), June 24, 1777.
2 iIbid, The reference to Pir awn as a ”Greek” was inaccurate; 




Baldwin* s-Relationship with the Bast India Company
Aside from the opposition of the Levant Company and Ainslie, 
Baldwin also faced that of the Bast India Company. The latter 
regarded the Red Sea trade as a hindrance to its monopoly on India 
p370ducts. It also deplored the fact that many of the Red Sea 
merchants were not members of the Company, and were often not even 
Englishmen, but Greeks or Armenians. It realized the efficiency 
of the route for the expedition of dispatches, however, and Bald­
win* s only appointment was as agent for the purpose of assisting 
the messengers between Suez and Alexandria.
Baldwin* s relationship with the Bast India Company was highly 
complicated and most unclear. His appointment as agent was never 
properly defined; instructions were confusing and often ambiguous. 
Baldwin, eager to win the acclaim of at least one body of officials, 
did his utmost to serve the Company, very often at great personal 
effort and expense. And for a long time, his efforts seemed to 
pass unnoticed and unremunerated.
Tfflien he was preparing for hi^departure for Egypt in 1775, 
he was asked by the Company to act as an agent to forward packets 
to and from England. For the reimbursement of expenses, the Com­
pany told Baldwin it would *'... thankfully discharge to your order
1such small expence as may be thereby incurred...'*
 ^Egypt 5, Secretary to Baldwin, May 25, 1775.
1In 1776, he was referred to as Consul at Cairo11, and later
reprimanded because hehad demanded reimbursement; he was told 
it was 11... the practice here to account annually for disburse­
ments made ... and that it will be acceptable to the Ccurt to con-
2tinue such method,.. Baldwin continued to aid the dispatch 
route with great enthusiasm although the Court of Birectors did 
not seem deeply appreciative. The first major clash between the 
two occurred in the latter part of 1777.
A packet of letters from London arrived ±i Egypt with a de­
livery note indicating it should go on the “Swallow11 by express 
delivery. If thediip was not at Suez, and was still in the Red 
Sea, Baldwin was instructed to follow the vessel and ensure the
speeder arrival of the dispatches since they were of great import-
■5
ance and very urgent* If the “Swallow11 was not at all available, 
the packet had to be returned to London.
The “Swallow11 had left Suez by the time the dispatches ar­
rived, and could not be followed in the Red Sea. Baldwin therefore
4took it upon himself to hire a boat at considerable expense and 
send it to India, since he felt the information contained in the
A
Egypt 59 East India H0use to Baldwin, Sept. 6, 1776.
2Xbid., Nov. 26, 1776.
3rbid., April 1, 1777.
The cost was 18,000 Turkish dollars, at the rate of 2s. 6d./dollar.
The total amount that Baldwin paid was about £4,500. Ibid.. Sept. 
19, 1777.
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dispatches concerning the reinstatement of Lord Pigot was 
vitally urgent. The Company was angry; not only did it refuse 
to pay for the vessel, but it also admonished Baldwin; it for­
bade him "... entering into any such engagements on behalf of
1
the Company without special orders'*.
There is no doubt that the Company had not authorized 
Baldwin to take such measures as he saw fit for the expediency 
of the dispatch route. He had previously asked under what cir­
cumstances he could send special messengers with urgent letters; 
he was told that when the letters were going to India, the Court
of Directors would inform him what to do, and when they were
p
going to England, he was to decide for himself. The "Swallow" 
case obviously came under the former stipulation, and the Court 
of Directors was unsympathetic to his petitions and justifications, 
refusing to reimburse him for the expenses incurred.
This was to be the first in a long series of disputes on 
the question of Baldwin's remuneration. His salary was never 
clearly fixed in advance, and whenever he presented his list of 
expenses, it was invariably disputed and finallycut down. Hot 
only were the actual fees debated, but also the basis for the rate 
of exchange by which he ms to be paid. The Turkish dollar was
1Xbid.
2Xbid.. April 1, 1777
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1valued at 2s. 2d. to 2s. 6d* in the Ottoman Empire, but the 
Court of Directors decided it would pay Baldwin at the London 
rate of 5s. to the dollar. This was especially infuriating to 
Baldwin since he knew that the Consul (Abbott) in Aleppo was
i 2being reimbursed at the local rate of exchange. v’^In June 1778 
he informed the Court that unless an adequate rate of exchange 
could be agreed upon, he would be obliged to discontinue his 
services.
In November 1777, he was asked to forward packets to the 
Commander of the "Terrible Bomb" which was anchored at Sues, and, 
a week later, to help John Whitehill, a member of the Council of 
the Presidency of Port St. George, and his companion John Bpynton, 
in their hasty trip from Cairo to Suez in order to catchup with 
the "Terrible Bomb". Baldwin did so willingly, and asked for 
£1,154. 16s. 6d. as the costs of these services. The Court of
3
Directors allowed only £600 to his solicitors.
Baldwin's great chance to prove himself and win recognition 
from the East India Company as well as from all those who were 
opposed to his establishment in Egypt, came in 1778. His use of
 ^Egypt 5, Richard Willis to Sir George Wombell, Sept. 16, 1778.
p
Egypt 5f Humble Petition to the Court of Directors from Baldwin, 
April 23, 1783.
3
Egypt 5, Extracts of minutes of the Court of Directors respecting 
Mr. Baldwin, Dec. 10, 1777.
the Red Sea route to send news to India of Anglo-French hosti­
lities gave the British a head-start on the war that ended in
1the successful siege of Pondicherry in September, 1778.
Baldwin first heard of the Anglo-French rupture from Ainslie in
Hay. He dutifully called together ail the Shglisbmen who were in 
2
Gairo and read the Ambassador* s letter to them. His immediate re­
action after that was to seek a quick method to convey the news to 
India* A private ship, the "Expedition11, was anchored at Sues, so he 
asked its Commander, Captain Pruen, to delay departure for Bombay un­
til further letters from abroad would confirm the news. The informa­
tion was so Important that, to ensure its safe arrival in India, he 
also enterprisingly sent another ship with more evidence on 14 May 
to Hadras and Bengal. Baldwin assiduously collected as much docu-
-•V
mentation as possible to send on these vessels, including:
a) a dispatch from a Venetian captain who had been 
in Korea where he met a Frenchman who had been 
sent by the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles to 
inform French consuls of the impending war.
1SP 97/54, Gov. Eumboia to Ainslie (copy), Nov. 1, 1778.
2
Baldwin did not mention who these Englishman were; it may be assumed
that they were captains and members of the crew of ships anchored in
Egypt. There is evidence, however, of two men who were living there
at the time. Captain Jones, who had assumed the name of Robert Robin­
son, and who had served in the army of Muhammad Bey Abu'l Dhahab with 
another Englishman, Peter Harvey, was in Cairo in 1775. SP 97/51, Hayes
to Rochford, Aug. 17, 1775. He was still there in 1777 when Irwin (see pp.
J5.2-3) visited it, Irwin, Series of Adventures, vol. 2, pp. 67-8. The 
second man was John Antes who lived in Cairo from 1770-1782. A mer­
chant who called himself an Englishman, Antes was actually "German",
since his mother tongue was German. See John Antes. Observations on
the manners and customs of the Egyptians.
b) a dispatch from Brandi of Alexandria, who con­
firmed the presence of a Frenchman on a similar 
mission in that city,
c) a letter from Leghorn, dated 9 April 1778, 
that spoke of the Franco-American alliance.
d) several accounts that Baldwin had heard from 
French merchants in Cairo of the hostile detention 
of British ships in ^ rench ports, and of the recall 
of Ambassadors from Paris and London.*1*
When Captain Barrington of the ketch "Nancy" asked for re­
muneration in India, he was refused. He returned to Cairo, pre­
sumably to petition Baldwin for payment, but was unfortunately 
killed in an undisclosed "foul" way.
In June, Captain Richard Matthews of the Secret Committee 
of the East India Company landed ii Alexandria. Baldwin had re­
ceived word from London to accompany him as.',.quickly as possible to 
Suez, for he carried urgent dispatches for India. Baldwin once 
again exerted himself. He managed to rescue Captain Matthews when 
the latter was attacked in the course of his journey, and finally
2
saw him safely on to the ship in Suez that carried him to Madras.
Egypt 5, Humble Petition to the Court of Directors from Baldwin, 
April 23, 1783. Also, SP 97/54, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy),
June 20, 1778.
2 ■
Egypt 5, Humble Petition to the Court of Directors from Baldwin, 
April 23, 1783.
Matthews, upon his arrival in India, wrote to Lnndon praising
1
Baldwin1s efforts and describing his establishment in Egypt*
Thus Baldwin sent word of the war to Bombay in June, to
Port St* George in June, and to Bengal in July* It was these
combined efforts that gave the British advance warning, and enabled
the victory of Pondicherry to be celebrated* He was aware of his
contributions “I had the satisfaction also to convey the first
advices of the war in 1778 to the East Indies; by means of which
we were enabled, to the astonishment of all England, when the news
arrived, to expel the Prench from India before succours could reach
2
them, and to add their possessions to our own."
The Select Committee at Port St* George recommended Baldwin 
to the Court of Directors n.*. for his giving them the earliest in- 
formation of the public affairs in Europe”. He was consequently 
awarded a “present” of £500. But he was hot satisfied. He requested 
a regular, fixed salary if the Court wished him to continue his 
services. His solicitors petitioned Sir George Wombell (Chairman 
of the Court) on 27 January 1779 for a minimal salary of £500 per 
annum* “ The* answer did not arrive until 25 March 1779 when '
 ^Egypt 5, Matthews to Peter Mitchell, June 12, 1778* Reference 
is made here to a forthcoming letter concerning Baldwin, of which 
no trace can be found*.
2
Baldwin, Pol* Rec* * pp. 6-7*
■5
Egypt 5, Extracts from minutes of the general court for the purpose 
of conferring rewards on.*. /JEhose who/.*, contributed principally 
to the successes.*, obtained over the French in India, April 7, 1779*
the secretary, Peter ItLtchell, promised Baldwin that the Court 
was considering 11 a handsome salary11 for him. He was finally 
officially accorded £500 per annum with £500 as the douceur for 
the Pondicherry contribution, but once again the terms were am­
biguous, and Baldwin was dissatisfied, for during the year 1779
2he was the recipient of only £142.10s. from the Company.
Baldwin1s commercial interests
But he did not rely oniiie meagre pittances of the East India
Company for his livelihood. He continued to encourage his thriving
branch of the Red Sea trade, ignoring Ainslie*s wrath and repeated
remonstrances, much in the same way the latter refused to recognise
< 3his numerous problems with Fir awn.
Ainslie was ever conscious of his rdle as promoter of English 
amity at the Porte, especially since he arrived there during the 
after-math of the Russo-l’urkish War, and was keen to place Britain 
in a prominent place at the Ottoman Court. Whenever the Reis Efendi 
showed him personal attention and consideration he proudly communi­
cated the incident to London, voicing the hope of maintaining the
*i
Egypt 5, Humble Petition to the Court of Directors from Baldwin, 
April 23,. 1783.
2Ibid.
3 <When Baldwin complained of the Fir awn1 s actions as going against 
the intentions of the Levant Company,, AinaHe1 s reply totally avoided 
the issue: how could this be, since the Company had repeatedly re­
fused to interfere in all matters concerning Egypt?
same privilege indefinitely. He consequently regarded Baldwin's
intrigues as detrimental to his plans, especially since the
other foreign envoys at the Porte would have been only too eager
to seize on any weakness to enhance their own respective positions.
He was, consequently, most annoyed at Baldwin's own report of
how advantageous his commercial ventures were proving to be. He
coldly replied, saying: ”... unless you acquaint me with the nature
of the commerce which you say might become so interesting as to
merit particular attention, X cannot with any degree of propriety,
make mention of it either to His Majesty's ministers or to the
1
Levant Company."
The exact nature of Baldwin's business ventures may only
be deduced, for he rarely supplied details of his commercial trans­
actions. It is known, however, according to his own statement,
that he imported goods from London for local consumption; £20,000
Zwas the estimate he gave on his sales for the years 1775 to 1778. 
During a period of two years he claimed to have freighted fifteen 
ships on the Alexandria-London route, with four (sometimes only two) 
in constant use. The other European merchants in Egypt were doing
^SP 97/54, Ainslie to Baldwin (copy), April 29, 1778.
^SP 97/54, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), June 20, 1778.
5SP 97/54, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), Feb. 21, 1778.
exactly the same thing, and were constantly competing with 
him. Baldwin always felt at a loss in the competition, since 
he had no . consular protection as they did, and often had to de­
fend himself against repeated injustices.
The records of the Levant Company do not give evidence of 
the number of ships Baldwin claimed to have come to Alexandria. 
During the years 1775-1779, the impositions book of the Company 
accounts for only three ships that arrived in Alexandria:
i) In June 1776, the "Fly": (Captain Stone),that loaded 
cotton and wool. It aiso went to Cyprus, 
ii) In June 1776, the "Peggy", that loaded raw silk,
cotton yam, and different kinds of gum. It also
1
went to Alexandretta.
iii) In May 1777, the "Olympia" (Captain Bett), loaded
Senna, myrrh, cotton and gum. It also went to 
2Alexandretta.
The other ships Baldwin employed were obvious^ not English 
or in any way connected with the Levant Company. He made a number
3
of references to Venetian captains; also, the British chancery 
register at Constantinople during the years 1779-85 contains ac-
*1
The modem town of §!canderoon.
2SP 105/170, Impositions Book, 1775-1785.
3See above, page 55*
counts of the disputes some of his associates had concerning 
vessels from Venice. So it may he deduced from these that he 
hired Venetian "boats for his import-export trade ; they pro­
bably went to other ports besides London.
He was not the only Englishman trading in Egypt, despite 
the fact that he alone was a resident. Althuugh the Levant 
Company totally discouraged anything to do with the country, 
mention is occasionally mada of captains from India and England 
who complained of high taxes. Records also indicate two known 
cases of Englishmen trading in Egypt. The first concerns a Timothy 
Goldsmith. He applied to the Privy Council in January 1777 for 
permission to export one hundred barrels of gunpowder to Alexandria. 
His application was referred to the commission for Trade and Plant­
ations who approved of the request."1'
The second concerns a report of a dispute between two Eng-
2lish merchants in Cairo inl777* John Robinson and William Shaw 
agreed on 27 March that the latter would buy from Baldwin, "agent 
and broker" of the former, 780 bags of saltpetre. Pour days later, 
it was further agreed that Shaw would buy pepper and other products 
that were to be delivered in Suez. The form of payment to be made
^CO39l/84, Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 
January 28, 1777.
p
Robinson was recommended to Baldwin by Warren Hastings. Add. Mss. 
29139 f.17, Baldwin to Hastings, July 5* 1777.
to Baldwin was to be partly in gold and partly a bill of ex­
change on Dalton and Martin of Bombay. But Shaw was unable to 
fulfil.>. the baig$i$, and Robinson consequently did not deliver 
the goods. The dispute attracted the attention of the foreign
merchants of Cairo who, without being asked, decided to ju$ge
1
the case. On 9 June they signed a paper that Shaw was in the
right. Robinson was asked to pay a sum of 2,500 German crowns 
2
as a penalty.
Baldwin* s commercial activity also joicluded active parti­
cipation in the Red Sea trade. He was the agent in Egypt for 
a group of Bombay merchants, William Hornby, Hunter, Pell and
3
Ives. Theyshipped calicoes, muslins, and other unspecified 
India products to Suez, which after paying duties, Baldwin sold 
in Egypt and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. He consigned 
these goods to John Abbott and Richard Willis, independent Eng­
lish merchants of Constantinople, and to the prominent house of 
Lee and Maltass of Smyrna.
The process of consigning goods from Egypt to different 
towns of the Empire was complicated by the system of import duties.
The foreign merchants were: Rosa, Pini, and Rosetti of Venice, and
Autran and Magallon of Prance.
^Add. Mss. 29199 f.75* 11A short and impartial detail of a dispute 
subsisting between Mr. John Robinson and Mr. William Shaw now 
in Cairo." 1777.
^SP 195/187. Extracted from register of British Chancery of Aleppo, 
Bombay, Jan. 4, 1780. Deposited in Brit ishvChaheery 'register, -Con­
stantinople.
When the merchandise arrived an Egypt Baldwin, upon paying the 
20°/o duty, was issued a **cochet" or tezkere3, which should have 
been valid in all parts of the Empire. But the lack of cohesion 
between Egypt and the Porte was reflected in the demand for 
further taxation when the goods arrived in Smyrna or Constantinople. 
Baldwin and his associates complained bitterly of this to Ainslie, 
who after much negotiation with the Porte was able to reach a 
compromises the duty paid in Egypt would be refunded upon pay­
ment of a second duty in Constantinople. To ensure this, the 
second duty would be deposited in the British Chancery for safe­
keeping until word arrived from Cairo that the money there had 
2been refunded.
More of Baldwin* s commercial activity can be ascertained 
from the post-1779 period. However, a few details may be gathered 
from passing remarks in dispatches, and occasionally from pages 
of the Chancery register in Constantinople. Ainslie inferred in 
a vague fashion more than once that Baldwin* s India trade involved 
aiding Englishmen from Bombay in transmitting their fortunes to 
Europe. Also that the capital for this trade was* not entirely his 
own; he promised sizeable dividends to investors.
There is record of a bill of exchange that Baldwin made 
out on 8 March 1777 on the house of Cazalet and Cooke of London
■j
The tezkere or certificate was designed to protect the merchant 
from further exactions on*the same goods. Gribb and Bowen, Islamic 
Society and the West, vol. 1, part 2, p.15, n.3.
2SP 97/53, Ainslie to Weymouth, May 17, 1777*
who might have been his agents since they imported the goods 
carried on the Levant Company ships. The bill was made to a 
James Reynold who reported that Cazalet and Cooke were only 
able to honour 30°/o; he retrieved his money by a sale Baldwin 
made in Leghorn of a large amount of coffee. So it is not unlikely 
that the India ships going to Suez loaded coffee at Mukha which 
was then p assed overland and sold in Europe.
According to Ainslie, Baldwin considered the possibility 
of having Russian ships navigate the Red Sea. The ambassador 
mentioned a Mr. Eroding who at one time had been actively engaged 
in the Suez trade, and had 1 ater been employed by Baldwin for 
that purpose. Eroding was established in Constantinople. On 3 
April 1781, he left the city and sailed for Russia via the Black 
Sea with a ^ rench merchant.2 This aroused the suspicions of Ainslie 
who was convinced of a Russian plan that somehow involved Baldwin.'
Although an exact assessment of the gains and losses of 
Baldwin*s establishment cannot be made, there is little doubt 
that it was lucrative. When Eyles Irwin^ visited him in Cairo in
See above, page 58.
2F0 78/2, ihslie to Hillsborough (cypher), April 14,1781.
E^yles. Irwin (1751-1817), oriental traveller and writer. In 1771, 
he became the superintendent of the East India Company* s grounds 
in Madras. He supported Lord Pigot during the uprising in 1776, 
and was suspended from his duties as a3Bsuit. He left India in 
early 1777, and sailed to England via the Red Sea. He published 
an account of his travels in A Series of Adventures in the course 
of a voyage up the Red Sea r. ( in Letters to a Lady.) .
September 1777, he was very much impressed with the generosity 
and hospitality shown him, as well as Baldwin's astonishing 
ability to speak fluent Arabic. Irwin also remarked that the 
position of Britain in Egypt seemed to have gained immeasurably 
with thesevival of the Red Sea trade: 1 It is manyjears since
the English trade has declined in the Levant. Their ships of 
war no longer ride triumphant in these seas... But the spell 
is revived. The English have found their way into the Red Sea..
Further proof of this was in Baldwin's persistent defiance 
of Ainslie* s orders to stop the trade, for in the founer*s own 
statement, he proudly claimed: "We composed our bowl of the 
Ganges, the Thames, and the Wile, and from the top of the Pyramid 
drank prosperity to England.1,2
Continued Use of the Route:
As the tension between Ainslie and Baldwin continued to 
grow, so also did the animosity of the Porte towards the use of 
the Red Sea route. In May 1778, the Reis Efendi made a "heavy 
complaint** against the increase of the trade between India and 
Suez. He had a report that there were thirteen Frank shipsafe 
Seuz at the time. Ainslie acknowledged the presence of only eight, 
but assured the Porte that 1778 would be the last year for the
1
Irwin, Series of Adventures, vol. 2, pp. 127-8.
2
Baldwin, Pol. Rec.. p.6.
1
traffic* The Reis Efendi was extremely angry, answering
whether there were eight or eight hundred was the same thing;
no ship would he allowed past Jedda any more.
But Ainslie was aware that a “knot of adventurers”,
Greeks, Armenians, and Europeans, including Englishmen, were
negotiating with the beys of Egypt for permission to continue
the illicit trade, and it was they who were responsible for the
2
eight ships at Suez.
This coincided with a revolution in Cairo, and the re­
instatement of Ibrahim Bey as shaykh al-balad. in February 1778. 
Once again the Ottomans were faced with grave opposition in Egypt, 
for the precarious political balance of the mamluks had quickly 
disintegrated. Isma‘il Bey had to leave Cairo and go to Syria 
because his principal allies, Rigwan Bey and $asan Bey al-Juddawi 
had defected to the camp of Murad and Ibrahim. When the Pasha 
named Ibrahim shaykh al-balad on 21 Mujiarram 1192/19 February 
1778 the mamluks divided into two main groups: the ‘Alawiyya and
the MujLammadiyya. Open fighting between the two resulted in the
defeat of the ‘Alawiyya, and the preponderance of ^urad Bey as
3the leader of the Mufcammadiyya.
^SP 97/54, Ainslie to Weymouth, May 4, 1778.
^SP 97/54, Ainslie to Weymouth (cypher), August 3, 1778.
^ *
^Jabarti, oo.cit.. vol. 2, pp. 21-2.
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Ainslie reported a Council Meeting at the Porte on 24 
August during which Egypt was the central topic for discussion.
It was dscided to recall the banished Reis Efendi. Isma‘il Bey, 
to serve as Pasha of Cairo because Ibrahim bad once beeo^ his 
slave.^
By December 177B, the fury of the Porte was frightening 
to Ainslie. The Reis Efendi. together with three officials^called 
Pisani, the Embassy dragoman, to file a new complaint. The Shaykh 
of Mecca reported an English ship loading coffee at Mukha and 
making off with it to Sues. The ship had left India in the Spring, 
so it obviously must have known of the new orders forbidding the 
trade. Ainslie instructed Pisani to reply that he was totally 
ignorant of the affair. But he privately thought the story un­
likely. He knew that the East India Company had published the 
prohibition, and its orders would not be disobeyed easily. Further­
more, the cargo on the ■sessel would not sell sufficiently to cover
the a:pense of the voyage. He therefore suggested to the Reis Efendi
2that the Shaykh of Mecca might have been mistaken.
The next day the Reis Efendi informed Ainslie that since 
1778 was drawing to a close, the Porte had decided to forgive 
England because of its lasting friendship with the Empire. However, 
■fcMe Divan would be meeting in a few days to discuss the illicit
1SP 97/54, Ainslie to Weymouth, Sept. 3t 1778. 
2SP 97/54, Ainslie to Weymouth, Dec. 17, 1778.
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trade; the Ambssador would he told immediately of the resolutions 
taken there*
Baldwin in Constantinople
In the meantime, Baldwin decided to go to Constantinople 
to persuade Ainslie to agree to the importance and possibilities 
of the trade, and consequently to use his influence at the Porte 
to have it allowed* So he arrived at the end of 1778* He con­
versed extensively with the Ambassador, but was met with polite 
but stubborn resistance to all his ideas*
Baldwin warned Ainslie that no orders from the Companies 
or the Porte would be able to discontinue the activity at Suez, 
since there was f ar too much money involved. The trade was one of
the few expedients left for the English merchants of India to
1transmit their fortunes to Europe* Moreover, tbe Beys were 
interested, and seemed eager to encourage it. If the Porte con­
tinued to ban it, the traffic would persist, but probably by flying 
Turkish colours.
When the reasons failed to convince Ainslie, Baldwin used 
another method ofp ersuasion that only added to the distaste of 
the Ambassador. He reported the incident to Weymouth: nFor my 
part, my Lord, I should be a considerable gainer, by the establish-
1Ibid.
ment of an English navigation in the Red Sea; and had I chose 
from the beginning to authorize a British subject to act as 
Consul... I was offered ten thousand piastres per annum.1* He 
went on to say: HX am ashamed to add that not withstanding my 
refusal, a much larger sum has been proposed to engage me to re­
present this, trade in a favourable light to the interests of 
Great Britain."'1’
Ainslie decided that the best path to follow would b e to 
placate the shrewd merchant, and have him return to Egypt. He 
therefore gave Baldwin the "strongest command" of protection that
a person without a consularypatent could hold, making him his
2 3vekil until the Levant Company wished to grant him a consulship.
The Ambassador also promised to write to Fir‘awn and revoke John
4 T*Murray* s commission. Finally, he gave Baldwin the right to
appoint an agent at Suez in order to discourage the persistent
trade, and also to help in the overland journey to Alexandria of
dispatches coming from India.
The next day he added more concessions. He sent another
letter protecting Baldwin and any Englishmen who came to Egypt
97/54, Ainslie to Weymouth, Bee. 17, 1778.
2Agent, or representative.
3SP 97/55, Ainslie to Baldwin, Feb. 25, 1779.
He was careful to remind Baldwin of hi3 right as Ambassador to 
receive 50°/o of what Fir‘awn had taken from English traders and 
asked him to enforce the regulation. Ibid.
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n... from personal insults, and every species of violence and
injustice". The appointment of vekil authorised Baldwin to
"... receive the same emoluments as if ... ... had a Consulary
2
Patent," In return, the merchant had to do all in his power to 
suppress the illicit trade, and at the same time keep the Am­
bassador informed on political developments in Egypt.
Thus Ainslie succeeded in turning the tables on Baldwin.
He ably employed the same method the latter had used on him; 
where bribery of a pecuniary nature was uninteresting to the 
ambassador, it seemed to work on the merchant because the promises 
were of titular honours. Baldwin returned to Cairo confident of 
his new-found security, and totally unaware of his Ambassadors 
confrontations at the Porte on the subject of his means of live­
lihood.
Ainslie was more suspicious than ever of Baldwin’s un­
scrupulous ways, and was willing to believe almost any derogatory 
information about the merchant that came to his ears. He seemed 
convinced that Baldwin had asked for his protection in order to 
be refused; he would then feel justified in unhesitatingly Seeking 
the prdbection of the Holy Homan Empire, perhaps even to the ex­
tent of accepting the Austrian vice-consul ship in Egypt. Ainslie
1SP 97/55, Ainslie to Baldwin, Feb. 26, 1779. 
2Ibid.
realised this was only a suspicion, hut promised Weymouth:
UI shall act in consequence of this suspicion, in such a 
manner as to leave him no just pretension for infringing his 
engagements to the Levant Company. •.
He furthermore believed that Baldwin, during his stay 
at Constantinople, had been "tampering" with the ^ rench Ambassador 
in an attempt to make the Red Sea trade permissible. This was un­
doubtedly the gravest suspicion, for the French were recognised 
by both Ainslie and Baldwin to be the arch-rivals of England 
in the Ottoman Empire.
French activity
Tet the activity of the French in Egypt up to 1779 never 
seemed to be a great concern to Ainslie, although he occasionally 
showed a wariness of their power and prestige. At the onset of 
the Red Sea problem in 1777, Ainslie, in a state of confusion, 
wrote to Weymouth asking for advice, questioning the possibility 
that another nation, France or Russia, could be involved in the
2
trading life of Egypt in general, and that of Sues in particular.
However, Baldwin’s report to him in January 1777, of a person in
Cairo from a "very powerful nation" who was inquiring about the
5use of the route seemed to pass almost unnoticed.
^SP 97/55, Ainslie to Weymouth, Jan, 4, 1779*
^SP 97/559 Ainslie to Weymouth, Feb. 21, 1777.
■^ SP 97/55, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), Jan. 22, 1777*
In August 1777 he\as curious about the Frenchman, M. Melon,
who had spent some time in Constantinople. A secretary to tbs
French Ambassador in Rome, he had come straight from France to
Constantinople where he stayed for a month. He then left on
1
12 August for Smyrna, and then to Cairo. A month later, an officer 
in the Seraglio reported to Ainslie that Melon had presented a 
Memorial to the Porte asking that the French be given the same 
arrangements as the British for trade in Egypt, offering to pay 
for the privilege in "presents”. The refusal was given with much 
"ill-humour”.^
3Ainslie also knew that Baron de Tott, the new Inspector- 
General of French trade in the Levant, had travelled to Cairo.
He carried with him manypresents for the Beys in order to ensure 
the lowest possible duties for French merchants, and had arranged 
for the advent of a French ship from Bengal to Suez in the Spring 
of 1773. Rather than expressing alarm at the French concern with
Egypt, Ainslie1 s main reaction seemed to have been exasperation;
the French demands would only serve to make those of the British 
more difficult to obtain.
The Ambassador was at a constant loss at the Porte because 
of limited funds. He earnestly pleaded for more, once remarking 
that the French always seemed to be ahead of him because of the
■^ SP 97/53r Ainslie to Weymouth (cypher), Aug. 18, 1777.
^SP 97/53* Ainslie to Weymouth (cy|iher), Sept. 17, 1777.
3Baron Francois de Tott (1733-1793). From 1755 to 1763 he lived in 
Constantinople where he assiduously studied the language and political
gifts they made to the Ottoman officials. The authorities at
the Porte all had gold snuff-boxes ’’made in France"* He had
already spent £200 from his private-purse in less than two
years at Constantinople, and still needed money for presents
and secret service.
In December 1778 he reported that Melon had reached a
trade agreement with the Beys, The Frenchman's valuable presents
seemed to have arranged the affair in such a way as to "...
screen the French merchants established in the different scales
2of this Empire from the resentment of the Porte"* The French 
would be able to revoke their consuls in Egypt, and to free their 
establishments there from the protection of the Porte, so as not 
to be encumbered by any responsibility* Ainslie1 s main concern 
now seemed to be that France would employ the moneyed men of 
Bengal and the East Indies to fit in with their own national 
economic plans, especially since Saint-Priest, the French Am­
bassador, had acknowledged French intentions to navigate the 
Red Sea*
set-up of the Ottomans, after which he was named Consul in 
the Crimea. In 1776 he was made Inspector-General of the 
echelles of the Levant.
^SP 97/54, Ainslie to Weymouth (cypher), May 4, 1778*
2SP 97/54, Ainslie to Weymouth (cypher), Dec* 17, 1778.
The Hatti Sherif of 1779
The authorities of the Porte were not unaware of the 
persistent machinations of the Europeans to defy their repeated 
admonitions about Red Sea navigation* When the Divan met in 
December 1778, it decided yet again that no more Frank vessels 
would be allowed to sail past Jedda after the passing of the 
year. As a consequence of t his decision, a Hatti Sherif was 
issued at the beginning of 1779, and a copy was delivered to 
Ainslie.
It was worded.in very strong terms. "The Sea of Suez is 
destined for the noble pilgrimage of Mecca. To suffer Pranks 
ships to navigate therein, or to neglect opposing it, is betray­
ing your Sovereign, your religion* and every Mahometan. And 
all those who dare transgress will find their punishment in this 
world, and in the world to come. It is for the most important 
affair of state, and of religion, that this express and irrevocable 
command isissued.”  ^ It was addressed to the Pasha, the judges, 
the Beys, the chiefs of the four sects, the doctor s of the Azhar,
v,
2the aaptains and officers of the seven o.iaks of Cairo.
This edict was to govern British affairs in Egypt in 1779.
Its tone was most emphatic, and, on paper at least, re-instated 
Ottoman authority in the country. It s. main reference, however,
^Translation of Hatti Sherif to the Government of Egypt. Available in 
Baldwin, on.oit.. pp. 8-12, SP 97/54, and Egypt 5. See Appendix II 
for complete text.
2Military corps.
was to the British and their vessels, going so far as to declare 
that the Porte had Ainslie*s approbation that "... in case of 
contravention, the effects of those who should contravene might 
be seized, their vessels confiscated, the crews of the ships and 
the supercargo imprisoned and condemned to perpetual slavery."
This was obviously intended to censure only the British. 
Ainslie did not object to the severity of tone, a fact that is 
most surprising. Even the ^ evant Company, long opposed to Egyptian 
trade, was alarmed at the threats directed at Englishmen, and 
warned the Ambassador of the possible repercussions and impli- 
cations of the statement.
The e diet had been preceded by a memorial delivered to 
Ainslie on 17 December 1778. It contained no clear prohibition 
to all Frank vessels, and seemed to refer to the English alone; 
it also had no clause for the permission of English dispatches 
to go through the Red Sea. So it was returned with an explanatory 
verbal message to the Reis Efendi. The corrected memorial was 
returned on 19 December, but still had no reference to the dis­
patches. The Embassy dragoman was sent to the Porte to ask for 
the permission. The request was refused for two reasons: the
first, because a declaration made by the Sublime Porte should never 
be open to criticism; second, the request itself had already been
^SP 105/120, Governor to Ainslie, March 9, 1779*
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regarded as inadmissible.1 The Reis Efendi pleaded with Pisani 
net to ask for more, and to acknowledge simply receipt of the 
memorial, since further contact with the Sultan was totally out 
of the question. In exchange, Ainslie was given a verbal promise 
that during the coming summer British packet boats would be per­
mitted to land at Suez provided they carried no merchandise.
Ainslie was satisfied with the state of events. It was
not until six months later that it occurred to him that the English
could continue to trade by flying foreign colours, most likely
those of France. Although he had assured Baldwin that the French
capitulations did not allow for Red Sea navigation, he was aware
2that this was rot so. He had thus jeopardized the security of his 
countrymen in an unsuccessful attempt to stop a commercial activity 
that he considered detrimental to the nationalinterest.
The India trade continued to thrive in Egypt, but it had to 
be done with 11 extraordinary secrecy indeed”. Packet boats arriv­
ing at Suez carried merchandise as well as dispatches; the former 
had to be smuggled carefully off board. Baldwin unashamedly wrote 
to the Ambassador of this, and complained if the Egyptian author­
ities hindered the passage of the dispatches and their bearers to 
Cairo and Alexandria.
^SP 97/55, Ainslie to Weymouth, Jan. 4, 1779*
2SP 97/55, Ain^ie to Mitchell, June 4, 1779.
^SP 97/55, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), April 30, 1779.
When Baldwin returned to Egypt on 29 April after his visit 
to Constantinople, heheard of twro English vessels that had arrived 
at Suez* Two of the passengers, Captain Soott and Lieutenant 
Mills,were in Egypt for the conveyance of special news from India: 
the defeat of French settlements there. But the vessels that 
brought them also carried merchandise. So the two English offi­
cers were detained in Alexandria, although they were told that 
their goods could not leave the ships.'** Infuriated, Baldwin 
wrote to Ainslie saying that two more ships were expected, one 
of them carrying the deposed chief of Chandemagore, M* Chevalier.
11 If the Firman which orders the passengers to be made slaves of,
is to have effect, you may see Mons. Chevalier come to work in
2
the arsenals of Constantinople.”
Ainslie obtained a safe passage, and two messengers from 
England were allowed to make their way to Suez and down the Red 
Sea in May.
The Caravan Disaster
The next month, the most outstanding incident during Bald­
wins first unofficial establishment in Egypt occurred. It was a
i
It was Rosetti, the Venetian merchant of Cairo, who finally obtained 
their release which cost them a thousand dollars. Baldwin, A 
Narrative of Facts (henceforth Narrative). p.4.
2SP 97/55, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), April 50, 1779.
5SP 97/55, Ainslie to Baldwin, June 2, 1779.
confused, chaotic event, disastrous for Baldwin and many other 
merchants, with great loss, both in prestige and money, for 
England. It was to mark the end of Baldwin’s first, sporadic 
attempt to re-establish the English in Egypt.1
Once again, it was concerned with the India trade. In 
May, two commercial ships flying Banish colours arrived at Suez.
The first, the uSt. Helena”, was commanded by Captain George 
Moore, an Englishman, who had letters of recommendation and 
introduction from the Govemor-Ganeral in Bengal to the Bey of 
Egypt. The Customs Master wrote two letters to Moore, promising 
his personal protection. The second, the ”Nathalia” was under 
the command of a German, van der Velden, who had a letter from 
the Governor-General in Bengal to Baldwin; he instead established 
contact with the French trading house of Magallon, Noel, Olive 
et Cie. Both ships were the property of Englishmen who protected 
themselves by flying Danish colours.
The Shavkh al-Balad sent his own camels to take Moore’s 
cargo to Cairo. The Customs official, however, insisted on charging 
double the usual tariff. An extra fee of 300 dollars per ship was 
made for anchorage.
1The account of the incident is drawn from:
i) SP 97/55* ”Mr* O’Donnell’s account of the treatment and conduct of 
the government and people of Cairo, to the Europeans who arrived 
at their port of Suez in the year 1779 - with the attestations of 
several gentlemen who were on the spot: to the troubles of such
facts and circumstances as came within their knowledge.” It is 
signed and approved by James Grant, James Hislop, A. Hammond,
H. R. Sulivan, Cairo, Sept. 1, 1779* 
ii) Baldwin, Narrative.
When the passengers of the "Nathalia” saw that Moore’s 
cargo and passengers were being escorted to Cairo, they were 
greatly encouraged to follow suit. Ten of the passengers left 
Suez on 15 June: they were John O’Donnell, Barrington, Jenkins,
van der Velden, Chilly, two French brothers St.-Germain, Mano- 
nallci, an Armenian linguist, and two servants. On their first 
night out, they were attacked by three hundred Arabs, stripped 
naked of their clothes, robbed of their possessions, and left 
in t he desert without food, water, or camels. Within a short 
time, seven of the men died, Chilly of wounds, the others from 
fatigue, thirst, and sunstroke. One of the St.-Germain brothers 
survived, and dragged himself to Cairo where he collapsed, but was 
soon revived*
,John O'Donnell managed to escape. He had conducted a thriv­
ing business in India, and his goods on the "Nathalie” were estimated 
at 150,000 dollars. He considered the Red Sea trade to be the most 
efficient method to transmit his fortune to Europe. He decided to 
make his way back to Suez. On the way, he came across Captain 
Waugh of the "Britannia” packet, onecf the three Bengal ships that had 
anchored at Suez recently. Together, they managed to return to Suez 
where they discovered that the stolen booty was being passed through 
on its, way to Tor, the stronghold of the thieves. They decided 
first to return to their respective ships to refresh themselves after the
ordeal of the desert and then to attempt to retrieve the mer­
chandise. The authorities of Suez forbade them to do this, and 
as an insurance that their orders be obeyed, arrested O’Donnell 
and kept him as a hostage. He escaped, however, and went on 
board the "Nathalia” which was anchored at port. A few days 
later he made his way to Cairo to join Baldwin who had anxiuusly 
awaited news of the missing cargo.
Some of the merchandise on the "Nathalia” belonged to Bald­
win, so his concern involved personal interest as well as a dogged 
determination to uphold the rights of his countrymen. He probably 
realized from the beginning that he had to contend with the wiles 
of Carlo Rosetti, who had lived in Egypt for a very long period 
of time, had once been the political adviser of ‘All Bey, and now 
enjoyed the personal friendship of Fir‘awn. Baldwin saw that he 
would have to enlist Rosetti’s help, since it was he who had used 
his influence with the Beys to release Scott and Mils.
After conferring with Rosetti, Baldwin decided that O’Donnell 
should petition Ibrahim Bey. The petition was written, translated, 
and shown to Fir‘awn for his opinion; he approved it, and it was 
submitted. The answer was long in coming, during which time 
O’Donnell anxiously urged the Customs Master to ask why Ibrahim 
Bey had not replied.
^Egypt 5, O’Donnell to Ibrahim Bey, July 8, 1779*
On 16 July, the Fir‘awn went unexpectedly to Baldwin’s 
house. He claimed to have come straight from the Shaykh al- 
Balad who had just found an opportunity to punish the thieves, 
for the merchandise had been discovered In an old house near 
Tor. Fir‘awn suggested that Moore should return to Suez with 
a party of one hundred and fifty men from the government to act 
as escort. As Moore would be readying himself to go on board his 
ship, the Egyptians would take their leave of him, and sail to 
Tor to surprise the thieves.
The plan was immediately and rather naively accepted. In 
the meantime, news arrived that the thieves were within two 
hours of Suez, and had most of the treasure with them. They wanted 
peace, admitting the cause of the plunder was that the English 
had killed eight of their men. They had occupied the water-supply 
source of the city, and refused to budge until the government 
agreed to compromise the affair.
The Bey, angered at the ultimatum, decided to send the same 
group of soldiers who were to escort Moore to lay siege to the 
Arabs. But to ensure the success of.;, the expedition, he asked 
for as many men as the English could spare to go to Suez in order 
to assess the number of the enemy. For this, the military would 
need letters of explanation from the commanders of the ships in 
Cairo to their men on board the vessels at Suez. The Englishmen
remaining in Cairo should be ready to leave in seven days; a 
desert meeting-place was fixed for the morning of 28 July.
After the army contingent left, and the Englishmen were 
preparing themselves for departure, Baldwin noticed that a 
young Venetian protege of Rosetti who was to have accompanied 
the caravan was being delayed by Fir‘awn. Mario Mutti was en­
trusted with about 30,000 dollars worth of goods belonging to 
Fir‘awn and a rich Levantine merchant, Jacob Sawaya. Both the 
Customs official and Rosetti urged the party;, not to miss the 
desert meeting on 28 July since Ibrahim Bey himself was to be 
there, but the young Mutti was not amongst the group. Baldwin, 
suspicious, insisted that the caravan shouldn>t leave until Mutti 
joined it, thus causing a delay that ultimately thwarted the 
plans of the plotters.
Early ±i the morning of 29 July, George Moore was arrested 
and taken up to the Citadel. Baldwin was urgently called to 
Rosetti who gave him further bad news: Ibrahim Bey had seized
the caravan. His men had lured the Englishmen on board the ships 
at Suez off shore under the false pretence of having entertainment 
planned for them. The ships were plundered, and the passengers 
arrested and sent, two on a camel, through the desert to Cairo.
Rosetti suggested to Baldwin that he and Andrew Skiddy, 
another merchant, place themselves under the protection'of Fir‘awn. 
But Baldwin, realizing he had been trapped, adamantly refused.
"I laughed at every idea of security - X saw no alternative
1but to sell our lives like Englishmen.11
The Englishmen were now at the complete mercy of the
government of Egypt. They were made particularly aware of
this when, the day before Moore1 s arrest, Ibrahim Bey*s answer
to 0*Donnell arrived. It was encouraging, promising to return
the stolen goods as soon as they were retrieved. It also claimed
that the Shaykh al-Balad ”... wrote to the Governor General
of Bengali upon this business and you ought to remain at Cairo
easy about this matter, as I hope in God, things will turn out 
2
successful.” The letter to Bengal had been given to Moore, 
but when he was imprisoned it was taken from him.
After a brief but fruitless attempt to obtain help from 
another Bey, Ibrahim Bey al-Wali, Baldwin and his companions 
came up with a new plan. The latter were to go to Rosetti and 
complain about Baldwin, ask the Venetian to protect them, and 
then attempt to obtain a safe conduct to Suez from him. They 
would pay 70,000 dollars for this, the amount of money that 
Fir‘awn owed $*oore.
Rosetti was delighted with the apparent disloyalty to Bald­
win. He negotiated with Fir‘awn for the release of Moore within
1
Baldwin, Narrative, p.13.
^SP 97/55, Ibrahim Bey to 0*Donnell (copy), n.d.
five days, and asked that all the Englishmen he allowed to 
return to Suez, except for the five young servant boys who had 
already been circumcised and enslaved.
The orders did not come. Instead, a new condition was 
presented: every Englishman in Cairo was to sign a bond of
indemnity before he would be released. Baldwin was the first 
to enter Fir ‘awn* s house for the signing of the bond, and was 
not surprised to overhear the Customs official and Rosetti 
chuckling delightedly over the humiliations they had caused the 
Englishmen.
The conditions for the treaty were difficult, but had to 
be accepted: they would never claim damages for the theft; they
would never complain to the Porte of the treatment they received; 
they would never again come to Suez with a ferman permitting them 
to do so; they would pay the expense of any command that would 
come from Constantinople concerning their welfare; they would 
be responsible for any ship that arrived at Suez to obtain redress 
for the incident. The bond was signed by Major Ewen Baillie, Lieuten­
ant John Hislop, Ensign Henry Sullivan, William Hammond, James
Grant, John O'Donnell, Andrew Skiddy, Gectrge Moore, Dun cons Campbell
1Chenaux, and Baldwin.
4
FO 78/l, uCopy of a bond drawn up in Arabic by order of the govern­
ment of Egypt, obtained by violence from those who signed” (copy) 
(translation),n.d. See Appendix III for complete text.
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In order to ensure the keeping of the bond, Baldwin and 
Andrew Skiddy were kept as hostages when the others were allowed 
to leave. Fir‘awn offered Baldwin his release if he could detain 
any other two men, but since the others were in a hurry, he re­
fused. The Englishmen, with the seeption of the hostages, finally 
left on 28 August for India.
Baldwin wrote to Ainslie asking for a command from the
Forte for his release which would also absolve the government in
1
Egypt from any responsibility in the affair. The Ambassador
2first heard of the troubles from Brandi who wrote him on 5 July.
3It was not until the end of July that Baldwin wrote Ainslie pre­
sumably because he knew that his involvement in the commercial in­
terests of the incident would not meet with the latter1 s approval.
Ainslie1s fury knew no limits; once again Baldwin had com­
promised his position at the Porte. Nevertheless, he sent a 
memorial to the Grand Veair oh 24 September, protesting against the
occurrences in Egypt, and asking for the release of Baldwin and 
4Skiddy. He obviously exerted himself to the utmost, for in it he
R
even referred to Baldwin as being "served with a royal order".
^SP 9l/559 Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), Aug. 31, 1779.
2SP 97/35, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian), July 5, 1779.
■^ SP 97/55, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), July 30, 1779.
^SF 97/55, Ainslie1s Memorial to the Porte (translation), Sept. 24, 1779. 
^The translation is also available in Egypt \ ,
84.
Departure of Baldwin from Egypt
Baldwin predicted the ineffectual quality of a command 
from the Porte, so he decided to escape,leaving Skiddy behind.
He managed to slip out of Cairo and go to Alexandria where 
he smuggled himself aboard a French ship. He arrived in 
Smyrna in November from where he wrote Ainslie to apologize
1for the trouble the Ambassador must have takenon his behalf.
When Baldwin had time to gather himself, and think about 
the past seven months, he was able to see the entire situation 
clearly. The traders had been trapped from the beginning, and 
had been treated mercilessly. The Hatti Sherif of 1779 legally 
protected the Egyptian authorities for their behaviour; the 
British in Egypt had no protection whatsoever, since Ainslie
disapproved of this activity. The cargo had by now probably
™ — 2 * 
been eagerly divided between Ibrahim Bey, Murad Bey, Fir awn
and Rosetti. Baldwin saw the latter as the instigator of the
whole trouble, who acted with the double motive of acquiring
greater wealth and at the same time successfully ousting Baldwin
from the country. On 15 December Baldwin delivered a pamphlet
to Ainslie: A narrative of facts relating to the plunder of
^SP 97/55, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), Nov. 24, 1779*
p M
Murad1s share of the booty was estimated at 120,000 dollars.
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1
English merchants. in which Rosetti* s guilt was clearly 
stated. The Ambassador immediately confronted the Bailo with 
the accusation, and assured Baldwin that if Rosetti* s parti-
2
cipation could be proved, redress would surely be obtained.
When the Porte*s command for the release of Skiddy and 
Baldwin arrived, the Egyptians refused to let Skiddy leave.
They probably, however, enabled bis escape by subterfuge.^
4He was helped by Richard Hughes, the Egyptian-born Englishman 
who remained in the country after the departure of Baldwin.
Baldwin remained in Smyrna until the end of 1779- While 
there, he married Jane Maltass, the beautiful, sixteen-year-old 
daughter of his agent, Henry Maltass. Early in 1780, he arrived 
in Constantinople in order to press bis claims with Ainslie. He 
blamed the Ambassador to a large extent for his destitution, and 
was eager to prove his ineffectuality. The situation between the 
two closely resembled open warfare; each accused the other of 
cowardice and deviousness. A further series of incidents occurred 
in Constantinople that were to sever irrevocably the ties between 
them.
i
This was published in London in 1780,
SP 97/55, Matra (Ainslie* s secretary) to Baldwin (copy), Dec. 27, 1779. 
^FO 78/l, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian), March 11, 1780.
^See Chapter II, below, p.92.
Baldwin*s arrival in Constantinople coincided with the 
Spanish King*s birthday which was being celebrated by the 
Neapolitan envoy, who was also the father-in-law of the French 
ambassador. A large dinner and dress ball was to mark the 
anniversary. When Ainslie only received a verbal invitation to 
the party, all the British residents loyally refused to attend. 
Baldwin, acting in open defiance of the boycott, went, talcing 
with him Richard Willis, one of the English merchants of the city.
The Ambassador* s dignity was very much at stales; not only was 
Baldwin* s action one of outright impertinence, but Willis had 
been a particularly good friend of Ainslie.1
Baldwin refused to see Ainslie. He even went to the extent
2
of refusing to bow to the Ambassador when they met in the street.
He instead spent most of his time in the French embassy, develop­
ing a strong friendship with Saint-Friest, the French Ambassador. 
Ainslie regarded this as "audacious and troublesome to the 3a st
degree'* since the Frenchman had always openly shown his dislike 
3
of him. On 11 April the French Ambassador loudly declared that 
Baldwin would surely be able to obtain redress for Ainslie*s actions,
1F0 78/l, Ainslie to Hillsborough, Jan. 17, 1780.
S k) 78/l, Ainslie to Hillsborough, March 3, 1780.
78/l, Ainslie to Hillsborough, April 17, 1780. The French 
Ambassador further insulted Ainslie by treating Baldwin with the 
pomp he would a public minister.
for the merchant had confided in Saint-Priest, and told him of
his great financial problems after the loss of the "NathaHa",
Baldwin also spoke of the commercial benefits of the Suez trade,
and so impressed the French Ambassador of its potential that he
wrote a memorial on the subject, and sent it to France, strongly
1recommending French promotion of the route to India,
Baldwin accused Ainslie of renouncing the British capitu­
lations by allowing the Hatti Sherif to be issued. He demanded 
a copy of the document, but was refused it by the officials at 
the British chancery.
On 29 March a General Meeting of the British Factory took 
place at the British embassy, Baldwin was officially not allowed 
to attend, since he had not been a resident of the city for six 
months. He forced his way in, however, and refused to obey 
Ainslie1 s orders to leave. " When the factors -insisted he leave,
he recognized his defeat and left, u... with the most impertinent
2
and insulting sneer...u, taking his friend Willis with him,
i
At last Baldwin realized that hispresence in Constantinople 
was of no use; he would have to find other means to avenge himself* 
So he readied himself for departure. He appointed Willis as his
4
Corr. Pol., Turquie, 166, Memoire contenant les details de ce que 
les anglois viennent d'eprouver en Egypte et de la.traine odieuse 
dont les sujets du Roy ete la victime. Enclosed in a letter to 
Bennin, Feb, 39 1780*
^FO 78/l, Ainslie to Hillsborough, April 49 1780
1attorney, giving him full powers to act on his behalf. He
also left behind some money and merchandise that Abbott, one
of the merchants, later tried to claim from Willis saying that
2Baldwin owed him about 64,400 dollars.
On 11 May 1780, leaving his wife in the care of Willis, he
quietly left the city, accompanied by van der Steen, a Dutch painter.
Their itinerary was to have been Aleppo, Basra, and India. But
after reaching Antioch, they were attached by thieves. Their bag-
4gage was lost, the two Tatars accompanying them were killed, 
and Baldwin was shot through the right arm.
Forced thus to discontinue his journey to India, Baldwin 
reconsidered his position, and resolved to return to England.
His voyage home took him first to Vienna where Robert Murray Keith, 
the British ambassador, had been warned about his devious ways by 
Ainslie. The latter was actually worried that Baldwin would plan 
with Baron Thugut, the former Imperial ambassador in Constantinople, 
for a scheme to re-open the Sues trade.
But, far from being cautious with Baldwin, Keith was warm 
and hospitable. The merchant *s connections in Vienna must have
A
SP 105/185, Power of Attorney deposited in British Chancery 
on May 12, May 5, 1780.
2SP 105/185,"Willis to Abbott, June 1, 1780.
% 0  78/l, Ainslie to Hillsborough, May 17,1780.
4
The official messengers at the Porte.
'’Add. Mss. 35522, Baldwin to Keith, April 5, 1781.
impressed the Ambassador; furthermore, the young Mrs. Baldwin,
who was very beautiful, must have played an important rCle
in the friendship Murray extended to her husband. Baldwin was
acquainted with the Prussian Ambassador at Constantinople, Prince
ICaunits Kietberg, to" whom he presented a memorial on the Red Sea
trade; Peter Tooke, an English merchant of Constantinople had
access to the text, and reported to Ainslie that it contained
much material that would be harmful to the interests of the East 
1
India Company. Baldwin and his wife also met with the Snperor
Joseph who apparently was much s truck by the beauty of the latter,
and they were consequently eagerly received in Viennese aristo- 
2cratic circles.
From Vienna, the Baldwins went to Brussels where they had 
an introduction to Alleyne Fitsherbert, the British minister 
there,from Keith. On 8 April 1781 they went to London. For the 
next four years, Baldwin became actively engaged in attempts to 
seek compensation for his material losses of 1779, to seek re­
cognition from the East India Company for his services as well as 
for the value of the Red Sea trade, and, finally, to promote an 
interest in the importance of Egypt, both strategically, and as a 
means to combat French influence.
^FO 78/5, Ainslie to Hillsborough, April 12, 1782.
2See Jane Baldwin1 s Obituary, Gentleman's Magazine, vol. 12, London, 
1859, pp. 656-8. The Emperor and Keith were not her only admirers; 
Dr. Johnson and the Prince of Wales were also impressed by her great 
beauty. She was to be known as "The Fair Greek1' in London, and Sir 
Joshua Reynolds painted two full-length portraits of her, as well
On 19 February 1784, he sent a letter to the East India
Company entitled: “Concerning Communication with India via
Suez Isthmus",“* in which he Iried to prove the benefits that the
Company could derive from the trade. First, he gave a resume of
the history of his residence in Egypt. Then, he put forward the
proof of his argument by listing the precise quantity of India
goods exported from England to the Ottoman Empire before, during,
2
and after the period of British trade to Suez. The conclusion
drawn proved that more goods went to the Ottoman Empire from
England during the height of the Red Sea trade.
There is little information available on Baldwin's other
activities during the four-year interim in London. In April 1762,
3or thereabouts, he was involved in a dispute with Sheridan.
Baldwin had been made to understand from a Captain Osborne that 
the post of Ambassador at Constantinople was vacant. Eager to 
qualify for such a coveted office, Baldwin tried to bribe Sheridan, 
for it, although he later denied having a ctually wanted to do such
as a sketch. Craves and Cronin, A History of the Work of Sir 
Joshua Reynolds. London, 1899» vol. It P*44.
Contained in Egypt, 5.
2
See Appendix IV for the complete tables.
^R. B. Sheridan (1751-1816), statesman and dramatist. He became 
a member of Parliament in 1780. His firtt speech there was in 
defence of a charge of bribery which his defeated opponent had 
brought against him. In 1782 he was under secretary for foreign 
affairs.
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a- "thing. He claimed that he h ad simply wished to do away with
”... the concurrance of any other person whose interest was
1greater than mine, by an adequate compensation.” When Sheridan5 
remained angry over the episode, Baldwin appealed to Edward Monk- 
ton, a member of Parliament, to intercede on his behalf. He ex­
plained: uIt was the importance of tbeobject that led me to pro­
pose what i did, and my meaning was no more, than to satisfy by
2some sort of compensation, the claims of a competitor.”
1Add. M b s . 35118 £.35, Baldwin to Sheridan, April 5, 1782.
2Add. Mss. 35118 f. 37,’ Baldwin to Monckton.
IMTBRIM DURING THE ABSEHCS OP BALDWIN;
1779 - 1786
Richard Hughes
After the "Nathalia" disaster of 1779, the only known 
Englishman left in Egypt was Richard Hughes. The first evidence 
of his existence occurred when he helped Andrew Skiddy^- to escape 
from Mamluk imprisonment, and thereafter claimed to he the sole 
Englishman in Egypt. He and Skiddy had obviously known one an­
other previously, at least on a professional basis; Hughes had
at onetime shipped goods from Alexandria to Leghorn, the proceeds
2of which were to go to Skiddy.
3Little is known of Hughes's origins. He spoke of himself 
as a native of Egypt, but of English extraction.4 Iiis mother 
tongue was Arabic, but he obviously knew English, aid claimed to 
know many other languages. He was quick to seize the opportunity, 
as an English resident, to inherit Baldwin's position in Egypt as 
agent of the East India Company. Indeed, he insisted that Warren
^See Chapter I, above.
SP 105/187, Chancery register, Constantinople, Jan. 17, 1781.
3In 1760, the Butch consul in Egypt, Robert Hughes, asked to become 
British consul, but his application was refused. SP 105/119, Levant 
Company to Hughes, Aug. 29, 1760. Richard Hughes may have been the 
son or younger brother of Robert Hughes, especially since the latter 
acted as agent for the British in the absence of a consulate.
4P0 24/2, Hughes to Lord Harrowby, Hov. 12, 1804.
Hastings had originally offered him the post when Baldwin re­
ceived his appointment from London,1 On 10 November 1779 , he
2wrote to the Company asking to replace Baldwin as agent. He 
also wrote to Ainslie to inform him of the possibility of the 
post. Abbott, an English merchant in Constantinople, told Hughes 
that the Ambassador had promised to recommend him to the Court
of Directors, after which he would obtain a ferman for his pro-
3tection.
Hughes's correspondence with the East India Company and 
with Ainslie leaves the reader with a confused view of the re­
action to and appreciation of his appeals. He wrote repeatedly 
to London and Constantinople, promising to keep out "busy foreigners" 
from matters pertaining to British interests in Egypt, aid never 
seemed to obtain an answer. When he finally received word from
4
London that the Company was going to appoint him agent, he im­
mediately wrote to Ainslie asking for the protective ferman. The 
Ambassador procured the ferman. but only for Hughes's work as a 
merchant; even then, he refrained from sending it to Cairo until
5
the Court of Directors officially notified him of the appointment.
■i
Egypt 5, Hughes to the Court of Directors, Aug. 25, 1781. There is 
no conclusive evidence to prove this. The Warren Hastings Papers do 
have, however, reference to HI!t who had offered to be the Company's 
agent at Cairo. Add. Mss. 29201 f.ll, "Proposition: to open a trade 
to Egypt, to obtain a return of cash for manufacturers of Bengal", n.
^Egypt, 5, Hughes to Mitchell, June 22, 1780.
^P0 78/l, Hughes to Ainslie, March 20, 1780.
^Egypt, 5, Hughes to Mitchell, March 15, 1781.
5P0 261/4, Ainslie to Mitchell, June 10, 1782.
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Ainslie was obviously worried that the question of offi­
cial representation would naturally follow, for once again he 
made it quite clear that the office of Consul in Egypt would be 
"highly dangerous in itself and in its consequence".*** His bitter 
involvement with Baldwin was not yet forgotten, and he was anxious 
to avoid even the possibility of a similar situation recurring. 
Although he seemed to have no strong dislike for Hughes, he must 
have found it most expedient to ignore him in the hope he would 
soon give up and disappear.
In 1782, an incident occurred, the outcome o f which illus­
trated Ainslie1s attitude to the affairs of Hughes and the British
in Egypt. Hughes was playing billards with a French merchant in
2
Alexandria when a quarrel broke out between the two. The French­
man hit Hughes, who immediately struck back. The relatively large 
and influential French community was so resentful of Hughes’s action 
that he had to flee its wrath. He sought refuge in the home of 
Brandi who was the Consul for Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Naples. 
The Frenchmen followed Hughes there and tried hard to evict him 
forcibly from the house. Brandi remained firm in his protection 
of the Englishman, knowing the latter would have been murdered other­
wise. A young German who was at the scene of the quarrel vocifer-
1Ibid.
p
Fhe quarrel started becauee Hughes informed the Frenchman that the 
latter had to be very formal with him as he was about to be named 
British agent in Egypt. AE, Bp 112, Extrait du registre de la 
chaacelloria du consulat-general de France a Alexandrie, April 5, 
1782.
ously disapproved.the collective French action. He was pounced 
on, and had to seek refuge immediately at the Austrian consulate. 
Attempts were made to follow him there, but the Consul (Augistini) 
also stood firm, and was punished for this by insults, followed 
by an assault by five Frenchmen armed with swords, sabres and other 
deadly weapons. When the incident was reported to Constantinople, 
the Ambassadors of the countries involved were furious and immediately 
demanded satisfaction from the French ambassador. They were pro­
mised compensation.
2
When Ainslie reported the happenings to Fox, he displayed
the amazing detachment he lad previously shown to Baldwin’s welfare.
He referred to Hughes as a person "who calls himself an Englishman",
as if not convinced of his veracity. He also admitted that Hughes
was an "utter stranger" to himself, despite the correspondence of
the previous three years. He added, with very little reluctance,
that he could do nothing for Hughes since there was no consulate
in Egypt, and the unfortunate man had no consular rank or public
3privilege whatsoever.
Hughes’s relationship with the East India Company also 
bore a great similarity to that of Baldwin. The 1779 caravan in-
1F0 78/3, Ainslie to Fox, June 25, 1782.
Charles James Fox (1749-1806), Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs.
^F0 78/3, Ainslie to Fox, June 25, 1782.
cident seemed to have caused great hesitance to continue the 
passage of dispatches through the Red Sea. Yet the Court of 
Directors accepted the information<Hughes sent on the affairs of 
Egypt, and more particularly, on the foreign use of the Suez 
route. But no direct answer was made to his repeated petitions 
for anestablished position as agent, for these petitions showed 
his great anxiety for financial consideration.1 Throughout his 
letters, Hughes presented well organized memorials on the import­
ance of Egypt to the Company and to Britain*, although it cannot 
be ascertained* it is most lilcely that his thoughts were the out­
come of Baldwin’s influence.
It was not only Hughes, however, who m s  eager for the
position of agent foriiie East India Company. The trading house of 
2Pini Brothers offered for it in the early part of 1785. A merchant 
of Jedda had sent a packet of letters, one of which was addressed
to the British Consul at Cairo. Pini Brothers opened it in the
3presence of Arnaud* a French merchant, and found letters addressed 
to the Court of Directors, so they forwarded them to Alexandria,
In 1800, Hughes was asked, however, by the Secret Committee of 
the Company to accompany Home Popham as Arabic interpreter to the 
Red Sea and Arabia. Hughes also accompanied Popham to London.
F0 24/2, Hughes to Harrowby, Nov. 12, I8O4.
2
Venetian merchants of Cairo.
Amaud was described by the Prench consul in Alexandria as an 
Anglophile. AE, Bj, 3, Traitbout to de Castries, May 30, 1778.
then to Marseilles. They followed this by an offer of their 
1services.
Foreign Activity in Egypt
One of Hughes’s unacknowledged services to the Court of 
Directors was to report foreign activity in Egypt. Brandi did the 
same for Ainslie, so between the two it is possible to draw up a 
fairly comprehensive picture of the comings and goings of the 
different nations during the years of Baldwin's absence, including 
the use of the Red Sea route, and how its commercial possibilities 
were instigating certain nations to show renewed and serious in­
terest in Egypt.
On 10 March 1780, six Europeans arrived in Cairo from Suez;
2
a Frenchman, St* Lubin, with his secretary; three Portuguese;
; 5
and, a German, sent from Bolts' of Bombay with dispatches for Vienna. 
They had gone from India to Jedda where they took a Turkish boat for 
the journey to Suez.
•l
Egypt, 5> Brothers Pini to Court of Directors, Jan. 26, 1785.
o
St. Lubin actually arrived in Cairo on 14 February, according to 
the French sources which may be assumed to be more accurate than those 
of Hughes. He was consequently involved in a dispute with an English 
captain in Mukha. AE, Bj, 112, Traitbout to Minister, March 1, 1780.
^F0 78/l, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian), March 11, 1780.
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In March 1781, Hughes reported that he had received word 
from Alexandria that a Venetian ship had arrived. It had been
1loaded at Venice by two Englishmen, and was on its way to Basra.
Hughes then mentioned two Germans who were in Egypt in April
1781. He strongly suspected they were Butch, for they carried dis­
patches for Batavia. He consequently warned British officials in
Basra and Bombay of their presence, and also sent word to commanders
— 2of British ships at Mukha and Jedda. The first "German1 arrived 
in Egypt on 29 March. Hughes visited him, and found him to be 
young, and very reserved, but he could only speak Erench and German.
He claimed to be a merchant, but Hughes suspected he was anofficer
in disguise. He referred to himself as ,,]^lrederik,,, but Hughes 
saw a letter addressed to him that indicated his name was van Vasser. 
On 20 April he left Cairo for Suea.
The other man was George Tornbauer who was going to Aleppo 
and Basra; in May, Charles Smith (who had served as pro-consul 
in Aleppo from 1770-1772) informed Hughes that Tornbauer was in
■1
Referred to by Ainslie as the Imperial agent in India. Add. Mss. 
35523 f. 155, Ainslie to Keith, Aug. 19, 1781. He had connections 
with the Red $ea trade.
^Egypt* 5, Hughes to Mitchell, April 29, 1781.
^Egypt 5, Hughes to Court of Birectors, April 29, 1781.
^His real name waawCapt. Erederik van Sawer, and he had the 
Imperial command to pass through Egypt. Ibid., May 18, 1781.
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Aleppo, staying with a French merchant. It was not until August
that Hughes could give a clear and definite statement as to the
nationality of the two men: they were German, but in the employ
of the Butch, Hughes*s warning to Smith in Aleppo had served a
purpose; Tornbauer* s trip to Basra was delayed, and he had to go
2
by land to Persia,
But the most important aspect of foreign activity was centred 
around the use of the Red Sea route. France and Holland seemed 
to make most frequent use of it for dispatches despite the sporadic 
passage of others. In early May 1782, Hughes announced the arrival 
of a French boat at Alexandria that had come from Marseilles. It 
carried a Lieutenant Colonel who seemed to be in a great hurry to 
reach the E&st Indies, and a uMahrattahu person with three Indian 
servants. Hughes was not entirely sure whether their route was to 
be via Suez or Aleppo, but hems careful to state: **Xt really grieves 
me to the heart to see that their Honors pay so little attention 
to the valuable and speedy channel of the Red Sea ... our enemies
the Dutch and French ... are continually profiting of it..." for
3dispatches.
 ^Egypt 5, Hughes to Mitchell, May 25, 1781.
^Egypt 5, Hughes to Court of Directors, Aug. 23, 1781. 
^Home Misc. .; '. .- ■j 162, Hughes to Mitchell, May 1, 1782,
While the French and Dutch were using Suez primarily 
for their dispatches in the years 1779-82, the Austrians were more 
interested in its use for the trade to India* numerous Austrian 
attempts to woo the Egyptian officials into an understanding for 
this purpose were reported* To begin with, advances to the Customs 
Master, An tun Fir‘awn, were made. He was created an Imperial sub­
ject, and recognized as such by a berat from Constantinople. Two
Beys in Cairo also acknowledged him as Austrian. Later, Emperor
1Joseph made him a Baron and Caunt Palatine. Then followed a great 
exchange of gifts between the Customs Officer and the Emperor;;
2
the former received valuable porcelain, the latter horses and camels.
The Porte then issued a ferman by which it held itself responsible 
for all losses sustained by Austrian subjects in the matter of 
trade. This was to include trade in the Red Sea area, and to pro-
5
tect Austrians from bedouins, the Beys, and the government of Egypt.
As if to confirm the rumours of growing Austrian predominance in
Egypt the Imperial ambassador in Constantinople requested that a
consulate be set up in Cairo, despite the withdrawal of the French
4consulate to Alexandria.
^FO 78/3, Extract of letter from Alexandria to Ainslie (probably 
from Lee, pro-consul at Smyrna), June 15, 1782 (cypher).
2F0 78/5, Lee to Ainslie, Oct* 17, 1782. Fir‘aim also made a 
commercial agreement with Trieste. FO 78/2, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian) 
June 20, 1781.
^F0 78/5, Extract of letter from Alexandria to Ainslie (cypher),
June 15, 1782.
"^FO 78/5, Ainslie to Hillsborough, April 12, 1782. The French con­
sulate had moved from Cairo in 1777 because of the pressures it was 
subject to by the ruling beys.
English suspicions of the intentions of the Holy Roman
Empire were raised by Richard Lee, the Consul at Smyrna, who
visited Egypt in the summer of 1782, He was convinced that
Rosetti, a “finished Machiavellian trader" who wanted to "rule
the roost" free of any responsibility, had formed the plan to
1renew the trade in a legal manner. Lee was sure that an agency
for the Red Sea trade was being formed in Trieste, and that Bolts 
2
of Bombay, as well as the Emperor himself, were connected with 
the scheme. When he informed Ainslie of the matter, Lee seemed 
to think that Rosetti could be bribed to stop the trade altogether. 
But Rosetti was anxious to keep the prospects of theienewed trade 
a secret; he denied any knowledge of plans to re-open the route
3
to an unidentified Englishman who went to Egypt for the purpose.
By the end of the summer, Ainslie began to feel alarm. He
seemed convinced of the truth of Lee!s reports, but did not lose
the .opportunity to suspect Baldwin1 s complicity in the entire 
4plan. He was sure that his old enemy was quietly plotting for a
^FO 78/4, Lee to Ainslie (extract), Dec. 51, 1782.
2See above, p.97.
^FO 78/4, Lee to Ainslie (extract), Dec. 31, 1782. See Chapter
X for Baldwin’s earlier suspicions of Rosetti.
^FO 78/5, Ainslie to Crantham (cypher), Aug. 26, 1782.
revival of the trade, and wrote to Robert Murray Keith, British
Ambassador in Vienna, asking him to investigate any connections
Baron d1 Herbert Rathkeal (imperial Ambassador at the Porte) might
1have had with Baldwin♦ When, in the early part of 1784, the
Austrians were clamouring for unlimited rights of navigation in
all seas of the Ottoman Empire, Ainslie's fears grew immeasurably,
He was frightened,most of all, that a renewal of the Red Sea trade
would once again hinder the profits of the Levant Company, and also
2those of the East India Company.
But there were other plans afoot to open the port of Suea 
to European ships from India. While the Holy Roman Empire had tried 
to win the services of Antun Fir4 awn for just these purposes, the 
French were able to successfully win the Customs official to their 
side. In January 1784, Brandi reported to Ainslie the sudden departure 
of Fir4awn from Egypt* He had left on the pretext of going on a 
pilgrimage to Jerusalem, but it was doubtful that he planned to 
return, especially since hehad taken his immense fortune, estimated 
at between eight and ten million francs, with him. In May of the 
same year, the itinerary of his journey was reported: Malta,
1F0 78/4, Ainslie to Keith, April 12, 1782.
^FO 78/5, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), Feb, 10, 1784.
^F0 78/6, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian), Jan. 5> 1784.
^Corr. Pol., Turquie, 174, Consular Report, Feb. 1786. A good part 
of his fiortune apparently came from his share of the booty of the 
"Hathalia" in 1779. Corr. Pol,, Turquie, 172, Choiseul-Gonffier 
to de Castries, Feb, 2 6, 1785.
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Leghorn, Venice, and Trieste. Once established abroad, Fir‘awn 
contacted French merchants interested in the Red Sea trade, 
and offered his services to them. He lad, in 1775, promised the 
French dragoman in Egypt, Venture de Paradis,'1' that be would 
aid French ships that brought India goods to Suez. In 1778,
Paradis went to Marseilles and spoke of Fir‘awn's offer to mer­
chants there, who showed great interest in the possibilities
of a Red Sea trade. It was with these men that the former Customs
2
official wished to co-operate.
The Russians were also trying to establish themselves in 
Egypt but did not seem to have any special interest in the Suez 
trade. In July 1785, a Russian consulate was set up in Alexandria 
with Baron Thonus as the consul who then proceeded to announce
3
the imminent arrival of an English consul and a Danish consul*
Thonus and the Austrians were helping Murad and Ibrahim to rebel
against the Porte, and hoped to thereby render the internal affairs
4of Egypt independent cf the Porte.
The Ottomans also made use of the Red Sea trade route during 
thisjperiod. In 1784, eleven Turkish^hips arrived at Suez from
•j f
Paradis was to accompany Bonaparte to Egypt in 1798. Clement,
Les Franyais d'Egypte. p.141.
2Corr, Pol., Turquie, 173> Comte A, Faraun to Guys (copy), Oct. 28, 
1785. For further information about this association, see 
Chapter IV, below.
■^ FO 78 /6 , Brandi to A in s lie  ( I t a l ia n ) ,  Aug. 22, 1785.
I^bid.., Aug. 24, 1785.
Jedda, with coffee, drugs, and other goods. There were rumours
1of thirteen more to come. In November 1785, Brandi announced
that a merchant ship in Bengal was destined, with much merchandise,
for Egypt, He could not ascertain, however, which colours it
2would be flying.
The use of an alternative route
Ainslie was determined to ignore the possibilities of the 
Red Sea dispatch route in order to discourage its use for trade
purposes. Owing to the necessity of an alternative route from
England to India, he turned to the idea of a passage via Aleppo 
and Basra. It was this method that he insisted on using during 
the period of Baldwin's absence from Egypt. He tried to convince 
the authorities in London of the practicability of the route, but 
succeeded only in receiving orders in 1786 to press claims for 
British rights of navigation in the Red Sea.
In September 1779, the Ambassador reported that two officers 
of the East India House had left London for Bombay on IQ.:July,
They arrived in Aleppo on 22August'-,, and went directly from there 
to Basra and Bombay, Ainslie seemed to find the speed of the
^EO 78/5, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian), May 12, 1784.
^ 0  78/7, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian), Nov. 28, 1785.
5SP 97/55, A in s lie  to Weymouth, Sept. 17, 1779*
passage extraordinary, for he commented repeatedly on it:
London to Vienna would take seven days; Vienna to Constantinople
1
twenty-two or three days; Constantinople to Aleppo seven days.
¥hen he heard of the Anglo-Dutch rupture at the beginning of 1781,
2
he sent the news to India by the new route. It evidently pleased 
the Court of Directors, for they rewarded him with a present of 
£500.3
Ainslie was also anxious to promote the Basra route for 
trade purposes in order to divert interest from the Sue2. He 
appealed to the Porte in the late summer of 1779 to facilitate the 
transport of goods from Basra to Aleppo and back. Sulayman, the 
Pasha at Basra, was the Ambassador1 s friend, and of great help to 
English messengers and traders. Ainslie suspected that the French 
were trying to overthrow him in order to start their own contra­
band trade with British settlements in India. A plan for this was 
made up by Jean-Jacques Rousseau1 s cousin who returned to Baghdad
4
in early 1781. His aim was to form a relationship with the Pasha, 
the Ottoman Coast Commanders, and the Arab tribes of the area. Ains­
lie was suspicious that those Britons who had been thwarted in the
Vo 78/2, Ainslie to Hillsborough, Feb, 1, 1781.
V o  26l/4, Ainslie to Mitchell, Feb. 1, 1781.
V o  26/4, Mitchell to Ainslie, May 14, 1781.
V o  78/3, Ainslie to Hillsborough, April 10, 1782.
Evidence in French archives shows that both the Red Sea route and
the Aleppo-Basra route to India were of interest to the French.
Corr. Pol., Turquie, 166, March 30, 1780, de Vergennes to de Sartine.
pre-1779 Red Sea trade were somehow connected with the French
designs in Basra. He even went so far as to ask Hillsborough1
for a secret service budget in order to verify some of his ideas,
2
since he suspected the Venetians were also involved*
But it was not only the French and Venetians who wanted to 
use the Aleppo-Basra route for trade. Ainslie was aware of the 
fact that many rich Greek and Armenian merchants were using it 
as a means to reach India. He mentioned a particular case of the 
wealthy Serpos family who had houses of trade in Venice and Con­
stantinople. They were sending a younger member of the family to 
11 seduce" the Pashas of Baghdad and Basra, in order to settle in 
India as his family's agent, Ainslie felt compelled to give the 
young Serpos a letter of introduction to his consul in Basra, but 
privately warned the latter of the dangers involved.
There were no real public conveyance methods from Constantin­
ople to Aleppo and Basra, Couriers would have to be hired, although 
Tatars were kept in Constantinople for the purpose, and the British 
Embassy had its own in constant pay and attendance. The Tatars were
"'wills Hill, 1st Marquis of Downshire, Earl of Hillsborough (1718-1793). 
In 1741 he entered Parliament. In 1763, he was the President of the 
Board of Trade. In 1768, after serving as Postmaster General, he 
became Secretary of State for the Colonies. In November 1779, he 
succeeded Weymouth as Secretary of State for the Northern Department.
He resigned the post in March 1732.
‘TTO 78/3, Ainslie to Hillsborough, April 10, 1/82.
^Home M isc ., 161, A in s lie  to Latouche, A p ril 7, 1782.
not honest, and often disobeyed orders, causing considerable
delay in the arrival of messages. Intermediate agents would
have to be employed in Constantinople and Aleppo, but once again,
this was extremely inconvenient.
A suggestion was presented by Humphrey, a British factor
at Constantinople, to Ainslie, who in turn conveyed it to the
East India Company in London; it was written in the form of a
memorial, and was concerned with the steps to be taken in order
1to ensure a better and more efficient route to India* It was 
based on the theory that hired Tatars were not to be trusted; 
but that four should be kept in constant pay, two at Constantinople, 
and two at Aleppo. The memorial was written, presumably, to attain 
the office of qgent for the Company.
British Activity in Egypt
Although official Britain virtually ignored Egypt during
the period from 1779 to 1786, especially after an act of Parlia-
2ment in 1781 prohibited the Suez trade, there were a number of 
individuals who showed interest in the country. They included travel-
1
H&ypt 5a, Humphrey to Ainslie, Nov. 8, 1784.
2
"And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that, 
from and after the fifth day of July, one thousand seven 
hundred and eighty-two, it shall not be lawful for any 
British subject ... to carry on or be concerned in any 
trade or traffic whatsoever, in sending any kind of goods 
and merchandizes, the produce or manufacture of the East
108.
lers, merchants, writers, East India Company servants, army 
officers and statesmen. Many of these visited the country, and 
some later published their experiences; they had a definite view­
point as to the rdle of their country in establishing a direct 
route to India.
Mark Wood, a captain of engineers of the East India Company, 
left London on 23 March 1779, and arrived in Alexandria on 16 May.
He was received by a Venetian merchant who, according to Wood, al­
ways entertained British travellers. Mention was made of Baldwin 
having an agent in Alexandria, and a French agent at Rosetta. The 
Englishmen in Egypt at the time, just previous to the "Nathalia" 
disaster, were Captain Waugh of the "Britannia", and Captain Robin­
son of the "Momingstar", both of whose ships were anchored at Suez.
Andrew Slciddy was also present. When Wood arrived at Suez in order 
to depart for Bengal, the "Nathalie" was just arriving.
Wood landed in India on 2 July. He wrote to the Secret Com­
mittee of his journey, and of his adventures at Mukha where the
Indies or China, by the way of Suez, or by any other channel 
to Europe; and in case any British subject ... shall carry 
on ... such trade..., he ... shall forfeit and pay to the 
United Company double the value of the goods and merchand­
izes which shall be so sent to Europe, to be recovered in any 
court of justice in the East Indies, or in His Majesty's 
Court of King's Bench at Westminster." 21 George III, C.65, cl.xxx. 
The Act was passed on 18 July 1781.




Frenchman St. hub in was the instigator of an Anglo-French outbreak.
The Pasha at Mukha was anxious to maintain the neutrality of his 
port, and detained the French until the ’’Morningstar” was safely 
out of the Straits of Bab-al-Mandab.
Wood obviously believed that the Red Sea route should be en­
couraged for the Company’s use, for in his letter he mentioned that 
two small packet boats (70 to 90 tons each) needed to be established! 
in the Mediterranean Sea for the use of dispatches; he suggested
Malta or Messina as excellent ports for these boats, Nice and Mar-
2
seilles being unreliable in times of war with France.
Some time very late in 1779? the ’’Nancy'1, an English ship,
3arrived at Alexandria. It was commanded by Captain John Wilson, 
and it loaded senna, myrrh, and linseed to be sent to Britain for 
the. two firms of John Bond, and Cazalet and Cook.
Towards the end of February 1780, two ships sailed from India. One 
of the vessels was a ship of war belonging to the Bast India Company, the 
other was H.M.S."Coventry. The latter carried urgent dispatches for the
4




Bgypt 5a, Wood to Sir William James and Secret Committee, Sept. 15,
1779. Also Mark Wood, Remarks during a journey from England to India througt
IsffiLiaJJia-
^SP 105/170, Entered Jan. 10, 1780 in Impositions Book of the Levant 
Company.
"^Sir Edward Hughes (17207-1794), Admiral. In 1775, he was named 
Commander-in-Chief inthe East Indies. In 1777, he returned to 
England, but was re-appointed to the same position in July 1778.
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1and Sir Eyre Coote. To protect the carrier of the dispatches,
2
the Hawab of Arcot, Admiral Hughes and Governor Humbold of Madras 
had letters for the Sharif of Mecca, the Pasha of Egypt, and Ibrahim 
Bey asking for a safe passage.
The ships arrived on 24 May at Qngayr. Pive men, including 
James Wooley, landed. They were well received, and given guards 
and camels to help them cross the desert by gusayn Bey who governed 
Qina, gusayn had already received "presents’1 for this service, so 
he even arranged for an escort. Then, all of a sudden, the men were 
made to pay 2,500 Spanish dollars, after which they were arrested 
and sent to Cairo as prisoners.
When they reached Cairo, they were taken to Ibrahim Bey 
who received them politely. lie read the letters of introduction, 
was satisfied with the contents, and gave orders for the release 
of the men. Pour of them then proceeded to Jedda and India; James 
Hooley remained hi Cairo since his destination was to be London.
^Sir Eyre Coote (1726-1785), General, In 1769, he was Commander- 
in-Chief of the Madras Presidency. In 1770, he returned to England 
on the overland route through Egypt. In 1777 he was named Commander- 
in-Chief in India.
2Sir Thomas Humbold (1756-1791). He served under Clive during the 
siege of Calcutta, and at Plassey was Clive's aide-de-camp. In June
1777, he succeeded Pigol as Governor of Madras. He gave the orders
for the attack on Pondicherry which fell on 19 March 1779, after 
which the crown gave him a baronetcy.
^P0 78/l, Edward Hughes to Sharif of Mecca, n. d.
P0 78/l, Thomas Humbold to Shaykh al Baida, n.d.
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The next morning he went to Isma/il Pasha in the Citadel to
show him the letters of introduction. The Pasha1 s reaction came
as a shock to Wooley: he abused the Englishman, shouted insults
at him, detained him, and finally imprisoned him."1* After a few
days, during which Rosetti pleaded for the Englishman, the Pasha
decided to send his prisoner to Constantinople for trial; to ensure
2
his arrival there, an Ottoman guard was sent to accompany him.
When Ainslie heard that Wooley was a prisoner in Constantin­
ople, he immediately sent a protest through his secretary to the 
Grand Vezir, the Reis Efendi being ill at the time. The aeply at 
first was ignorance of the entire matter, then that the question 
would have to rest pending the Reis Efendi* s return. Ainsiie con­
tinued to press the authorities, until he was allowed to visit Wooley 
at the Customs House where he was detained. After much trouble, Ains­
lie was able to secure the release of his countryman by taking him
3into his own custody according to the Capitulations.
But the officials at the Porte were exceedingly angry when they 
learned of Wooley* s departure from the Customs House, They appeared 
at the British Embassy with orders from tjie Grand Vezir to return the
1 «According to Ainslie, it was the French Ambassador who put pressure 
on the Ottomans to detain Wooley. Egypt 5, Ainslie to the East 
India Company, Oct. 17, 1780.
S*0 78/2, Wooley to Ainslie, Aug. 26, 1780. Also, ibid.. Aug. 28, 1780.
3
It was not entirely done without payment. It cost the Ambassador £154* 
Egypt 5, Extracts of letters from Ainslie respecting expenses at the 
Porte, 1777-80.
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Englishman with them. He had disobeyed the edict of 1779 and would 
have to be punished. A great uproar followed, during which Ainslie 
remained adamant, and refused to have Wooley evicted from the Embassy.
Ainslie was greatly irritated. While heaemained convinced 
that Wooley was essentially innocent'*' and had suffered needlessly 
at the hands of the Ottomans, he was most suspicious that the English­
man had been purposely used by the authorities in India to try to re­
open the Red Sea trade. His most decisive proof was the letter sent
by Governor Humbold to Ibrahim Bey which urged that the past friend-
2
ship of the two countries should continue,i Ainslie was convinced
that the passage of Wooley on the "Coventry" was merely a facade 
for the real purpose of Rumbold and Admiral Hughes* to re-establish
3
contact with the Beys of Egypt with a view to further economic ties.
Wooley was finally able to leave Constantinople on 1 September
4for Belgrade, Vienna, and then London. He reported his experiences
to the Court of Directors, and was most emphatic in his statements
that Britain had to ensure a free and safe passage for the route to 
India via the Red Sea.
1
He referred to the unfortunate man as "my old acquaintance".
Add. Mss. 35519 f.202, Ainslie to Keith, Sept. 2, 1780.
2
See Appendix V for complete text of the letter.
78/l, Ainslie to Weymouth, Sept. 16, 1780.
^FO 7 8 / l ,  A in s lie  to Hillsborough, Oct. 2, 1780.
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On 9 March 1780, an Englishman arrived in Egypt from Leg­
horn on his -way to India. He was First Lieutenant (Navy) Samuel 
Nickills, hut was in the service of the Holy Homan Empire. He 
had a recommendation for Eosetti who took charge of him while in 
the country.***
J.&mes Capper was a Colonel in the service of the East India
Company. He travelled to Egypt in 1778, hut published the details
2
of his journey in 1783. They were written an the form of letters 
from Port St. George in 1780, at the request of a “person of rank" 
in India who wanted to return to England via Suez. He described 
the procedure of arriving at Suez: an Egyptian boat approached
the incoming vessel, and asked what the passengers wanted; an 
officer then came on board with a present of bread and oranges from 
the government; the officer then took the letters that would be 
forwarded the same day to Cairo; and, with the messenger who took 
the letters, a note would be sent infoiming the shaykh al-balad of 
the ship's arrival. Capper made it quite clear that ”... nothing 
less than the existence of o ur settlements in India may some time
or other depend upon our possessing a right of passing unmolested
3
through Egypt 1
^FO 78/l, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian), March 11, 1780,
2
James Capper, Observations on the Passage to India through Egypt and 
across the Great Desert.
3I b i d . , p . x i i .
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On 24 April 1732, Henry Rooke arrived at Suez from Jedda.
Six days later, he arrived in Cairo where he was to stay for a
few days before his departure for Alexandria, and then England.***
He was most amazed at the fact that the East India Company did
not make more use of the Red Sea route for dispatches* He suggested
that the Company should offer presents to Ibrahim Bey, the shaykh
al-balad. Rooke claimed that the irip from London to Madras lasted
only sixty-three days. He did not seem particularly enthusiastic
about a renewal of the trade from India to Egypt, however*
One day while Rooke was out riding in Cairo, he met a party
of Ottoman soldiers who said that Musfafa Bey wished to see him.
He was taken to Musjafa* s headquarters along with two European
friends who wished to accompany him* When they arrived, the two
others were separated from Rooke who was taken in alone to see
the Mamluk. The latter informed him that an Englishman who had
passed through Egypt two years previously owed £500 to an Armenian
merchant. Rooke was told he had to pay the debt. When he refused,
he was imprisoned, but was well treated. He was only released later
2with the aid of a certain "Mr. R*u, presumably Rosetti, for de­
scriptions of his influence with the local authorities and his claim 
to have been of great help to travelling Englishmen, seem to indicate
A
Henry Rooke, Travels to the Coast of Arabia Eelix, and from thence 




While Rooke was in prison, he was visited by some of the
Bey's officers. He recalled later: "I found several of them
pleasant liberal-minded men, and we conversed together very
1sociably through my Arabian servant..." In the evening, the
Bey asked to see him. He was in a very good frame of mind and
temper, but seemed very anxious to have the money. He asked Rooke,
smilingly, to convert to Islam; Rooke said he "... hinted that
I should be very well off if I could become one of them and stay 
2
at Cairo...." During the interview, two of Ibrahim1 s officers
entered and, because of Rosetti1 s influence, demanded Rooke1 s
3
immediate release. Musjafa had to obey the orders, albeit some­
what reluctantly, ”... observing at the same time that whenever 
he had an opportunity of making a little money, Ibrahim Bey always 
interfered and prevented him".^ Before he left Mustafa’s quarters, 
Rooke still had to pay some money; he paid £50 to "different
5 - *
people". He then saw Ibrahim Bey, who was exceedingly kind and 
courteous to him, and promised him all necessary protect!cn.
^Ibid.
Ibid., p. 100.
Another person who helped Rooke out of the situation was a^rich 
Turkish merchant ?Haj Kosim,who pleaded p ersonally with Ibrahim 
for the release.
^Rooke, op.cit., p.100.
5Ib id . . p .101
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Rooke*s amazement at the lack of interest shown hy the
East India Company for the extraordinary swiftness of the Red
Sea route -was echoed by other Englishmen. In 1783, Robert
Richie, the British consul in Venice, presented A sketch of a
Plan for a more expeditious and regular Intercourse between
London and India, and of employing for that -purpose two -packet
boats in the service of the Honourable East India Company between
1Venice and Latakia. or Alexandria and Cyprus. He also gave
the Company another plans A Sketch of a clan for two -packet
boats to be employed 3n the East India Company*s service between
2Venice and Latakia or Alexandria. Yet a third project was in­
cluded in a letter to Carmarthen in 1784: Sketch of a plan for
3sending dispatches to India by the way of Bassora.
Major John Scott^ of the Bengal division of the East India 
Company forces, later sent to England by Warren Hastings as his 
political agent, was eager to see a revival of the Suez trade. 
His reasons were put forward in consideration of the Bengal econ­
omy, as well as to uphold Hastings* theories thereon, especially 
during the latter*s impeachment. In 1782, he published a pamphlet 
entitled A review of the transactions in Bengal during the last
^Egypt 5a, Richie to Mitchell, Feb. 5, 1783.
2Ibid.
■5
Egypt 5a, Richie to Caimiarthen, Oct. 1, 1784.
^He later became Scott-Waring.
1
ten years which presented, amongst many other items, the reasons 
behind the desire to reopen the trade. Bengal at the time was 
suffering from the exodus of the Bengali fortunes to England.
There were two ways in which this was being done: first, the
money was beingssnt out in large sums which was ruinous to the econ­
omy; and second, Englishmen were lending their money to foreigners, 
thus decreasing the sales of the East India Company in England.
The second method could be made practicable, but only if the 
foreigners were.required to bring bullion to Bengal in order to 
buy cargo; thus, the decrease in sales would be otherwise com­
pensated. On the other hand, if the B e n g a l i s  were not able to 
lend their money to foreigners, they should bring bullion to 
Bengal, or give up trading altogether. The ’'languid circulation" 
in Bengal necessitated Hastings's opening of the Suez trade; its 
growth would have put a stop to the transfer of British tapital to 
foreign countries, and to Erance most of all.
Edmund Burke, In the 9th Repo it to the Commons, verified 
2Scott's theories. He stated that XL million a year were being 
sent out of Bengal. The investments made in goods by foreign com-
•]
An extract is to be found in Egypt 5.
2
Reports of the Hr»use of Commons, vol. 6, 1783, East India. "9th 
report of the Select Committee appointed to take into consideration 
the state of the administration of justice in the provinces of 
Bengal, Bahar and Orissa", Reported by Richard Smith, June 25, 1783*
panies from funds of British subjects were being sent to China.
£2 million were paid iito private hands for the charge of col­
lection, as well as for civil and military establishments. The 
trade to the Red Sea was one of the best ways to carry money 
out of Bengal, It was a great pity that it had sadly diminished 
since 1779.^
Lieutenant Richard Scott arrived:in Alexandria on 18 June. 1780 
and wished to go to India, But at the time there were no avail­
able vessels to carry him there. Furthermore it was considered 
dangerous for hhn to go to Suez so soon after the ’'Nathalie" 
incident. He was advised to leave Alexandria as soon as possible.
He went to Latakia on 24 June, and then from there to Aleppo 
where he arrived six days later.' In Aleppo he met Baldwin who 
was still considering a journey to India. Scott observed in 
Baldwin an unusual concern for the papers which had been stolen 
from him when he bad been attacked in Antiochs Scott strongly 
suspected that Baldwin had designs and plans to expose in India
that were not compatible with the interests of the East India 
2
Company. He was very wary of Baldwin, descx’ibing him as having
It is interesting to note that Baldwin was an "intimate acquaint­
ance" of Burlce; the latter had promised him to obtain damages for 
the "Nathata" disaster. FO 78/l, Ainslie to Hillsborough, March 3, 
1780.
^Egypt 5, Scott to L. Sulivan, July 6, 1780.
"ambiguous sentiments, and evasive arguments”. He “was also 
made to understand that Baldwin had connections with Mr, Bolts 
for a seven-year plan for the Red Sea trade. Scott was sure that 
this scheme would so ham the Company that it would almost surely 
be driven out of India.
Baldwin gave Scott an account of his plan, Baldwin1 s Re-
2flections Concerning Suez to India. In it, he began by attacking 
Ainslie for having created obstacles to destroy the Suez trade.
He then gave suggestions for opening the communications for passen­
gers and dispatches, and also for re-establishing the trade. In 
order to re-open the passage for communication, Baldwin put for­
ward the idea that two ships should go up the Red Sea from India, 
but refuse to trade coffee until reparations for the "Hathalia” 
losses be paid. Since the Ottoman Umpire needed coffee badly, it 
would be forced to acquiesce, after which a new treaty could be
drawn up. As to the methods to re-establish the trade, Baldwin
3
suggested that armed ships flying the Hawab1s colours ' should seize 
Egyptian trade in the Red Sea. When the Porte would consequently 
protest, unlimited trade in Egypt would undoubtedly follow, since 
the coffee trade linked Egypt, Mecca and Constantinople. Baldwin
*j
Scott stated that Bolts was from Bengal; it is most likely he was 
mistaken. See above, pp.9% and 101.
2Egypt 5, 1780.
3
Presumably the Hawab of Arcot.
feebly ended M s  thoughts by putting in a reminder that Britain's
great power would always emerge victorious in case of armed combat.
The Red Sea route was not entirely ignored ty Englishmen,
for Jean Baptiste Mure, the French consul in Alexandria, reported
the arrival in Suez some time in the summer of 1783 of a messenger
with urgent dispatches for London.'1' It is interesting to note
that he was accompanied by Manonalki, the same Armenian linguist
who had been abused during the caravan disaster of 1779*
Two more; Englishmen were associated with Egypt during the
2
period from 1779-1786. Sir Richard Worsley visited Egypt in 
3
1785. He was well known to be an avid collector of antiques, 
and it is presumed that his visit was instigated by archaeological
4
rather than political reasons. But he did become involved in
5
local /problems when he arrived.
On 7 August 1786, at the height of the crisis following the 
Ottoman punitive expedition to Egypt, an English merchant by the 
name of Mr. Clark arrived in Alexandria, having come from Marseilles.
A^E, B^ ., 115, Mure to de Castries, June 17, 1783-
Sir Richard Worsley (1751-1805), antiquary and traveller. In 1779 
he was made clerk of the Privy Council. From 1774 to 1802 he was 
a member of Parliament. He had also served as governor of the Isle 
of Wight.
3K) 78/6, Brandi to Ainslie, Aug. 22, 1785.
He was accompanied By Willey Heveley, an artist, who made sketches 
for him. Add. Mss. 35535 f. 286, Ainslie to ICeith, Bee. 3, 1785.
5
See below, p. 134.
He wanted to go to India, and had with him a letter of recommenda­
tion to the French Consul from Baldwin who was, by now, the Consul- 
General, but had not yet arrived.'1' Mr. Clark wanted to take the
Suez route, but was advised not to because of the troubled conditions.
2
So he was obliged to travel via Aleppo and Basra.
Growing British awareness of French designs and subsequent 
confrontaticaas at the Forte
Individual Englishmen were beginning to see the value of an 
official interest in Egypt, but found little support for their 
ideas from their government, the two Companies, or the British am­
bassador in Constantinople. France, in the meantime, ms actively 
engaged in seeking closer political and commercial ties with the 
Beys, the 1785 Truguet agreements being the culmination of earlier 
efforts. Ainslie was constantly/ being informed of the situation, 
albeit often from second-hand sources, but he somehow managed to 
remain adamant in his long-standing belief that Britain should 
have no interest in Egypt. And he naively continued to justify 
his conviction by turning to the Porte for its repeated denials 
of French concessions. The present account deals mostly with British 
reports on and reaction to the French presence in Egypt.
i
See Chapter III, below.
^ 0  7 8 /7 , Brandi to A in s lie  ( I t a l ia n ) ,  Aug. 9, 1786.
Ainslie was highly aware of the rivalry that existed 
between England and France for influence within the Ottoman 
Empire; it was a rivalry that was greatly increased by the 
enmity that existed between the two countries. A manifestation 
of this persistent competition may be seen in two isolated ex­
amples, both cited by Ainslie.
The first concerned the diplomatic circles of Alexandria.
On 4 June 1782, King Gaoage1 s birthday, the Ragusan Consul refused 
to fly his national flag in the customary tribute. The reason 
was that he wished to show his sympathy for France. Brandi, who 
somehow felt responsible for English affairs, was insulted, and
complained to Ainslie who denounced it as **improper and insolent 
1conduct". He complained to the Rector aid Councillor of the
2Ragusan Republic, yet he realized that the French were ultimately 
3responsible.
Another incident was of greater importance to the British.
In May 1784, Ainslie proudly reported to London that after a great 
deal of negotiation, he was able to persuade the Porte to exempt
1F078/3, Ainslie to Fox, July 10, 1782>
‘Ti'O 26l/4, Ainslie to Rector and Councillor Ragusan Republic (Italian), 
July 10, 1782.
The Ragusan Consul had apparently complained that Brandi ms in no 
position to act for the British; Ainslie firmly replied to the 
Rector that although Brandi was not a Consul, he was recognized by 
the Ottoman Enpire. Ibid.
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the British from the mastarlye duty. In June of the same year,
the French Ambassador, Choiseul-Gouffier, asked the Porte for
permission to navigate a limited number of merchant ships in the
Red Sea, accepting any restrictions the Empire might wish to 
2
impose. The Ambassador claimed it as an indulgence following 
the recent British exemption from the mastarlye duty. The proposal 
was treated with great mysteiy by the Porte, but Ainslie reported 
to Bon don that one of his M friends" there had claimed it had de­
finitely been rejected.
During the time preceding Truguet!s visit to Egypt, Ainslie 
proved to be extremely slow in realizing the possibilities of an 
independent French a greement with the Beys. When Truguet visited 
Constantinople in 1784, the Ambassador merely reported his presence 
iki London. When Truguet left, he noted that the boat slipped out 
of the harbour in November of the same year. Even Truguet1 s 
return was noted without any special concern. He arrived on 21 
February 1785 from Alexandria; the interim had been spent an France, 
Alexandria and Suez.
^FO 78/5, Ainslie to Carmarthen, May 25, 1784. France had obtained 
the exemption in 1739. ^he mastariye (or masderiye) tax was im­
posed on goods imported frcm a foreign country and sold in the 
Ottoman Empire. It was levied according to the weight or measure 
of the commodity. Gibb and Bowen, op.cit., vol. 1, part 2, p. 13. 
Also, Wood, op♦cit.. pp. 213-214.
S ’O 78/5, Ainslie to Carmarthen, May 25, 1784.
h b x d . , Nov. 25,1784.
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A short while later, Brandi informed Ainslie that Truguet had
arrived on the uTarleton", armed with a Katti Sherif to the Pasha*^
2
for a free passage for India goods on the Red Sea. Truguet had also 
asked for free entry to the new port of Alexandria which had hitherto 
been reserved for Ottoman and Egyptian ships. Murad Bey refused to 
allow it, hut honoured the frenchman with a present: a fur garment
valued at 1,500 pataccas.
Upon receipt of the above communication, Ainslie immediately 
dispatched Pisani, his dragoman, to the official secretary of the Grand 
Vezir, to enquire whether the Porte had indeed granted free navigation 
of the Red Sea to Prance. Pisani stressed the fact that since Britain 
had put a stop to the route for the sake of the Ottoman Empire, des-p 
pite the great loss of efficiency for dispatches, the Ambassador hoped 
that, if and when the rule were revoked, he would be the first to be 
notified. The Grand Vezir sent Ainslie the "strongest assurancesTl 
that he was "totally ignorant" of any concession made to Prance.^ He 
furthermore stated that the Porte was uninformed of French manoeuvres 
in Egypt, and would definitely look into them, after which he would 
inform Ainslie.
1 -w  « «
The Pasha, Muhammad Silat^dar, had been ordered by Murad^to descend from 
the Citadel on 15 Dhul Hijja 1198/51 October 1784; Hurad Bey then de-
A w  J WV- *i"J
clared himself qa im maqam. Jabarti, op. cit*, vol. 2, p.S5.
% 0  78/6, Letter from Alexandria to Ainslie (extract)(prench), Jan.29, 1785. 
It is assumed the writer was Brandi.
The patacca was a Westernized version of abu-taqa, the colloquial ex- 
pression for the window-like image on the face of the coin, a thaler.
Tag a was Egyptian for window. Description de 1'Egypt e, vol. 16, p. 289.
^F0 78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), March 10, 1785-
The Ambassador was greatly concerned that if the news from 
Egypt were cox'rect, France would lave the exclusive right to 
bring India goods to the Ottoman Empire. He realized there was
very little he could do, and did not know exactly what. He there-
1
fore wrote to Carmarthen, saying: "In this situation of affairs
I humbly request to be honored with Your Lordship* s instructions
how to act. It certainly would be difficult, but I do ..not think
impossible to. ..engage the Porte to retract her concession... the
2influence of France seems daily to increase at the Porte."
A few days later, Ainslie received a "very civil** message 
from the Crand Vezir with "positive assurances'* that the Porte 
would always prevent French vessels going up the Hed Sea from Mukha 
and Jedda. He saw no reason to believe the mmours about a possible 
treaty with Truguet. H© only knew that the Frenchman had asked 
for permission to u se the old port of Alexandria, but had been re­
fused. Ainslie was quickly satisfied with this answer. "I have 
reason to think that this declaration is consistent with the truth.. * 
His suspicions of the French were not totally discarded, how­
ever. He seemed convinced that they were seeking the protection of
^Francis Osborne, 5th Duke of Leeds, Marquis of Carmarthen (1751-1799) 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1783 to 1791.
*TPQ 78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), March 10, 1785.
^F0 78 /6 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen (cypher), March 18, 1785.
a Muslim prince for the Red Sea trade, but he could be sure of 
nothing because of the lack of precise information. He began 
to realize the necessity of a consul or "public agent" in Egypt, 
but needed the approval and financial aid of the East India Com­
pany for the post. The best argument he could put forward was 
that British influence at the Porte ms negligible in the face of 
that of Prance; French engineers were employed in all departments
of the Ottoman government, and were even wearing their French
1uniforms at work.
In the meantime, Carmarthen conferred with the Commissioner
for the Affairs of India and promised to supply him with all
available information on the trade and communication between India 
2
and Suez. The Minister also instructed Ainslie to bear in mind 
the fact that Britain must at all times follow French activity 
in Egypt. Despite the flimsy evidence of the Truguet rumours, the 
Ambassador was told to act as if they were true. "You sir have 
heard of the wish to induce the Porte to allow her the two ports of
Suez and Gedda on the Red Sea, these objects are of themselves
3sufficient to create alarm on our part..." Carmarthen also wished
1Ibid.
^FO 78/6, B. Rouse to W. Fraser, April 231 1785. 
^FO 78/6, Carmarthen to Ainslie, May 19, 1785.
f'v y  fv
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toknow what r61e, if any, Russia and the Holy Roman Empire had 
in the French plans.
The first signs of French use of the Red Sea after Truguet's 
visit seemed to pass unnoticed by Ainslie. On 10 June, 1785, 
he reported to Carmarthen that he had received a letter from Egypt 
saying that a French packet boat from Bengal had arrived at Suez.
Xt carried four p assengers who had landed, aad then went on to 
Cairo. But the Ambassador was not woiried about French advances 
in Egypt, he was more concerned about the validity of the letter 
he had received which had not been dated.1
Fifteen days later, he was able to confirm the rumours of 
the French ship. It had sailed from Pondicherry, and had most 
probably carried dispatches to France. It carried no merchandise, 
but there were nxmours that it was soon to be followed by a merchant- 
ship with goods consigned to French trading-houses in Cairo. Ainslie 
was also able to confirm the fact that the primary interest of the 
Truguet mission concerned the entry of French goods to Suez, and 
that the Porte and the Sharif of Mecca disapproved.
Choiseul-Gouffier, the French Ambassador, disclaimed any know­
ledge of his country1 sintention to re-open the trade. Ainslie drily 
concluded that ”... should a ship arrive at Suez with India goods,
^FO 78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen, June 10, 1785. 
^FO 78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen, June 25, 1786.
it is by no means improbable she will be produced under the 
English, or any other flag, except that of France". He did 
not believe his French counterpart, of course, but found it equally 
difficult to disbelieve that Englishmen were connected with French 
plans.
Ainslie reported to Carmarthen in June that he was aware
that both France and Austria were anxious to render Egypt inde-
2
pendent of the Porte. Yet it is amazing that he never looked 
further into French designs. A fortnight later he confessed that 
he was "entirely in the daik" as to French intrigues in Cairo, and 
did not know whether there were any argents there from Pondicherry. 
"But I have the strongest assurances that the Porte will never 
approve the views of France or ever tolerate a plan of commerce 
to and from India." An incident occurred that proved to Ainslie 
the great jhterest of France and Austriaii Egypt. An English cap­
tain by the name of ¥aldegrave had been staying with Ainslie, but 
planning to go to Egypt in order to report to Carmarthen on the 
state of affairs there. Both Choiseul-Gouffier and Herbert Rath- 
keal, the French and Imperial Ambassadors respectively, suddenly
'ibid.
2Ibid.
'’PO 78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), July 9, 1785.
showed great interest in him, after having ignored him for six 
months. They pretended to he anxious aboxit the captain's de­
parture, and fearful lest he should he infected with the plague 
which was quickly spreading ini Egypt. Captain Waldegrave finally 
had to postpone his departure.1'
The Porte was equally worried about German and Russian 
efforts to establish themselves nn Egypt. Their respective sgents 
were encouraging the Beys to rebellion, and urging them to aim 
f6r independence. Ainslie did not discard the possibility of such 
an uprising; he remembered the revolt of 4Ali Bey,. and knew that 
the Beys would always seize the opportunity of disturbances within 
the Empire to rid themselves of the Ottoman aegis. It did not 
seem likely they would do anything at the moment, since they were 
financially dependent on the Porte, owing to the plague and famine 
in Egypt, But it was a well-known fact that Murad Bey had been 
suspected for many years of a plan for independence, for which he 
had been "courted" by the Holy Roman Empire, Venice and France.
The French merchants of Egypt had lent him a great deal of money 
and, of all the foreigners, seemed to enjoy his confidence the most.
•]
Ibid. ¥aldegrave actually never reached Egypt. He became ill 
in October, and an his way to Greece and the Morea developed 
a violent fever.
1 3 0 .
Realizing his inability to discover French motives in
Egypt^  Ainslie decided to engage Brandi as a private agent to
help British subjects in Egypt,and to send out as much information
1as possible concerning events there. Brandi was also the Consul 
for Sweden and the vice-Consul for Maples, and had lived in Egypt 
for twenty-five years. In the early summer of 1785, he travelled 
to Constantinople; while there, he received his appointment from 
Ainslie. He was to be paid £50 per year, with no other responsi­
bility from Britain. Ainslie gave him £25 in advance before he 
left Constantinople on 5 July. It is indeed strange that it never 
occurred to Ainslie that an Englishman would be a far better and 
more reliable source of information; the Ambassador disliked 
Baldwin, but Hughes was probably still in Egypt.
It is even more strange that the Ambassador relied only on 
Brandi!s letters for a detailed enquiry of French pursuits in Egypt, 
On 23 July, he had to admit that even the Porte had "... varied in 
her general opposition to establishing a trade to India through
Egypt by opening navigation of tie Red Sea to the flag of Christian 
2
powers11. The logic of his argument is rather vague, for he went 
on to say that although he knew that there was a French mission in
A
Brandi had actually referred to himself as British agent as far 
back as 1780. Consul Mure said: "Brandi ... guise dit agent des 
anglois..." AE, Bj, 112, Mure to de Castries, July 24, 1780.
F^O 78 /6 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen (cypher), Ju ly  9, 1785.
Cairo, he could swear that the Porte had not been consulted, and
actually knew nothing of it. Once again, Ainslie identified Britain
with the Ottoman Empire; if the Porte were unaware of French plans,
there was no reason for Britain to be different.
Ainslie knew that the present plan of France in Egypt had
originally been devised by Saint-Priest, the former Ambassador to
Constantinople. But he only saw it as a means to ruin the East
India Company. He also knew that the plan was to begin by trying
to allow all Christian powers to navigate the Red Sea, so as not
to irk the Porte against France. Then the latter country would
negotiate with the Beys to secure a firm position for its trade .
Ainslie warned the Porte of these plans, and proudly reported to
]_
London the strong assurances of opposition. The Reis Efendi even
added that he had strongly reproached Ibrahim Bey for allowing
2the French packet boat from India to berth at Suez.
Further support for Ainslie came from the Grand Admiral of the 
3
Ottoman Empire: "... I received the strongest assurances of the
Grand Admiral's personal friendship for me, and of the most parti­
cular respect and regard of the Porte for His Majesty's Crown. He
^FO 78/6. Ainslie to Carmarthen., (cypher);, ..Oct. 10, 1785.
2
See above, p. 127.
3 ___
Ghazi gasan, the ICanudan Pasha, who was to lead the punitive expedition 
to Egypt in 1786.
confims my former intelligence relating to the trade of Egypt
and the navigation in the Red Sea . . • but was remarkably reserved
on the politicks of the Porte..,
But Carmarthen did not feel reassured by Ottoman statements.
He told Ainslie that it was absolutely essential that information
should be^relayed on the passage of French military men by the
2
overland route to India.
V/hen Brandi arrived in Alexandria on 15 August, he immediately
set about trying to find out what Truguet and the Beys had been up
to. He then heard of the agreements, and sent copies of them to 
3
Ainslie. The Ambassador’s immediate reaction was not one of con­
cern. He relayed the content of the agreements to Carmarthen, add­
ing that even under the present conditions, a British Consul in 
Egypt was unnecessary. He thought that it would be better to have 
the dispatch route put under the protection of another country that 
would be willing to deal with the Beys, something Ainslie obviously 
did not think of for Britain. He was sensitive, however, to the precedent
the Truguet agreements would cause, and he foresaw the possibility
4
of other nations wishing to follow suit,
V o 78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen,(dypher), Aug. 9> 1785.
V o  78/6, Carmarthen to Ainslie (cypher), Aug. 16, 1785.
V o  78/6, Brandi to Ainslie (Italian), Aug. 22, 1785.
Vo 78/6, A in s lie  to Carmarthen, Oct. 10, 1785.
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It was not until November that Ainslie sought an inter­
view with the Porte regarding the agreements. His interview 
with the Reis Sfendi was then reported in detail to Carmarthen.
The Porte emphatically denied previous knowledge of the agreements. 
Ainslie began by telling the Reis Efendi that he had personally 
contradicted all rumours of the agreements until he had actually 
seen a copy. The Ottoman official interrupted with ”extraordinary 
agitation” and asked what was meant by that statement. So Ainslie 
produced a Turkish copy of the agreements. ”Nothing could exceed 
the surprise...” of the Reis Efendi except, perhaps, the indig­
nation he showed sfc the mention therein of having the Hatti Sherif
1of 1779 revoked. He begged the Ambassador not to mention the
2
interview which would only then be communicated to the Divan.
He then went on to assure Ainslie that "...no overture whatever 
had been made to this .Court by the French Ambassador, who constantly 
denied having any previous intimation respecting the mission of 
the packet boat to Suez, and had even promised that this practice 
should be discontinued in future.”
The Reis Efendi also asked Ainslie for news of Truguet, saying 
he knew nothing about him except that he was now somewhere in the
Vo 78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Nov. 10, 1785.
2Ainslie interpreted this as: ”At all events the Reis Effendi’s demand 
to keep the French business secret is an indication that he intends to 
steal a march upon them.” Ibid.
'’ibid.
Archipelago. He concluded the interview by assuring the Am­
bassador that the Porte had no intention of revoking the Hatti
Sherif of 1779, and would never change its views on the navi­
gation of the Red Sea.
The Divan met on 18 /November to discuss the Truguet 
agreements. The Grand Vezir and the Kapudan Pasha were in attend­
ance. Before the meeting took place, three couriers had been
sent to Cairo to give the Porte *s command which was reaffirmed
at the Divan; the Red Sea trade was to be discouraged by all 
possible methods; Two days later, the Reis Efendi once again 
assured Ainslie of the sincerity and determination of the Porte.*** 
The Ambassador trusted the Ottomans completely. ”... I 
am perfectly convinced that the new ordinance of the Porte will 
render their ^ the French/ situation insupportable at Cairo, and
that they will limit their principal speculations to the trade
2
of Alexandria which is sufficiently important.” He was further
3
reassured by a report from Worsley who had applied himself ener­
getically to find out more from the French.^ He had lived in 
thhir quarters, and reported that the resident French merchants
V o  78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Nov. 25, 1785.
Ibid.
3
See above, p. 120.
V o  78 /6 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen, Nov. 25, 1785.
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saw little hope of any commercial advantages to he derived from
the agreements* He also witnessed insults and impositions that
were being hurled on the French community which had no means of
1
defence or retaliation*
At the end of November, Brandi reported that as yet the 
terms of the agreements had not been put into effect. He was 
sure that a letter had arrived for Ibrahim from Choiseul-Gouffier 
asking for the agreements to be ratified. Ibrahim apparently 
answered that heuas planning to have the agreements put into 
effect despite the disapproval of Constantinople, and that his 
personal guarantees would protect Frank merchandise from the re­
prisals of the bedouins.
The Truguet Agreements
While Ainslie in Constantinople was busily trying to ascertain 
the Porte's non-involvement in a French agreement with the Beys, 
the French themselves had dispatched Chevalier de Truguet to Cairo 
where he successfully concluded three agreements that ensured his 
country's right to bring merchant ships to Suez. French awareness 
of the political importance of Egypt was by no means a new thing; 
memorials and treatises on the subject had been written since the
Baldwin was unconvinced of this argument, although he obviously 
respected Worsley. Egypt 5, Comments by Baldwin, 0ct,1785-Jan. 1786.
F^O 78 /7 , Brandi to A in s lie  ( e x t r a c t ) ( I t a l ia n ) , Nov, 28, 1785.
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days of Louis XI?. But the renewed interest in the commercial 
navigation of the Red Sea had been directly brought about by 
the example of the lucrative trade the British had carried on 
after the March 1775 Treaty. With the departure jfcom Egypt of 
Baldwin in 1779, followed by that of Fir*awn in 1783, the possi­
bilities of British and Austrian plans to command the Red Sea 
trade were laid aside. Xt remained for France to take advantage
of this in order to assert itself.
1
In July 1783, de Castries sent the Comte de Bonneval to
Egypt to enquire into the possibilities of the trade route from 
2Suez to India. The Minister also instructed Bonneval to meet 
with Mure, the French merchants of Cairo and the Customs official.
But despite the fact that fox' undisclosed reasons Bonneval was 
unable to go on the journey, Mure wrote to Castries. The next 
year Choiseul-Gouffier sent Truguet from Constantinople on ex­
actly the same mission.
Truguet arrived an Alexandria in December 1784. From there 
he went to Cairo where he started out by studying how the British
3
had conducted the Red Sea trade. Then, with the help of Charles
■j
Marquis Chari es-Eugene-Gab riel de Castries (l727-180l), a brilliant 
soldier who was successively Commander-in-Chief of the Gendarmerie, 
Governor-General of Flanders, and, in 1780, Ministre de la Marine.
In 1783, he was named Marechal de la France.
2
Corr. Pol., Turquie, 169,Copie d!un article des instructions de 
M* le Comte de Bonneval, July 9, 1783.
3
Corr. P o l. ,  Turquie, 172, Truguet to  C hoiseul-G ouffier, Feb. 2 i, 1785*
1 2Magallon and his wife he was able to conclude three different 
agreements: with Murad Bey, with Tusif Kassab, the Customs Master
who had replaced Fir*awn, and with Shaykh Nasir Shadld, a bedouin 
chieftain.
The agreement with Murad Bey was signed on 27 gafar 1199/
10 January 1785, and had the signatures of two other men besides
the Mamluk and Truguet; that of ‘iJthman the K&hya of the Must ah-
3 - 4figan, and that of Sulayman, foimer IC&hya of the Mustahfigan.
Ibrahim was not in Cairo at the time, but Murad promised Truguet
that he would add the signature of the Shaykh al-Balad as soon
as he returned. The agreement required the ratification of the
Porte by a Hatti Sherif, but it was declared that if the edict
were late in arriving from Constantinople, the terns would still
be valid. The eighteen clauses were as follows:
A
Charles Magallon (1741-1820), a French merchant who settled in 
Egypt c. 1775 after having travelled extensively on the Levant.
He was named Consul-General for France in Egypt in 1795* He 
left Egypt in 1797, but returned with Bonaparte the next year.
He was later imprisoned by the British, but was able to go to 
France in 1800. For further information, see Chapters III to V, 
^below.
Baldwin later reported that Mme. Magallon received a diamond- 
encrusted picture of Louis XVI in return for her services. Egypt 
5a, Baldwin to E.I.C., Jan. 19, 1787.
Lieutenant, or executive officer of the Mustahfigan. the garrison 
Janissaries.
"^Corr. Pol., Turquie, 172, "Conventions preliminaires d!un traite 
de commerce et de navigation de l'inde par Suez, arrStees et con- 
clues au Caire le 10 janvier, 1785.” Testa, op.cit., vol. 2, 
pp. 75-80, also has the text, but certain errors may be found: the
date is quoted as being 9 January; and, the signatories are con­









All vessels of French merchants might land at all Egyptian 
ports, and would pay the same taxes as Turkish vessels.
No one might inspect the cargo, or force it to be landed.
If the French ships needed help, the authorities at Suez 
would give it, charging the minimum price.
If French vessels were damaged in Egyptian ports, the Bey 
of Cairo would protect and help them.
Warships that simply accompany merchants vessels were not 
to pay anchorage duties. The captains aid others of the 
warships might land safely. These ships might also replenish 
water supplies, at Suez. Also, French ships and their cap­
tains would have preference over those of other nations.
If the merchant vessels were unable to reach Suez, they might 
land at Tor, and would be protected on the road to Cairo.
In case of trouble between Egyptians aid Frenchmen, the former 
would be dealt with by their government, the latter by their 
ship’s captain, or the consul.
French merchants going to or from India might cross Egypt 
without any harm, and would not be taxed.
The French Consul in Egypt touLd be received with all the 
honours due to his rank, exceeding any for his colleagues.
When French vessels arrived at Suez, the French vice-consul 
established on the city would go on board, and then would 
notify the Consul of the list of goods. No one else would
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"be allowed on board without the Captain's permission. The 
loading md unloading of French boats would be done without 
any foreign intervention.
IX Only the Pasha and the ruling Bey of Cairo might count the 
bales that are carried on the vessels, and put seals on them. 
When the merchandise arrived in Cairo the seals would be 
broken in the presence of a French delegate and a delegate 
of the Pasha. The price of the customs duty would then be 
fixed.
X The customs duties on all goods from India would be: 4°/o
to be paid to the Pasha; 2°/o to the shaykh al-balad.
On cloth, the duty was to be paid in kind; on drugs, spices 
and other articles, in cash. Once they had paid the duties, 
the French merchants were entirely free of charges.
XI If the French merchants were dishonest about the quantity 
of spices and drugs, the Egyptian authorities would have 
the right to keep the goods, and pay for 90°/o of the total 
value claimed.
XII If coffee was to be used as a present, or even to be used for 
private consumption, the ordinary tax would have to be paid.
XIII If the goods were intended for use in France, and ordinarily 
would go around the Cape, only 3°/° was be paid (2°/° 
to the Pasha, l°/o to the shaykh al-balad).
XIV Presents to officials were not obligatory.
XV When French merchant ships arrived at Suez, the government 
of Cairo would protect the passengers on their journey to 
Cairo, and would he answerable for any theft or pillage which 
might be made by the Arabs.
XVI If ever the rulers of Cairo decided not to allow India 
merchants in Cairo, they must give the latter one year’s 
notice to leave, and guarantee they would not lose their 
homes or money.
XVII If another European country asked for conditions similar
to those of France for the India trade, ^ranee would always 
retain the best advantages especially when it came to the 
paying of duties.
XVIII The signatories swore to pphold the terms of the agreement.
The agreement between Truguet and Xusif Kassab, which was 
to be kept secret, was signed on 12 Rabi* 1199/25 January 1785, 
and also had the signatures of ‘Wthman and Sulayman.*^  The hine
clauses were as follows:
I Kassab promised to aid all French merchants arriving at
Suez.
II Kassab would always place French interests above all others.
1Corr. Pol., Turquie, 172, nTraite particulier entre Truguet et 
Mu’allim Joseph Kassab”, Jan. 25, 1785. The text is also available 
in Testa, o~p.cit.. vol. 2, pp. 80-82.
III Kassab would alxjays mediate between French merchants
and Egyptian officials; he would try to alleviate unjust 
extortions from the latter.
IV If Kassab realised the guilt of a French merchant, he would 
only notify the French Consul who would then deal with him 
justly.
V Kassab would obtain 1^2°/o on all French goods; if cloth, 
in kind, if drugs and spices, in cash.
VI Kassab would obtain 5°/o on all India goods destined for sale 
in the Ottoman Empire. This would be kept secret from the 
Beys and the Pasha.
VII Kassab would obtain l^°/o on goods shipped via Alexandria 
or Rosetta to France.
VIII Goods arriving from France for India would pay 3°/o either 
in Alexandria or Cairo; they would not be charged more at 
Suez.
IK If Kassab left his post, he promised to make sure that his
successor would fulfil the terns of the agreement.
The third agreement was signed on 16 Rabi*. I -1199/27 January 
1785 in the presence of Kassab,1 It stated that when French ships 
arrived at Suez, Shadid would see to it that the goods would be con-
■j
Corr, Pol., Turquie, 172, ’’Traduction du traite fait avec un sheik 
arabe pour le transport des marchandises de Suez au Caire”,
Jan. 27, 1785. The text i^not to be found in Testa, op.cit.
See Appendix VI for the complete text.
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veniently and safely escorted to Cairo. The duties paid were to 
be fixed by Shadid. It was signed by Shadid and Truguet, and 
three witnesses: Ismacil, Mustafa Agmad, and gasan.
Chapter III 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OP A CONSULTS:
BALDWIN* S APPOINTMENT
Reaction to the Truguet Agreements
When the contents of the Truguet agreements became known
in London, alarm seized the members of the newly-created Board
1
of Control for Indian affairs* The Commissioners for the af­
fairs of India prepared a report on Egypt based on a history 
of Anglo-Egyptian relations* This nncluded Murray* s papers, 
as well as those of Ainslie, Weymouth and Carmarthen. No trace 
could be found of Murray*s call for an agent in Egypt, or of 
the 1774 ferman from the Porte regarding Red Sea traffic. The 
1775 agreement was also not to be found, and Carmarthen* s office 
declared that the last British treaty with the Ottoman Empire 
had been in 1675*
Baldwin immediately became the only person who could success­
fully .explain the affairs of Egypt to' the India Board. Henry 
Dundas summoned him to a meeting of the Board. He was asked to
■1
An act of Parliament in 1784 created a governmental department 
in the form of a Board of Control for India. Its main functions 
were the political, financial, and military administration of the 
territorial possessions of the East India Company. The Board was 
also responsible for the appointment of a Governor-Greneral who 
was to be the representative of the Grown.
‘TPO 78 /6 , Eraser to Rouse, A p ril 23, 1785.
give M s  opinion on the news of the Truguet agreements, and 
the probable intentions of the French in Egypt. After lengthy 
discussions, Dundas asked him to write a memorial on Egypt,
"... as to its geographic relations; as to its intrinsic and 
extrinsic resources; as to its means of defence; as to its im­
portance to France; as to its danger to England... Conse­
quently, Baldwin wrote Speculations and Resources of Egypt, a
pamphlet which he later published in two editions in 1801 and
21802 under the title of Political Recollections. It was on 
the basis of this work that the decision to have a British Consul- 
General in Egypt was made.
When the news leaked out that Baldwin was* to be officially 
reinstated in Egypt, the members of the board of the Levant Com­
pany were alarmed. The deputy-govemor and two members were sent to 
Carmarthen to remind him of the Company1 s right by charter of 
its own choice and selections of consuls in the Ottoman Empire. 
Carmarthen declined to either deny or confirm the rumour of the 
appointment. The Company then turned to the Attorney-General and 
asked him to verify its chartered rights, pointing out its anxiety 
to "... prevent the mischiefs which may arise from the appointment
i
Baldwin, Pol. Rec., p.25*
^For a complete list of all Baldwin’s publications, see Appendix X.
145.
1
of a Consul in Egypt,,."
One of Baldwin1s sympathisers was Governor Genge John- 
2
stone. He was completely convinced of the importance of the
Red Sea route, claiminglhat at least £25*000 a year could he
saved if it were used £_pr dispatches. He thought very highly 
of Baldwin, and said he was "the fittest man" he knew to he in 
Egypt, although he was not unaware of the enmity that existed 
with Ainslie, All the same, he stressed that Baldwin1 s advantages 
far outweighed his disadvantages. Johnstone suggested to Dundas
that he should receive £350 per year from the government, and £500
from the East India Company, Ihere should also he an extra pay­
ment of £400 for the cost of transmitting letters between Alex­
andria and Suez, especially since Baldwin would not he allowed
3to maintain any private trading.
It was Brandi who first sent rumours of Baldwin1 s new posi- 
4tion to Ainslie. He assured the Ambassador, however, that it was 
not possible for Baldwin to return to Egypt. Ainslie was greatly 
disturbed at the possibility. He had already appointed Brandi as
^F0 78/7, Levant Company to Ainslie (extract), Nov. 29, 1785.
^George Johnstone(1730-1787) who had served as Governor of West 
Florida in 1763. In 1783* be became one of the Directors of the 
East India Company.
^Egypt 5, Johnston to Dundas (copy), Sept. 4* 1785.
^F0 78 /6 , Brandi to A in s lie  ( I t a l ia n )  (e x tra c t ) ,  Aug. 24* 1785.
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his agent, and he did not relish another period of friction with
his old enemy. He carefully told Carmarthen that 11... in my
uncertainty of Hr. Baldwin’s motions, I could not consistently
with your Lordship’s commands retract my said agency, and drop
1
a correspondence which may he useful until others arrive..."
He also i*eminded the Minister that when he had taken up his
position in Constantinople, he was bound by a penalty of £10,000
to appoint only those Consuls that the Levant Company should re-
2
commend fox* the benefit of its trade.
Ainslie was relieved that the charter of the Company was
being studied by the Attorney-General. He was sure, despite the
rumours of an official appointment, that Baldwin would never
venture back to Egypt; the state of turmoil that existed there,
and the fact that the Porte remained adamantly opposed to Red Sea
3
traffic, were sure proof of a thwarted mission, Anthony Hayes 
in Smyrna seemed to share Ainslie*s feelings; "Mr. Baldwin has 
but a very discouraging prospect, in regard to his establishment, 
and the more so, considering his former situation, and he has a 
greater share of ambition and vanity, than prudence, in venturing 
again to Egypt.
^F0 78/6, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Jan. 25, 1786.
^FO 78/7, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Jan. 25, 1786.
JF0 78/7, Ainslie to Levant Company (extract), Jan. 25, 1786.
^F0 78/7, Hayes to Ainsli.e (extract), March 17, 1786.
But Dundas was determined to s ee a British establishment 
in Egypt, most of all to ensure an open communication to India 
at all seasons of the year. After examining the Blench and Russian 
Capitulations, and realizing that both states legally had access 
to the Red Sea, he decided that a treaty with Egypt should be nego­
tiated to put Britain on an equal footing with them.’*'
Dundas was aware of the personal relationships that ex­
isted between Baldwin and Ainslie, and the harm that could be 
done by it. So he obtained from the former a promise to be in a
state of u... forgetfulness of all past animosities between
2Sir R.A. and himself..." Ainslie, at the same time, was reminded 
that the Levant Company’s interests should never be considered 
before those of the nation.
The Levant Company, however, continued to express its dis­
approval of the appointment. It desperately tried to prevent Bald­
win’s departure, and even aslced Ainslie "... whether you are of 
opinion that any injury will be likely to arise; we are persuaded 
we need not point out to Tour Excellency the expediency of taking
such measures as you may judge most proper, in order to obviate
3any difficulties..." Ainslie hastily assured the Company that
1
Egypt 5, Dundas, ¥alsingham, Grenville, Mulgrave to Carmarthen,
May 19, 1786. Also in FO 24/1.
2Ibid.
FO 78 /7 , Levant Company to A in s lie , Aug. 1, 1786.
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he had no reason to suppose the India trade would he reopened; even 
if it were, the Porte would firmly oppose it, and at any rate, the 
Ambassador would be there to protect all British factors.1 But 
the Company was not convinced; it continued to find excuses to 
hinder Baldwin fs departure until the last minute of his stay in 
England.^
Ainslie did not receive official word of the appointment un­
til the late summer of 1786, He hoped until then that Baldwin was 
going to Egypt merely as an agent for the East India Company, and 
therefore as a private citizen. Consequently, "... neither his
transaction ... or his engagements can commit anybody but himself
3,..,!, He cautioned Carmarthen, however, that if Baldwin were to 
receive the title of Consul, the Ambassador, n... contrary to his
4
engagements with the Turkey C o m p a n y . w o u l d  have to obtain his 
patent from the Porte, and then be responsible for his actions.
When the official appointment finally reached Ainslie, his 
shocked surprise was quickly put aside, and he bravely promised 
obedience. nI shall at all times exert my utmost efforts, and in-
^FO 78/7, Ainslie to Eevant Company, Sept. 9, 1786.
2Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Oct. 12, 1786,
^FO 78/7, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Sept. 25, 1786.
^FO 78 /7 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen, Sept, 25, 1786.
fluence at the Porte to facilitate compleat success of that 
gentlemans mission.""1* He even went so far as to agree that 
the Levant Company*s interests would he made subordinate to 
the superior ones of the British nation. He immediately noti­
fied the Reis Efendi of Baldwin's impending arrival, and promised 
to apply for a Consular Patent as soon as the Consul reached 
Egypt. He also volunteered a letter of introduction to Grhazi 
gasan Pasha, one of his personal friends, who was, at the time, 
at the head of the Ottoman forces in Egypt.
But he did not hesitate to add, later, that the friendly
foreign missions in Constantinople regarded the new appointment
2as "dangerous" and "inimical" to the Porte*s interests, especially 
since he had found out in the chancery of the Porte that the berat 
of the last British Consul in Egypt had been removed by orders of 
the Reis Efendi. It was only after Ainslie sent his congratulations 
on Ghasi gasan's achievements in Egypt, and said that the tine had 
come for Britain to re-establish connections with that province 
now that it was once again under Ottoman control, that Baldwin's 
commission was granted.
The British government was most anxious that the Baldwin- 
Ainslie feud should be put aside in consideration of more important
Sn0 78 /7 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen, Oct. 10, 1786.
V o  78 /7 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen (cypher), Oct. 25, 1786.
duties to be attended to, and Ainslie was aware of this. "I
flatter myself Your Lordship will credit my solemn declaration,
that my disapprobation of Mr. Baldwin's measures when they appeared
improper, had nothing to do with the man, at that time nearly a
stranger to me, and only known by the civility and favours shewn 
1
him." Dundas approved of Ainslie*s attitude, and realized that 
the Ambassador had done his duty towards Baldwin "bonafide and
p
honourably". He must have known Baldwin well, for he suggested 
to Carmarthen that he should be made to understand Ainslie*s willing­
ness to forget the past, and at the same time learn to avoid all 
the mannerisms of behaviour that he knew would irritate his superior 
in Constantinople.
When Baldwin was told of his new position, he notified the
East India Company, and offered to be its agent for the correspond-
3ence between India and England. The offer was considered four days 
later at a Committee of Correspondence on 23 May 17Q6. Thede-
A
cision was taken to re-establish communications via Suez. Baldwin 
was called in, and told that he should consider himself a Company
1Ibid.
Vo 78/7, Dundas to Carmarthen's office, Dec. 19,1786.
Vgypt 5, Baldwin to E. India House, May 19, 1786.
Vgypt 5, At a Committee of Correspondence, May 23, 1786.
agent; he was told also to prepare a memorandum on the most ex­
pedient method of forwarding dispatches through Egypt.
This Baldwin did in a detailed report concerning the financial 
aspect of his services.^ He asked for a fixed salary of £1,000 with 
an added payment of £200 for the rent of his bouse. The remainder 
of the cost, which totalled £2,230, included payments to be made:
a) to his deputy at Alexandria £100
*) » t» it it gUez £150
c) for 2 dispatches from 
Alexandria to Cairo £ 80
d) to hire an Arab writer 
and interpreter £200
e) for presents to the Pasha 
and Beys £500
He also suggested, if the Company were to agree, that extra agents 
at Gaza, Tor and Qugayr could be added, at the extra expense of 
£880.
But once again, the Company was not willing to accept Bald­
win's charges. On 1 June 1786, he was officially appointed agent 
with a fixed salary of £500 plus £100 for his house rent. The 
other payments made would be:
*bsgypt 5, Baldwin to the E. India Company, May 25, 1786.
a) to his deputy at Alexandria £100
b) to his deputy at Suez £150
o) for each Suez to Alexandria, and 
Alexandria to Suez dispatch £ 40
a) for an Arab writer and interpreter £110
e) for presents to the Pasha and Beys £300
The Committee added an initial payment of £1,000 for/presents to
the Beys for free passage of dispatches. But the agreement with
Baldwin was founded on the stipulation that he would obtain
a free passage through Egypt from the responsible authorities
within one year. Under no circumstances whatsoever was he to
participate in trade.’1'
The Company agreed to Baldwin's earlier suggestions of having
regular vessels set out from India for the purpose of carrying
dispatches. It was decided that an armed cruiser would set out
once a year from Bengal on 30 November to Fort St. George, then
to Bombay, and finally to Suez. It would remain at Suez until
Baldwin sent it back with Company correspondence newLy arrived
from England. A similar arrangement would not be necessary in




Egypt 5, At a Committee of Correspondence, June 1, 1786,
2
Egypt 5a, Secret Court of Directors, June 27,1786.
The Aim of Baldwins mission
"The great end of Mr. Baldwin’s residence at Cairo is the 
opening a communication to India through Egypt.
It is quite clear that in the few months that had elapsed 
after London became aware of the Truguet agreements there had been 
much careful research, in the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations, 
probably for the first time. The affairs of Egypt were and had 
been so remote that even Dundas had an imprecise date for the 
1775 agreement between Hastings and Muhammad Bey Abu?l Dhahab.
The greatest impetus for the sudden interest in Egypt was, without 
a doubt, the fear that the French, with their recently concluded 
agreements, would gain an important step over the English in India.
To Baldwin was therefore provided the opportunity to obtain, single- 
handedly, equal rights for Britain.
The Consul was supplied with a long list of instructions for 
his mission in Egypt. In these, the Hatti Sherif of 1779 was ex­
amined in the light of the English capitulations of 1675, and it 
was regarded, therefore, if somewhat belatedly, as being entirely 
inconsistent with British rights. The fact that Ainslie had allowed 
it to be put into effect was weakness on his part, for he had written 
to Weymouth in 1779, and had shown him the fourth article added to
•j
Egypt 5a, Dundas, Wallingham, Grenville, Mulgrave to Carmarthen,
May 19, 1786.
^It was referred to as having been concluded in 1775 with (Ali Bey.
Ibid.
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the French capitulations of 1673, in which ranch vessels were 
to he allowed to bring goods to Suez. The English capitulations 
had put that nation on exactly the same footing with the French, 
and therefore there should, by right, be no hindrance to their 
ships sailing the Red Sea.
Despite the fact that Dundas urged both Baldwin and Ainslie 
to press for British rights of trade, his primary interest was in 
an efficient route to India. He emphatically acknowledged Bald­
win’s rCle in the saving of British establishments on the coast 
of Coromandel in 1778, and recognized the unlimited possibilities 
of a representative in Egypt.
Concerning the route itself, it was decided, presumably upon
1
Baldwin's recommendation, that dispatches should be sent from
Venice to Alexandria in 20 days; from Alexandria to Suez (via
Cairo) in 6 days; and from Suez to the nearest port in India in
25 days. A duplicate would be sent from Alexandria via Gaza to
Tor or Jedda, since the greatest losses usually occurred between
2
Alexandria and Suez.
In order to reduce the oost of the route, Carmarthen instructed 
Carteret, the Postmaster-General, to arrange with the East India 
Company for an expedient way to send dispatches. It was decided
•j
This does not appear ;in Baldwin's "Preliminary to Instructions", 
however, Egypt 5.
*T?0 24/l, Route by Suez to the East Indies, n.d.
that an annual public correspondence should be established. A
packet would be sent out in June fx*om London, and in November
1from India. Private letters would cost 6 shillings each.
Baldwin1s Instructions
The instructions were given to Baldwin before sailing for
Egypt, snd a copy was sent to Ainslie. The orders were closely
defined, and were intended to be the Consul's guide in the assertion
2and maintenance of British prestige in Egypt:
1) He was to report regularly to London on any events that 
would be of interest, and most especially about those 
that would relate to the trade or passage of the Red Sea.
2) He was to remain constantly aware of French activity, 
and report on it.
3) He was immediately to set about trying to negotiate a 
trade treaty with the Beys for the East India Company:
a) he was to remind the Beys of the 1775 agreement, 
in which Britain risked offending the Porte in 
order to bring its lucrative trade to Egypt.
b) he was to stress that, by that very agreement,
Egypt could not deny Britain the rights she ac-
A
FO 24/lf Carteret to Carmarthen, June 6, 1787. 
24/l, Carmarthen to Baldwin, June 20, 1786.
quired before any other state
c) he was to state his willingness to entex’ into
a Treaty with the Beys, on condition they granted 
him the same privileges they did to Truguet
d) while negotiating the treaty he was to ensure the 
discontinuation of double-duties (i.e. to have 
tezkeres validated)
e) he was at all times to demand the same concessions 
as those given to France.^
4) When the agreement was concluded, he was to send it to Ainslie 
for the signature aid ratification of the Porte.
5) He was to draw up to £2,000 as initial payment for necessary 
presents, and after that a sum of £500 per year. He was at 
all times to submit an account for money spent, remembering 
to exercise the utmost moderation.
6) He was to send an account of the number of French ships that 
were trading from India to Egypt; also, the number of ships 
trading under French colours; also, those trading under 
Muslim colours.
7) He was to report any stipulation made for trading ships be­
longing to Asiatic Powers in alliance with France; this was 
to include the tonnage and build of the vessels, a detailed
1
The draft of the instructions said that if Baldwin were unable to 
obtain the commercial treaty, he should immediately negotiate per­
mission for the dispatches. F0 24/l, Heads of Instructions from 
the India Board, May 19> 1736.
description of their cargo, and the selling price of the 
merchandise. He was also to keep a close watch on re­
mittances made by the French ships from East India Company 
members. He was to remit the names of French packet boats, 
the dates of their arrival, and a complete list of officers 
on board.
He was to protect the Englishmen that passed through Egypt 
and Palestine whether they were government officials or 
members of the India Company,
He was to prevent any obstruction of Red Sea navigation by 
the Sharif of Mecca.
He was to make a note of the instructions given to British 
consuls in Europe concerning Mediterranean Passes.
He was to appoint native agents at Qugayr, Jedda, Tor, and 
G-aza, with salaries of £100 per year each. The rate of ex­
change was to be made on the basis of the Turkish dollar 
of the day.
He was not to receive presents or gratuities from merchants 
trading in, or passing through, Egypt.
He was not to trade unless the East India Company gave him 
permission to do so.
He was to maintain and support the rights of the Levant 
Company always.
15) He was to maintain a constant correspondence with the 
British Ambassador in Constantinople,
It is obvious from the list of instructions how anxious 
London was about the success of Baldwin's mission. It is im­
portant here to note, however, that no mention of his appointment 
was made either in the French consular reports from Egypt or 
the French ambassadorial accounts in Constantinople, While the 
British interest in Egypt after 1785 seemed to grow directly 
out of a feeling of competition with Erance, the latter, on the 
other hand, seemed to be totally oblivious of the British presence, 
and tended to concentrate on the internal developments of the 
country, especially during the Ottoman expedition of 1786,
Ainslie1s Instructions
When a copy of Baldwin's instructions was sent to Ainslie,
a further list of orders was included for the ambassador concerning
1the consulate in Egypt, It stressed that Ainslie was to remove 
any impediments that stood In the m y  of Baldwin's two principal 
missions: the conclusion of a treaty of commerce; and, the se­
curing of permission of passage for the India Company dispatches.
If a treaty were entirely impossible to obtain, he was immediately
F^O 78 /7 , Carmarthen to A in s lie  (cypher), Sept. 1, 1786,
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to press for claims of the rights of passage. In case the 
treaty should be acceptable, it was essential that tezkere 
should be validated for Egypt; the best argument would be the 
Capitulations, the 31st article in particular, where the port 
of Alexandria was cited as one of the places where the double­
duty could not be levied.
The Ambassador was to lose no time in notifying the Porte 
of Baldwin*s appointment. After that, he was to keep up a re­
gular correspondence with the Consul. In order not to offend 
Ainslie, Carmarthen said that Baldwin had been assigned mainly 
because Cairo was so remote from Constantinople, and not because
X
of ”... the smallest inattention to your rank and character.♦.'*
He also delicately pointed out to the Ambassador his rdle in 
the issue of the edict of 1779* But he was extremely firm when 
it came to the clash of interests between the Levant Company and 
the Crown: ”... Your Excy. is to consider this instruction by
the King*s command, with this express reservation, that it is 
only to be in. force when neither the orders, nor the interests of 
the Turkey Company shall be repugnant in any manner whatsoever to 
the superior interests of the nation at large...." Carmarthen
^EO 78/7, Carmarthen to Ainslie (cypher), Sept* 1, 1786.
2Ibid.
meaningfully asked for a copy of the French capitulations of 
1673 9 a section of which Ainslie had quoted in the letter to 
Weymouth iri 1779 to prove that the French had acquired the right 
to navigate the Red Sea.
A second, accompanying letter, also in cypher, was sent 
to Ainslie. It was devoted largely to the delicate matter of 
the former troubles between the Ambassador* and the newly-
1appointed Consul-General, and how they should be overlooked.
Ainslie had previously asked repeatedly for extra money for 
his Embassy to be spent on secret service facilities which the 
French apparently had a great deal of. Carmarthen, with the im­
portance of Baldwin*s mission uppermost in mind, now allowed him 
to draw up to £2,000. It was to be concentrated on efforts to 
have the edict of 1779 revoked, and also on helping bring about 
the proposed treaty with the Beys. He was also allowed a further 
£600 for presents.
It must have been greatly humiliating for the Ambassador to 
be finally accorded the money he had previously unsuccessfully 
asked for, especially when it was to be for the accomplishment 
of the mission of his old enemy. Xet he immediately showed his 
readiness to comply with all the orders. On 9 October, he notified
^F0 78/7, Carmarthen to Ainslie (cypher), Sept. 1, 1786.
the Porte of Baldwin* s appointment. Because time was short, he
decided to do away with an official application from Baldwin,
and instead apply immediately for the herat and imperial command
X
that were essential to the Consul*s recognition. A fortnight
2
later he obtained both documents, and sent them to Brandi in 
Alexandria to await Baldwin*s arrival. He also enclosed two 
letters for Baldwin: the first from the Grand V^zir to ‘Ibidi
Pasha of Cairo, recommending the Consul and all British merchants 
and travellers; the second, an introduction to his great friend 
Ghazi JEasan Pasha. The .Ambassador also applied for a recommendation
A
to ‘A’Bidi Pasha from his Kami K&hva. at the Porte*
Arrival of Baldwin in Egypt
Carrying the ICing*s appointment, Baldwin left Palmouth on
g.
15 August 1786, and arrived in Naples on 29 September, ‘ He was
A
The documents cost 915 piastres. PO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, 
April 25$ 1787.
2Brandi* s services were now discontinued* Ainslie mentioned that he 
had not been particularly pleased with him, but seemed to feel 
pity for the Italian due to numerous family problems, including the 
fact that his wife and daughter had died in the plague.
^Official agent.
^This letter was finally not enclosed with the others,
PC 78/7, Ainslie to Baldwin, October 25r 1786.
5Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Oct. 12, 1786.
1accompanied by his wife, and possibly even a daughter. From 
Naples, they sailed to Smyrna, presumably for family reasons 
since Mrs. Baldwin1 s father was a merchant of the city. Baldwin 
wrote to Ainslie from Smyrna, and informed him cf his great willing­
ness to co-operate on all points in his instructions. He asked 
the Ambassador to press claims at the Porte to allow British 
ships to enter the old port of Alexandria. He could not resist 
adding; "The present opportunity would be a fair one, if Your 
Excellency would take it up with heart - X beg pardon - if Your
Excellency should think it wise - for in that case the heart is
2
pre-engaged, and I am sure will succeed.11
He left his family in Smyrna, deciding to send for them only
3
when he had suitable lodgings in Cairo available, and sailed alone 
for Alexandria where he arrived on 18 December.
Before leaving England, he had asked Carmarthen for a sloop 
of war to accompany his ship to Alexandria, claiming that his French 
counterpart had enjoyed the same honour. He was careful to add that 
he had "... no personal vanity to gratify in this humble intimation#..", 
but merely wanted to ensure equal respect for England to that accorded
i
He referred to "the ladies". Evidence of at least one daughter 
in Baldwin, Mr. Baldwin’s Begacy to His Daughter, or the Divinity 
of Truth,
78/7, Baldwin to Ainslie/ 1786.
5Ihey arrived on June 13, 1787.
Xto France* His request was refused.
The Government of Alexandria and all the foreign consuls
there paid him the customary compliments and public honours due
to the rank of a consul-general. He then exhibited his berat
2
and letters of recognition at the mabkama where the principal 
officers of the government were gathered. The letters were acknow­
ledged and authenticated by the qa&i who then sent them to Gairo 
for ratification by the Pasha. After that, Baldwin m s  able to 
put up the flag of his nation and exhibit the Royal Arms and 
pictures.
He then proceeded to form the staff of his consulate. He 
had originally intended his Vice-Consul to be Thomas Turner, an 
Englishman who sailed with him from Falmouth. But Turner became 
very ill in Smyrna, and could not continue the journey; eventually, 
he returned home.^ So Baldwin appointed a sbaff made up of local 
residents: in Alexandria, James Wilberforce, a German, and Adamo
do Mareo, an Armenian, the latter to serve as Arabic scribe and
1Egypl; 5a, Baldwin to Carmarthen, August 14, 1786.
2Islamic law court.
^FO 78/7, Baldwin to Ainslie, Hov. 29, 1786.
'S’O 78/7, Baldwin to Ainslie, Jan. 13, 1787.
He was later dismissed because he went into private business.
Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Morton, Feb, 23, 1789.
interpreter; in Suez, Hajji Derwish from Cairo was to be his 
1agent. Later, he re-appointed Giovanni Felice Buccianti, who
had been his scribe during his previous stay, as the agent for
2
his chancery in Alexandria. He decided not to appoint agents
at '^or, Gaza, and Qu^ayr. ¥hen he first arrived, the uncertainty
of political events prevented any serious consideration of the
3
matter; later, he found it unnecessary to have agents* there.
One of the most incomprehensible aspects of Baldwin1 s
official residence was his alliance with Carlo Rosetti* The
latter, with the Customs Master Fir‘aw, had laid the trap for
the 1779 caravan disaster, and Baldwin had not hesitated to de-
4nounce him at home and abroad. During the seven years of Bald­
win * s absence, Rosetti had alienated himself from the French com­
munity, and had tried to work for an alliance with the Russians 
in Egypt. Nhen the Russo-Turkish war prevented any development
5
of that friendship, he turned to Baldwin and the British. It 
must have been very difficult for the Englishman to put aside his 
hatred for the Venetian, and accept his help to combat the animosity
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to E.I.C., Jan. 19, 1787. Hajji Derwish died 
later that year and was replaced by Chelebi Xanni* Ibid., Dec.
22, 1787.
2F0 78/7, Buccianti to Ainslie (Italian)(copy), April 18, 1787.
^FO 24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, July 2, 1787.
^Baldwin then said of him: ”... he first infuses the spirit of 
devastation, and conceals his diabolical influence under the veil 
of pretended friendship.” Baldwin, Narrative, p.4.
^Corr. Cons., le  C aire, 25, Magallon, Nov* 17, 1787*
1of the lelatively large French community. H© no doubt realized 
Rosetti* s extensive knowledge of the country that had changed so 
much since his previous stay, and wished to benefit fcom it*
When Baldwin left Egypt in 1779, Ibrahim Bey had been the 
shaykh al-balad and Murad Bey the co-ruler. Ism a/ll Pasha had 
been re-instated after a brief interval during which he bad been 
replaced by the Wall of Jedda, Ibrahim Pasha, who had died in office. 
Murad and Ibrahim retained their hold over the country in the years 
that followed, except for the period 1783-17B4 during which they 
quarrelled and a state of warfare existed between the two* Ihey 
finally decided to resolve their differences in April 1784* In a 
meeting of the Bivan on 10 Rabl4 11 1199/21 February 1785, Ibrahim, 
the older of the. two, was once again proclaimed Shaykh al-Balad. 
and Murad Amir al-Hani* An uneasy truce continued to exist be­
tween the Beys until the expedition of Ghazi gasan Pasha in 1786 when 
they were forced to strengthen their position against him.
But the years 1783 and 1784 had been bad ones for Egypt for 
other reasons as well. During both years, the Mile did not reach 
the required level during the flood seasons. Very poor harvests en­
sued, causing prices, and that of wheat most especially, 'bo rise 
enormously. With regular extortions imposed by Murad on the merchants
1In 1786, there were 61 Frenchmen ±l Egypt: 36 in Cairo, 15 in
Alexandria, 10 in Rosetta* AE, B^, 113, Mure, n.d.
2 —Jabarti, on * cit.. vol. 2, p.92*
poverty and famine struck the country. The inevitable outbreak 
of plague followed, causing many cbaths, great panic and misery.
The foreign community was not spared any of the suffering 
during this period* It was mercilessly taxed by the beys, and 
was powerless to resist or refuse to pay. The FrenchODmmunity 
was no exception. Despite the enormous benefits obtained for it 
by Truguet, its condition seemed to deteriorate rather than im­
prove. It must have seemed ironical to Baldwin when he realized 
the ineffectual qualities of the very treaties he had been sent 
to emulate. While discussions were being waged in London concern­
ing the commercial and political advantages recently obtained by 
the French in Egypt, the foreign community in Alexandria was under­
going an experience that proved how far it was from the protective 
realm of signed treaties.
" v
Murad Bey and the foreign community in Alexandria: February 1786
When Murad Bey left Cairo in late January 1786 to collect
1 -
his annual contribution, he sent his kashif, gali^ t Agha, on 10
2
February to the foreign consuls that lived in Alexandria. He 
demanded a fine of 5,000 pataccas (12,000 piastres) for the two
3
buildings of the Hospice de la Terre-Sainte that had recently been
1 *Murad referred to him as his "son" in his letter to the Franks.
„,A kashif was immediately subordinate to a bey.
The consuls were; Mure (France); Baron Thonus (Russia); Count 
Baliovich (pro-Consul, Venice); Valing (Holland); Agostini 
(imperial); Brandi (Sweden); Giovanni Lapi (pro-Consul, Ragusa). 
The Dutch and Russian consuls were newly arrived in Egypt*
%he hospice was usually made up of a monastery and a church.
repaired without permission* The buildings themselves would also
have to be demolished unless the Consuls were willing to buy them
1back for 100,000 piastres.
The consuls immediately held a council to decide bow to answer 
him. The church of the Terre-Sainte was the parish church of the 
Europeans in Alexandria, and it was run by Franciscans. But they 
decided to refuse to pay any money, and claimed their capitulatory 
rights.
Since the orders could not be revoked, the next day, at 11 a.m.,
the walls of the church were tom down* The Frank inhabitants and
the monies were frightened, and sought refuge in the ships anchored
in the harbour. Only the consuls remained in the city, and gathered
2at the home of Hure, the French consul. Mure and Baron Thonus,
the Russian consul, went to the scene of destruction. They met
-  «  3
there with the kashif. the qa&i. and the serdar. and after con-
versation with the latter, were convinced that the whole manoeuvre 
was only a pretext for. extortion; they were therefore most re­
luctant to give injf afraid of establishing a precedent. They tried
^F0 78/71 Consuls to their Ambassadors In Constantinople (French) 
(copy), Feb. 12, 1786.
p
The French residents in Egypt later claimed that it was Thonus, with 
the help of Rosetti and the Customs Master, who brought about the 
entire crisis. AE, Bj, 113, Magallon to Mure (copy), duly 12, 1786.
3Military governor.
to bargain for a smaller sum of money, but the effort was futile.
In desperation, they petitioned Ibrahim Bey and the Pasha, Muham­
mad Takan, for help. But the latter was virtually a prisoner in 
the Citadel, and the Bey’s reaction was long in coming. They 
then resolved to appeal to the Porte, and wrote a collective 
letter to their respective ambassadors in Constantinople,'1* claiming 
all the while that although the hospice had been repaired in 1783,
both Murad and Ibrnhimhad given their permission for tie work to 
2
be done. They gave the letter to a Venetian captain whose ship 
was due to leave Alexandria on 12 February, but the kashif gave 
orders that no vessel was to be allowed to leave that day. The 
next day, the ship was permitted to depart, but not before a thorough 
search was made to ensure that no resident was on board.
In the meantime the consuls did not forget to ask Mme. Charles 
Magallon in Cairo to use her personal influence with Murad’s family 
to help them. Mme. Magallon had lived in Egypt for a long time.
Her first husband, Bernandi, a Venetian merchant, had supplied the 
mamluk houses with French finery. When he died, his widow married 
Charles Magallon who continued his predecessor’s business, and his 
wife was easily admitted to the harims of the ruling beys where she 
exhibited the latest silks and laces from France. She was a special
1
See above, p.19, n.4*
2AE, B^, 113, Mure to  de C astries , March 25, 1786.
friend of Sitti Hefissi, Murad’s favourite wife. The consuls 
wrote to Mme. Magallon, hut the letter was intercepted by 
Saliji Agha.
The kashif then told Mure that he was going to burn the two
buildings. He told the Frenchman to take note of the valuables
there, and to remove them. The Consul refused, knowing he would
be arrested in the process of evacuating the religious site of its
possessions, and that the effects would be confiscated. The
lcashif consequently proceeded to denude the place of its precious
items then he suddenly decided to d;op, and wrote to Murad asking
what he should do.
On 14 February Murad wrote a letter addressed to "Franks,
1
Consuls, Creek and Coptic Rations". In it he said that when
Sali£ Agha asked him what to do, he told him to leave things as
they were. But the Consuls would have to p ay 5»000 pataccas for
2
his "hatketarik”. If the sum were not versed in full, he swore 
by God to destroy all their houses.
On 15 February, the Gonsuls met once again to decide on a 
plan of action. They finally reached the conclusion that the kashif
1 TO
FO 78/7. The date there is 16 Rabi4 I. Assuming that there was 
a mistake in the translation, and that the date was actually 16 
Rabi4 II, the date then would be 16 February 1786. But the accounts 
given by the consuls say the date was definitely 14 February. There­
fore the date must have been 14 Rabi4 II.
2jtaqq al-Tariq (road tax) which was imposed on village inhabitants 
by the messengers and other officials that were sent to the villages 
by the members of the government. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the Age of 
the French Revolution, p.145.
would have to be told that the capitulations protected them against 
having to pay the amount. But the dragoman was too afraid to 
deliver the answer. The Consuls tried to deliver the message 
through the Customs Master, but he coldly refused, although the 
Franks had always considered him their friend. Thonus finally 
managed to send the message with a Turk.
*sr 1
That same day, Ibrahim wrote to Murad, complaining of the 
harsh treatment. He warned Murad of the strong connection between 
the foreigners and the Forte, and voiced his fear of the consequences 
of the incident. But Murad ignored the warning, and on 3 March 
an expedition to Alexandria demanded and obtained the money*
When Mme. Magallon finally heard of the affair, she went to 
Murad’s wife, and told her about it. Sitti Nefissi wrote a pleading 
letter to her husband who promised to {'discontinue the entire matter. 
But his orders were late arriving in Alexandria; so, once again 
Mure appealed for help. When Mme, Magallon told Murad's wife, the 
latter reproached her husband and demanded an end to the episode. 
Murad Bey then sent for the Frenchwoman and politely apologized, 
saying -ohe had been misinformed about the reparations of the hospice. 
He even told M. Magallon to issue orders for the closing of the 
affair in his name, and promised to replace anything missing. He
O
wrote to Ibrahim and a short while later a Bivan m s  held in Alex-
FO 78/?, Substance, of a letter written in Arabic by Ibraim Bey... 
to Murad Bey, February 15, 1786.
^On 12 Jumada I  1200 /l3  March 1786. Copy ava ilab le  in  AE, B^, 115.
1andria, the orders read, and everything returned to normal.
But the consuls had already sent a second collective letter
2to their ambassadors,’ asking for formal protests that their 
capitulatory rights should be enforced, ^hey especially asked 
not to have a form an sent; it would only serve to antagonise the 
Beys. A military expedition was the only solution. On 6 March
3
the ambassadors made an official appeal at the Porte. On 15 
March, the Reis Efendi told the French Ambassador that the Porte 
highly disapproved of Murad Bey!s actions, and would in due course 
find a way to manifest its anger.
The Ottoman Expedition of 1786
^he landing of Ottoman forces, according to the representatives 
of the Europeans, ostensibly came as a direct consequence of the 
persecution of their community in Alexandria. But to the Muslims, 
the expedition was represented as due to the failure o f the ruling
*|
The account of Jabarti does not agree with that of the Consuls.
He said that the fine had been levied against all the inhabitants 
of Alexandria, with the threat that the churcliwould be destroyed 
if the money were not paid. Furthermore, it was only Baron Thonus 
who did not seek protection on the ships; he agreed to pay the 
money, but only if the Pasha ordered it in a ferman. So gali^ L 
was obliged to give up the venture, and Instead asked for the Haqq 
al-Tariq. Jabarti, op.cit.. vol. 2, p.103.
^ 0  78/7, European Consuls in Alex, to their Ambassadors in Con­
stantinople (French), Feb. 21, 1786.
3
The Swedish Minister refused to sign the appeal, since it wan. con­
cerned with a Catholic Church. Ainslie was not even asked to sign. 
F0 78/7, Ainslie to Carmarthen, March 8, 1786.
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Beys to pay the taxes that were due to Constantinople and the 
Holy Pilgrimage, as well as to the had management of the Pilgrimage.
The Porte had, in fact, seized the opportunity as an excuse 
to re-establish order in Egypt* ¥hen Baldwin arrived in Alexandria 
in December 1786, Ghazi Hasan Pasha of the Ottoman forces had al­
ready made his triumphant way to Cairo. He had landed in Alex­
andria on 7 July 1786. After successfully subduing the city 
and its customs-house, he assumed control of the customs-houses 
of Damietta and Rosetta. In the meantime, Murad headed an expedition 
intended to confront the Ottomans at Puwwa; it was defeated by 
the Ottomans at Rapmaaiyya, and news of the defeat reached Cairo 
on 2 August. Ibrahim had, meanwhile, remained in Cairo, but he 
fled and joined Murad at al-Xthar on 6 August.*^ * The Beys gathered 
their forces together, and on 26 October, a bloody battle took place 
near Manshiyya which ended in a victory for the Mamluks. Encouraged, 
they reached Giza on 25 November, and threatened Cairo, On 4 Decem­
ber, another battle took place in which Murad and Ibrahim were de-
2
feated, after which they retreated south towards Upper Egypt.
The situation thus when Baldwin arrived was still uncertain. 
Murad and Ibrahim had been pushed down to Upper Egypt which they con­
trolled; Cairo and Lower Egypt were governed by the Ottomans. In
Jabarti. on.cit., vol. 2, p.115. 
^Ibid.t p.155*
Cairo, gasan Pasha named Isma 11 Bey the shaykh al-balad. and
tcr'i ^
the Amir al Ha,in was at first gas an Bey and then Mugamma d Bey.
*Abidi Pasha replaced Mugammad Yakan as the YJali of Egypt.
Although at first everyone welcomed the ousting of Murad 
and Ibrahim from power, the popularity of Ghazi gasan In Egypt 
began to wane* The impressions he gave of a magnanimous ruler 
who sought only to re-establish order and justice soon changed 
to those of a rapacious governor concerned with amassing a per­
sonal fortune. He emptied the treasuries, seized the private 
wealth of the rebels and their supporters, and began to tax local 
citizens, especially the Christians, mercilessly. When his own 
army began to protest about scanty provisions and insufficient 
pay, he turned on it furiously. Baldwin quoted one of his addresses: 
"Are these complaints, or is it bastardy? Will you fight? You 
shall be paidl But if your spirits are alienated your faith is 
so degenerated as to suffer these Beys to consign your country 
and your religions to a Christian Power that seduced them; not a 
man amongst you shall be sparedJ Is the terror of the Ottoman 
forgot?11^
The reference to the Christian power here was no doubt to 
Russia, although Ainslie reported that at first Prance was openly
1 —His real name was Murad. To avoid confusion and unpleasant
association of thoughts, the Xapudan-Pasha changed his name.
2F0 78 /7 , Baldwin to Carmarthen, Jan. 13, 1787.
1 V.on the side of the rebels. The Russian Consul, Baron Thonus, 
who had recently (1785) taken up his post, had all the time en­
couraged the rebels against the Porte. When gasan Pasha arrived,
ilu 9*t*
the Baron declared that Murad and Ibrahim were under the protection 
of the Empress. It has already been seen how the French suspected 
him of having caused the church incident in Alexandria in order 
to alienate the foreign community from the authorities, and thereby 
being the only representative 3n official favour. At the time when 
gas an Pasha was in Alexandria, and the duumvirate was still ruling 
Cairo, the two Mamluks wrote to Thonus asking him to help them 
by approaching gasan and telling him they promised to do all that
the Porte demanded of them, and that they humbly begged its pardon.
A
The Kanudan Pasha refused to consider the offer.'
Baldwin reported that when gasan Pasha first entered Cairo, 
the Venetian and French Consuls of Alexandria followed him there 
with great pomp to pay court to him. But when the rebel Beys made
Ainslie reported that on 3 August 1786, Choiseul-Gouffier handed 
in a memorial to the Pofcte, asking that the Ottomans recalls their 
fleet from Egypt, and name Murad Bey shaykh al-balad.. EO 78/7, 
Ainslie to Carmarthen, Aug. 9> 1786.
2In 1783, the Russians had made an alliance with Murad and Ibrahim 
in exchange for permission to have a garrison at Alexandria, Rosetta 
and Damietta. In 1784, two engineers were sent to Alexandria to 
prepare for the garrisons. In 1783, a Georgian officer named Maximo 
Kaskaciow lived with Ibrahim for four months as a "relative”. Since 
then, a Russian consulate was established. EO 24/l, Baldwin to Car­
marthen, Sept. 24, 1787.
^EO 78/7, Copie dlune lettre que Ibrahim Bey et Murat Bey du Caire 
ont ecrit a Mr. Le Baron Thonus... n.d.
^EO 78 /7 , Baldwin to A in s lie  (copy), Jan. 13, 1787
175.
it k n o m  that they had no intention of surrendering, the consuls 
fled to Alexandria for safety.1 Baldwin found this situation ad­
vantageous to him: ’’I propose to off for Cairo in a few days to
Z
watch my opportunity...",
The British Consul, acting on the oi’ders laid d o m  for him
by Carmarthen, reported his view on the situation in Egypt,and
his personal idea of what the outcome would be. He foresaw total
victory for gasan Pasha, if he were not recalled to Constantinople
because of the impending Kusso-Turkish war. There were two reasons
for this: the first, that the Ottoman forces were superior to
those of the Mamluks; the 33cond, that the number of Mamluks
who were deserting Murad and Ibrahim and promising loyalty to the
Ottomans was growing every day. It seemed quite likely to Baldwin
that general desertion rather than mere battles would determine
the victorious party, since the leading features of the mamluks
5were instability and proneness to desertion. He also saw in
gasan Pasha an excellent warrior who had been "infamously neglected"
4and "shamefully served".
■i
Also because gasan had begun to "borrow" money from the Px’ahks, 
although Baldwin did not refer to this.
Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Peb. 10, 1787. He was still in 
Alexandria at the time of writing.
5P0 78 /7 , Baldwin to A in s lie  (copy), Jan. 13» 1787.
4Ib id . . Feb. 9, 1787.
¥ith the Porte supreme m  Egypt, Baldwin foresaw the re­
establishment of a constitution, but realised that it would have 
to be only that, and not a reversal of the present order of things. 
The beys that had been loyal to the Porte would have to be given
u
a vestige of power since ... their weight... in the constitution
1
of Egyptian government was the preservation of Egypt to the Port©". 
In that case, Britain could easily claim the enforcement of her 
Capitulations with the help of the Embassy in Constantinople.
The Return of .Animosity between Ainslie and Baldwin
Ainslie was at first willing to comply with his orders from
London, and correspond on an amicable and regular basis with the
Consul-General in Egypt. He wrote Baldwin four letters from 23
2
October to 22 November 1786, in the space of a month. Baldwin 
was obviously touched by this generosity, for he was far too em­
barrassed to be able to express any gratitude to his superior.
But that was as far as the goodwill between the two men ex­
tended, for as soon as business had to be discussed, it was obvious 
that their viewpoints were totally opposed regarding Britain* s 
position in the Ottoman Empire. Acting on his instructions to re­
inforce English Capitulations in Egypt, Baldwin asked the Ambassador
^EO 78/7, Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), Eeb. 9f 1787.
2
These letters are not to be found, but mention is made of them in; 
EO 78/7, Baldwin to Ainslie (extract), Hov. 29, 1786,
to put pressure onihe authorities at the Porte vigorously to
acclaim British rights; hems powerless to do mry much at the
moment since political events in the country gavelittle indication
as to what the government would be like in the future. The Consul
also asked Ainslie to send Ghazi gasan Pasha a letter underlining
British rights In Egypt, especially those concerning the navi-
1
gat ion of the Red Sea.
Ainslie disagreed entirely .with Baldwin* s approach to the 
problem of permission for dispatches. He had to make a nominal 
effort since his instructions on the matter were most explicit.
He did not regard the Bed Sea route as important enough to out­
weigh other considerations in Anglo-Ottoman relations. He was much 
more intent cn obtaining the confidence of the Porte than in wanting 
to seize certain opportunities to obtain concessions for his country. 
Bakkwin, on the other hand, took a more practical approach to the 
situation: in its pre-occupatiai with the internal chaos of Egypt,
the Porte would undoubtedly rather distractedly produce a ferman 
enforcing English Capitulations in the country.
When Baldwin asked for the ferman, the Ambassador stopped 
m i  ting to him. When the Consul complained, Ainslie insisted he had 
written, but that the letters were being intercepted. MI cannot
^EO 76/7, Baldwin to Ainslie, Jan. 13, 1787. It was not until March 
1787 that Ainslie was able to obtain the papers that Baldwin had 
asked for. EO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, March 10, 1787*
account for the miscarriage of my letters to Egypt. But it must
needs he in consequence of general orders from government or
treachery 011 the part of my agent at Alexandria, which I hope to
discover very soon.Baldwin continued to write to his superior
in Constantinople. By 20 April 1737* he had written seven letters.^
And, Ainslie continued to claim nuneasiness” over the fact that
none of his letters were reaching the Consul.
Matters came to a head in the summer of 1787* On 17 August,
Ainslie sent a circular to all the consuls in the Levant informing
them of the Ottoman rupture with Russia. Baldwin did not receive
his copy, presumably because it was sent to Cairo, and he had been
staying in Alexandria. Baldwin could contain himself 110 longer,
and spoke his mind to the outraged Ambassador who was greatly in-
u 3
suited, and stigmatized the letter as improper”. The forced 
politeness was over, and once again the two men regarded each other 
as enemies. Baldwin continued to report his actions to Ainslie 
who never bothered to answer, although he always claimed that he 
had not received the Consul*s letters.^
E^O 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Eeb, 23, 1787.
‘Tj’O 78/8, Baldwin to Ainslie, May 27, 1787*
^EO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), Dec. 10, 1787*
4They are available today, however.
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Ainslie's dislike of Baldwin was not cnly based o n a differ­
ence of opinion regarding the propriety of demanding British 
rights in Egypt. He also distrusted the Consul, afraid he would 
start a Bengal-based business to Suez once again. UI shall only 
add that should Hr. Baldwin (trusting to his influence with the Beys) 
have encouraged speculators from Bengal previous to consulting with 
me, I shall, not withstanding, most heartily employ my utmost ef­
forts, and use all my credit in order to prevent mischief and losses,
although in the present circumstances, X cannot flatter myself 
1much success.1'
The Ambassador had reason to suspect Baldwin. When the3atter
was on his way to Egypt, he sent the Ambassador a message that he
2
was carrying goods destined for sale in Alexandria, and in view 
of the tezkere problem in Egypt, he did not want to have to pay 
customs on them in Smyrna. The Ambassador answered that he would 
have to do soV: but should be able to enforce the tezkere ruling 
once in Alexandria; Ainslie saw the Reis Efendi. who promised 
him personally that a double-duty would not be exacted in Egypt.
But the Ambassador found it difficult not to be suspicious of the 
Consul carrying merchandise, since his instructions specifically 
forbade any personal trade whatsoever. He m s  even more suspicious
^F078/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Hay 25^ 1787. 
2
34 bales of clothi
when he found out that Baldwin ,had not consulted with Consul Hayes 
in Smyrna, hut had instead done so with his dragoman, conclusive 
proof that his dealings were not entirely legal. He therefore told 
Baldwin that Hayes had been angry and added: "I am perfectly con­
vinced, sir, you had not the least intention to hurt that gentle­
man's feelings, and much less to invade the office of British Consul 
1
at Smyrna..,"
The lack of communication between Ambassador and Consul per­
sisted throughout the latter's period of official l’esidence in Egypt. 
Baldwin xeceived little or no help from Ainslie for the concessions 
he was able to procure for his country. The Ambassador, on the 
other hand, was far too disgusted to hide his distaste of Baldwin 
from the authorities in London. Ainslie tried at first to obey 
his instructions concerning Egypt by totally ignoring Baldwin; later, 
he was able to consider therproblems of Egypt of minimal importance 
in the light of others; finally they receded into the background of 
his thinking as a matter of utter indifference.
^PO 76/7, Ainslie to Baldwin (copy), Dec. 19, 1786.
Chapt er IV 
THE YEARS AS CONSUL-CMERAL:
1786 - 1793
The Rule of Hasan Pasha
The defeat of Murad and Ibrahim on 4 December 1786 resulted 
in two major consequences: the rebels were firmly pushed into
Upper Egypt, which area they dominated, and, while the Ottoman 
army ruled over Cairo and Lower Egypt, reinforcements arrived 
from Cyprus, Syria and the Crimea.'* On 28 Rabi‘ II 120l/l7 Eeb~ 
ruary 1787? the Ottoman forces delivered a blow to the rebels at 
Amir parar in Upper Egypt. A great number of the Mamluk army 
was killed, including Lachine Bey, one of Murad's supporters, 
and many of the I-Ianadi bedouins who had been fighting for the 
rebels. The Ottomans confined to press south after the departing 
Mamluks, and on 23 Jumada I 120l/l6 March 1787? the seizure of 
Aswan for JIasan Pasha was announced in Cairo. The rebels had been
pushed down to Ibrim in Nubia after a very rough battle during
« p
which Ibrahim Bey barely escaped, leaving behind his belongings.“
A strong Ottoman post was left at Aswan, commanded by gasan Bey
at al-Juddawi, and the expeditionary force "began to make its way
3
Uabarti. op.cit,, vol. 2, p.137.
S?0 78/7? Baldwin to Ainslie (copy), March 28, 1787.
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back to Cairo, since it could not possibly remain in the south 
indefinitely.
Towards the end of April, news reached Cairo of the north­
wards advance of Murad and. Ibrahim, and by the beginning of
fi 1
Sha ban 120l/May 1787, their arrival in Girga was announced. 
Messages between the two warring groups ensued, JIasan Pasha 
hoping to work out some form of agreement, since news from Con­
stantinople indicated an impending Russo-Turkish war and a con­
sequent withdrawal of Ottoman forces from Egypt. But no favourable 
solution was reached, mostly owing to the lack of agreement as to 
the number of villages thi.rebels wished to hold in Upper Egypt, 
and gasan had to take a decisive step to consolidate his position 
before leaving the country. On 14 Dhu*l gijja 1201/29 September 
1787, he held a divan in which he read a ferman from the Porte in 
which an amnesty for the rebels was declared, on condition that 
they remained far in Upper Egypt* Ibrahim was confined to Qina,
and Murad to Isna. Isma/il was to be the Shaykh al-Balad, and
4
Qaytas Bey the Amir al-ga.j ,i.
The unsettled state of affairs was hardly ideal for Baldwin 
who had arrived to set up the first British consulate in Egypt 
for almost thirty years. The conditions were far from being pro-
-]
Jabarti, op.cit., p.140. 
2Ibid., p.146.
pitious for an attempt to implement the seemingly anachronistic 
instructions laid down for him in London. Yet there can be no 
doubt he was overjoyed to be back in Egypt, free to negotiate 
all he had previously unsuccessfully hoped for, armed this time 
with protective consular authority.
A commercial treaty with the Beys being utterly inconceivable 
during Ottoman rule, Baldwin turned with as much fervour as he 
could to the relatively simple task of opening the Red Sea to 
British packetboats by having the Hatti Sherif of 1779 rescinded. 
But he first had to make up his mind about his own views of the 
political unrest of Egypt, how long he thought it would remain 
unchanged, and, most important, on whose side British interests 
lay.
An immensely practical man who lacked the moral righteousness 
of his Ambassador in Constantinople, Baldwin saw both the prepond­
erance of the Ottomans in Egypt and the return of Murad and Ibrahim 
as useful to Britain, for in either case a settlement could be 
worked out. In the former, he would rely on British influence at 
the Porte, and in the latter he could use his own local means of 
influence. He was careful to analyse the political affairs of 
the day, and’saw in gasan's attempts at reccnciliation in the 
summer of 1787 an unusual step. "Nothing could have engaged the 
C-Basha to give into such a measure, but to serve as a better
184.
1
stratagem to obtain bis ends...*1 The reason m s  the impending 
Russo-Turkish war, in which case Baldwin foresaw, after the with­
drawal of gasan and his troops, a total victory for the Mamluks.
In the meantime, since it was gasan Pasha who controlled 
Cairo and Lower Egypt, Baldwin saw in him a person whose influence 
would help to secure British rights. He met with the Ottoman
admiral at least four times during the latter's stay in the country,
2
and was "graciously treated". The first meeting took place in 
Cairo on 6 March 1787 during which the Consul broached the s^bj ect 
of Red Sea navigation. It seemed clear to Baldwin that Hasan liked 
Ainslie very much, and was willing to do all he could to help the 
British. But he specified that the Porte would have to sanction 
his permission of English vessels going to Sues, and suggested 
that Ainslie obtain a ferman; he asked also that a copy of the 
English capitulations be sent to Egypt for his own use.
The s econd meeting took place on 26 March. Baldwin wished
to see Hasan because he bad heard that a French vessel m s  in the
Red Sea and was heading for Sues. He wanted to remind the Pasha 
of his previous statement that he would be willing to allow vessels
^EO 24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, July 2, 1787.
^EO 78/7, Baldwin to Ainslie ( copy), March 28, 1787.
5Ibid.
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to go to Suez,"1* gasan m s  hesitant at first, hut finally gave 
the landing orders. When somebody placed the edict of 1779 into 
his hands, he had to fevolce the instructions, but after much: com- 
plication, the vessel, “Venus", was allowed to unload.
Baldwin m s  not unaware of the present plight of the Epench 
in Egypt. He fully realized that gasan1 s rule had had an adverse 
effect on the Erench community, especially when it came to the 
enforced "borrowing" of money, and that the Ottoman admiral per­
sonally favoured- England. The Consul did not hesitate to flatter 
gasan Pasha, offering him presents, and promising to send for 
pistols from England for him when he was asked to do so. But he 
wished to have the "Venus" allowed to land at Suez, in order to 
pave the way for British vessels to come.
Ainslie violently disagreed with Baldwin's manner of thinking.
He was far too cautious an individual to see the wisdom of allowing 
the enemy ship Into' Suez for purposes of a precedent. On the other 
hand, he accused Baldwin of utter naivete in his assessment of 
gasan Pasha as a straightforward, honest man who meant what lie said; 
he was, rather, "... a perfect master of dissimulation...", despite 
his personal sincerity to Ainslie. Baldwin, "... like most Europeans,
EO 24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, April 11, 1787.
2
The incident relating to the "Venus" and its arrival will be 
described in some detail on p. 187 below.
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misled by exterior appearances, thinks the Turks a heavy people
1
with whom much may he risked...”, he complained to Carmarthen,
The best example he could offer was that gasan had already asked 
the Ambassador for pistols; two pairs had already been ordered 
for him, one in gold, and the other in silver. He had not men­
tioned this to Baldwin, undoubtedly hoping to obtain yet another 
pair*
Ainslie1s Reactions to the Affairs of Rgypt
The Ambassador was interested in following his instructions
to bring pressure to bear upon the Porte to cancel the Hatti Sherif 
of 1779t to obtain another edict to open the Red Sea loute, and 
if possible, to allow for a treaty of commerce with the Beys. He 
was extremely cautious in his approach, and always seemed to have 
good excuses to postpone a serious confrontation with the Reis 
Bfendi. The sequence of events during which he tried to complement 
his orders shows an inconsistent and hesitant approach to the prob­
lem as a whole.
He began the proceedings by sending appropriate presents to 
the Grand Tesir, to gasan’s agent at the Porte, and to a few other
important officials for the mawlid al-nabi festivities in early
^PO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), July 10, 1787.
^The bii’thday of the Prophet.
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1787. Previously, when he heard of gasan* s attempts to arrange
a settlement with the rehel heys in November 1786, he decided to
delay addressing the Porte on the "delicate subject” of navigating
the Red Sea. He thought it would be wiser to wait until an in-
2
temal settlement in Egypt was reached. He was convinced that 
if he made a step in that direction in February it would ”... dis­
oblige the Seraglio, ... alienate the confidence of the Vizier, 
and ... ruin my credit with the Divan”.
On 20 March, Ainslie had a private meeting with the Grand 
Vezir in which many topics were discussed. But when the Ambassador 
tried to bring up the topic of Egypt, he was told that the situation 
there was so uncertain that no alteration of old arrangements could 
at present be discussed.^
His reaction to the arrival of the W e n u s ” was an important 
but detrimental step to the establisbment of British rights in Egypt. 
On 29 March 1787, the ”Venus” a frigate of forty guns, arrived at 
Suez; its commander was Francois-Etienne Rosily. Hhen Magallon 
heard of the arrival, he went to gasan Pasha in order to obtain per­
mission for the vessel to anchor. The Kapudan-Pasha was hesitant
^PO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), Jan. 11, 1787. The gifts 
cost him 1,000 £>iastres.
^EQ 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Feb. 23, 1787.
3rbid.
t?0 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, March 24, 1787.
at first, but finally agreed when the Frenchman produced a
letter to Choiseul-Gouffier, from gasan Pasha himself, promising
1to allow French vessels into Suez. The Kapudan Pasha made it
2
very clear, however, that no trading could take place.
It has already been mentioned above that Baldwin was also
anxious to have the 11 Venus" anchor at Suez in order to create
3a precedent for British ships. He was particularly pleased when
he found out that East India Company dispatches had been carried
by M. Rambour on board the "Venus" which he delivered to the Con- 
4sul. Rosily also offered, obviously in return for Baldwin’s 
help insdicii-ing Hasan1 s permission, to take letters to India.'
On 26 May, Ainslie made an application to the Porte to protest 
against the arrival of the uVenus". Pisani, his dragoman, told 
the Reis Efendi that Britain had forbidden its ships to go to 
Suez to please the Porte; in return, the latter had given the
Choiseul-Gouffier was convinced he was able to persuade gasan 
to write the letter only because the Kanudan-Pasha was unaware 
of the whole situation of the Red Sea route. Corr. Pol., Turquie,
172, Choiseul-Gouffier to de Castries, May 10,1785.
2Corr. Cons., Le Caire, Tome 25, Mure to de Castries, May 4, 1787.
3He did not realize that the coming of the ship caused another visit 
by Frenchmen, this time to Isma‘il Bey, who promised to allow French 
ships and trading vessels to Suez. The Mamlulc wrote this down: "Vous
pouvez exnedier des navires et des marchandises a Suez ... lie n !auront 
rien a craindre dela par aucun de nous...". Precis d'une lettre 
d1 jsmail Bey aux commandants frangais dans I'inde, 24 Raj ab 1201/
12 May 1787.
^F0 78/7, Baldwin to Ainslie, April 20, 1787.
"’Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, May 21, 1787. Rambour returned to 
India on May 27. Egypt 5a, Baldwin to E.I.C., July 2, 1787.
French permission to anchor there. Pisani added that the British
government was angry, and demanded equal privileges.1 "The Reis
Effendi received this unexpected declaration with visible signs
2
of surprise and bad humour**1 He swore that the French had made
no overtures to him on the subject, and that the Porte was also
furious. Two messages had already been sent to gasan Pasha in Cairo
calling on him to stop all such peimission.
Ainslie also sent Pisani to the President of the Chancery,
and his secretary to the Grand Vezir,1 both men confirmed the message
3of the Reis Bfendi. The Grand Vesir offered to produce the re­
gister of the commands that had been sent to Cairo, but the Am­
bassador "prudently declined" the offer. The Grand Vezir added 
that so long as he remained in office he would never allow for French 
navigation of either the Red Sea or the Black Sea,
The third meeting that Baldwin had with ghsan Pasha was in
April 1787, when he heard of the impending arrival at Suez of Lord 
4William Murray, the brother of the Duke of Atholl, with the coffee 
fleet from Jedda. While in Jedda, Murray had seen the vezir of the 
Sharif of Mecca who consented to help the British with their dispatches,
FO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, June 9, 1787*
2Ibid.
5rbid.
Lord William Murray afterwards stayed in Alexandria as a guest iri 
Baldwin’s house. Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Court of Directors, July 2,
1787.
1
and who wrote a letter to King George confirming this. Baldwin
was especially pleased, and hoped to be able to appoint an agent
2
there in order to cultivate the friendship of the Sharif.
The Gonsul asked gasan for permission for Murray to land, so 
a ferman was issued giving' the Englishman full protection. The 
Kapu dan-Paslia once again asked Baldwin to obtain from Ainslie a 
document attesting to the Porte’s concurrence of the permission.
To the Consul’s great chagrin, all that arrived from the Porte 
was a reprimand to Hasan for having allowed the ’’Venus” into Suez, 
and a reminder of the threats of the Iiatti Sherif of 1779* Baldwin 
realized that the reprimand had been instigated by Ainslie, and 
could not fully comprehend the reason. He had received no letters 
from the Ambassador except for the few at the beginning of his re­
sidence, and could only interpret the action as a deliberate plan to 
damage his personal standing In Egypt. What made Ainsliefs silence 
even more difficult to cope with was that Jtasan Pasha began to be­
come more insistent about the gift of pistols; Baldwin persistently 
but futilely transmitted the request to his superior in Constantinople 
and consequently had to make embarrassing excuses.
Ainslie seemed totally unaware of the predicament his actions 
had placed Baldwin in. He went about in his non-commital fashion
^Egypt 6, Vezir to Murray (translation), April 16, 1787.
2Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, July 2, 1787.
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of sounding' ait the Porte on the question of Egypt, On 10 July
he reported a confidential conversation he had had with the Grand
Vezir,during which he had tried to "feel His Highness* S;1 pulse” about 
1the Red Sea. The Ambassador said that the only reasonable ob­
jection to having English ships in the Red Sea had been removed 
by the ousting of ^urad and lbx,ahim from power. He pointed out 
that while gasan Pasha had not proved indisposed to grant the 
“Venus" permission to enter Suez, the British had to insist on 
equality. Ainslie also tried to point out to the Grand Vezir all 
the advantages the Porte and Egypt could derive from revoking the 
edict of 1779.
The Grand Vezir, however, "... seemed perplexed at the very 
mention of Egypt...", and admitted that the situation was far more 
complicated than Ainslie had made it out to be. He added that "... 
until the beast was killed, he could not dispose of the skin..,",
2
implying, of course, that the rebels were not yet certainly beaten. 
He also firmly stated that gasan Pasha would not dare to disobey 
his instructions, but had to allow the "Venus" to anchor at Suez, 
because he simply had no force to oppose a ship with forty guns.
The interview ended with the Grand Vezir thanking Ainslie dhr his 
views regarding Egypt "... of which we might in due time consult




After that, Ainslie sent generous gifts for Ramadan to the
Reis Efendi, his secretary, dragoman, and the Grand Vezir1 s private
treasurer, which the French Ambassador referred to as having caused
2
great distaste at the forte. He then attempted to bring up the 
topic once again, but was repulsed and told the time had not yet 
come for discussion. He was also told he would only damage his 
personal influence by insisting at the present time. The Ambassador 
was careful to report this to Carmarthen so that Baldwin’s wrath, 
of which he was not unaware, could be seen in its proper contesVt.
Ainslie firmly believed he understood the Porte’s viewpoint, but 
added ”... I would not risk the disobliging Mr. Baldwin by an appear­
ance of partiality to my own opinion in opposition to his recommenda-
r'3tion and the request cf the Captain Bashaw11.
After leaving Egypt, Lord William Murray visited Constantinople 
where he arrived on 9 September 1787. He brought with him a letter 
from Baldwin to the Ambassador. Ainslie insisted, when he learned 
the facts of Murray’s arrival at Sues, that gasan Pasha had only
Ibid.
2 *”Le chevalier Ainslie a force d* intrigue s, d1 agit at ions, j2t je pui s^  dire
sans exagerer, ja force d*extravagance, es't parvenue’~a se zendre odieux 
a tout le niinistere; Rashid ... lui temoigne le mepris le pins insult ant.” 
Corr. Pol., Turquie, 176, Choiseul-Gouffier to Moiitmorin, Dec. 28, 1787-
^PO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), July 10, 1787.
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allowed him to disembark because he had come with the coffee
fleet, and therefore under Turkish colours. He also seemed con-
vinced that gasan had "... got to the bottom of Mr, Baldwin's
schemes,..", and that was the reason for his desire to have the
1
Porte issue a ferman allowing the Red Seatraffic. Ainslie, on
the other hand, was sure that the problem could be put aside for
the time being, especially since Ghoiseul-Gouffier had promised
2
to prevent French vessels from navigating in the Red Sea,
This promise from the French Ambassador somehow relieved
Ainslie of the pressure of the problem. He now felt he could
pursue his instructions concerning Egypt at leisure. He took a
few indirect steps, such as "... feeling ... the pulse of some
3of the leading members of the divan". He did it under the pre­
text of wanting to facilitate British correspondence from India 
to England, but ultimately aimed for exclusive British rights of 
navigation in the Red Sea. The method he had in mind was to or­
ganise an ad hoc conference on the subject, but its success would 
depend entirely on the utmost secrecy and discx-etion of all parties 
concerned. Fox" this he would need the aid of douceurs, and asked
^FO 78/s , Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), Sept, 10, 1737.
Ibid. There is no evidence to support this statement by Ainslie 




£500 of Carmarthen for the purpose,
¥hen he was inihe process of writing the above messages to 
Carmarthen, Ainslie said he had just been called upon to see the 
Grand Vezir about an urgent matter. Fifteen days later, he re­
ported the proceedings. The Grand Vezir wanted to offer the British 
government a commission as a sign of the strong ties of friendship 
with the Ottoman Hmpire; the commission was to supply the Ihipire 
with one million piastres worth of rope, nails, tin and powder.
The next day, the Grand Vezir himself brought up the subject of
Ainslie’s request for the use of the dispatch route. He told the
Ambassador that it would be discussed and settled to Ainslie1s
satisfaction after Bayram when the pressure o f the break with
2
Russia might have diminished.
A fortnight later, Ainslie reported a meeting he had with
the Grand Vezir during which a promise at last was given; at the
first opportunity the Grand Vezir would personally ask the Sultan
for permission. It was such a delicate matter, that it had to be
kept a secret; it could not possibly be submitted for discussion 
3in the Cabinet,
^FO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), Sept. 10, 1737.
2F0 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Sept. 25, 1787.
■^ FO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), Oct. 10, 1787.
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The Ambassador seemed to have been happily unaware that the 
Ottomans were discreetly and very effectively side-tracking him 
with futile promises. Even, the French Ambassador noticed that 
his British counterpart had become a nuisance at the Porte.^ But 
Ainslie remarked: nI flatter myself that the affair of the navi­
gation in the Red Sea will now succeed, in which case your Lord­
ship will approve and render justice to my economy of the public 
2money. u
Fifteen days later, the Ambassador addressed a memorial to 
the Porte asking for permission to have British packet boats in 
Siiez. He seemed convinced that if this were granted, an automatic 
annulment of the Hatti Sherif would ensue. But he was worried at 
the delay of his application. It was decided to postpone consider­
ation of the affair until gasan Pasha returned to Constantinople.
Ainslie was anxious to meet with officials before then, so he con­
trived a meeting on 5 November with the Grand Vezir, whom he con-
4sidered a friend. But the latter refused to commit himself until 
the arrival of gasan Pasha.
1
See above, p. 192, n,2.
*T?0 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Oct. 10, 1787.
^FQ 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Oct. 25, 1787.
^F0 78 /8 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen, Nov. 10, 1787.
When, soon after, gasan Pasha arrived in Constantinople,
1laden with considerable booty from Egypt, Ainslie went to see
2
him. The Ottoman admiral received the Ambassador "in his arms”, 
and expressed all the appropriate joy at meeting his old friend. 
Ainslie proudly noted that he was as confidential and open in 
his manner as he had been before the expedition to Egypt. But 
when the Ambassador mentioned the question of the Red Sea in gen­
eral, and that of the 11 Venus11 in particular, gasan became visibly 
embarrassed and admitted that the French Consul and Rosily had
3
made ’'important11 offers which could not be overlooked. But Ainslie
confidently told him that the British permission for the dispatch
route depended on him. gasan smilingly replied; nI obtained for
Your Excellency the exemption of the duty of the masteria, and I
shall also procure you this much more important passage, in hopes
4to secure the friendship of Great Britain.”
Xt was not surprising that the porte used any excuse to delay 
the question. The French mission in Constantinople had told the Otto­
mans that the British were making arrangements to furnish the RuSS-
l^
Including 3 large ships full of coffee, rice, and other produce*
FO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Nov. 24, 1787,
2 <Ibid.
3Baldwin reported that the French had paid gasan 60,000 dollars.
Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Feb. 10, 1787.
^FO 78 /8 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen, Nov, 24, 1787.
ians with, warships and officers The Grand Vezir and gasan Pasha 
told Pisani, Ainslie’s dragoman, that until all doubts of the 
validity of the accusation had been dispelled, a pronouncement 
on the Red Sea matter would have to wait. However, if the Am­
bassador could immediately and formally contradict the rumour, 
the delay would no longer exist.^
On 12 December, Ainslie met with the Grand Admiral, and was 
able to convince him of the untruth of the French story. The 
Ambassador was then told that his country would not be denied the 
navigational rights already granted to France, but there would only 
be one condition for this: the Ottoman Empire needed to buy or
■n Iborrow warships from Britain. An alternative condition woulc|be
j
for Britain to promise to keep Ottoman coasts and islands free
from Russian trade, Ainslie firmly replied that ’’private demands
of friendship” and "public national engagements” were distinct and
2
separate, and should not be confused.
The year 1788 saw the end of Ainslie’s Hopes of settling the 
matter. Somehow, British aspirations for the dispatch route were 
nmntioned in the foreign gazette of Constantinople, and France and 
Holland immediately put in their claims for equal privileges. The 
Grand Council had to put off consideration of the issue, since it
^FO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Dec. 10, 1787. 
^FO 78/8, Ainslie to Carmarthen, Dec. 28, 1787*
did not want to alienate France. Ainslie complained to the Grand 
Vezir that he had broken his promise. "The worthy man appeared 
much mortified, and tittered with a sigh, oh, the Council, the 
Council.
British merchants in Constantinople tried to rally to the 
cause, and offered a loan at 8°/o interest to the Porte, but the 
latter refused, saying it was not in need of money. A further 
attempt was made when the Ambassador agreed with gasan Pasha to 
have three English merchant ships delivered at Jedda for Ottoman 
trade to Sues on the condition that Britain be accorded the much 
sought-for permission, gasan promised to give an answer, but 
never did so.
And so, a deadlock ensued. Ainslie could think of no other 
way to approach the problem, and the Porte was only too anxious 
to delay a formal reply, always afraid of ^rench reaction. The 
Ambassador continued, however, to make overtures; he received vague 
answers, and regularly reported to Carmarthen that he had not given 
up. He was clearly not convinced of the British rights of navi­
gation, for he would have firmly instead of furtively masked for a 
ferman.
In November, Ainslie received information from a "friend11 at the
^FO 78/9, Ainslie to Carmarthen (cypher), Jan. 10, 1788. 
2Ibid.
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Seraglio concerning the reason for the delay of his request.
In October, the French Ambassador had insinuated that British 
vessels were loading goods in Bengal for sale in Sues. Choiseul- 
Gauffier had therefore assumed that the Porte had given its per­
mission, since the British had not reached an independent agreement
1
with the Beys. He claimed equal rights, citing the Capitulations.
Ainslie made no effort to counteract this rumour. He felt
that Pranced position vis-a-vis the Porte was fast sinking, and
consequently did not wish to press for anything unusual in the
fear that it would be improper. He was absolutely convinced he
would never be able to obtain the ferman. And if a dispatch boat
had to go through the Hed Sea, he made it clear to London that he
”... would prefer that the Porte should think that I had not been
2
consulted, nay was totally ignorant of the matter..."
That, in conclusion, was probably his wish from the beginning, 
Baldwin realised, after the first two years of frustrated communi­
cation with his ambassador, that he would have to rely entirely on 
his own means to obtain whatever he could for Britain in Egypt.
The connection between the two men practically ceased to exist 
after this period, for although Baldwin sent fairly regular reports 
to Constantinople, he never received a reply.
F^O 78 /9 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen (cypher), Nov. 15, 1788.
A
FO 78/ 9 , A in s lie  to Carmarthen (cypher), Nov. 8 , 1788.
French Attempts to Use the Route
Baldwin, at first relying on Ainslie to obtain the necessary
documents for Egypt, had little to do except follow the affairs
of the French and the Russians, and try his best to thwart any
plans they had to penetrate Egypt. He was quick to find out
about the French company that had been recently established in
Marseilles to trade with India via Suez.'*' He learned that Magallon
was the agent for the company, and had bought half of the homes and
warehouses of one side of the European street in Alexandria for
the purpose. The Consul also learned that the company had in-
2
creased its capital from fifteen to forty million livres.
The Marseilles company also had the interest of Antun Kassis
Fir*awn, former Customs Master of Cairo, who was a Count of the 
Holy Roman Empire. The wily Syrian had always been interested in
the India trade at Suez, and had kept in close touch with a former
3French dragoman in Egypt, Venzure de Paradis. From the correspond­
ence between these two men, it is obvious that Fir*am had always
•i
The French India Company had had the s ame objection to trade with 
Egypt as had its British counterpart (see Chapter Isabove), Although 
it had promoted the 1785 Truguet agreements,it did not consider them 
applicable without the ratification of the Porte. And so a new com­
pany was formed in Marseilles, directed by two merchants Audibert and
Seymandi, with the sole purpose of selling India goods in Egypt, and
parts of the Ottoman Empire, Clement, op.cit., p.264.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Feb, 10, 1787,
3^See Chapter II, above.
been partial to the French during the years of his rule of the
customs. ¥ith the establishment of a company especially designed
to engage intbe trade which always concerned him, he willingly
gave all the help needed to make the venture successful. He
warned, however, that without a ferman from the Porte to sanction
1
the navigation of the Red Sea, the business would not be safe.
Once again, Baldwin was aware of the transactions between Fir*awn
and the Marseilles Company, and reported them to the Court of
2
Directors in London.
In October 1737, be reported that the French had ordered cargo 
from India, and that their ships were soon to be expected. Baldwin 
realised that the French considered the Ottoman ^mpire to be in a 
state of decline, and that the approaching ships were a manifestation, 
by defiance, of the situation; furthermore, they were eager for a 
footing in Egypt once the weakness of the Empire took firmer shape.
3
"They are so subtle in their schemes. They know the value of Egypt..,*;
But the Consul m s  not always correct in his assessment of the 
meanings of French movement in Egypt, Onep articular incident that 
occurred in the latter part of 1787 presents an interesting example 
of how his unfounded suspicions caused him to inadvertently help his
Corr. Pol., Turquie, 174, Faraun to Venzure (transl.), Aug. 23, 1786.
^\Fir*awn lived in Trieste, after travelling to Leghorn and Venice. 
■Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Court of Directors, July 2, 1787.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Oct. 21, 1787.
country, and at the same time allowed him to remain unaware of
certain truths of the situation.
On 28 October, a French ship arrived in Alexandria from Marseilles.
It carried one passenger (aside from servants) and had no merchandise,
thus arousing the suspicions of the ever-watchful Baldwin. He was
not unaware of French designs to uphold Holland against Britain,
and could only think that the French were planning some sort of blow
to British possessions in India. The passenger claimed to be a doctor,
1
which Baldwin found very difficult to believe. He noted that the 
Frenchman brought letters for. the French Consul, and did not allow 
his servants to disembark. Baldwin, by nature eminently suited to 
cloale-and-dagger intrigues, decided to send his own cook, a French­
man, to the ship to converse with the cook there. The 11 doctor” turned 
out to be a “Marquis”, a ” General ”, and a “Cordon Rouge”, and was 
going to India to fight the British there. He had formerly been 
a captive of the British, but somehow had managed to escape.
The same evening, Baldwin dined with some Frenchmen of Alex­
andria, and obtained even more information about the visitor: his
name was the Marquis de Mont camp, and he had set out from Paris.
The Consul then immediately decided to take it upon himself to follow 
the two paths now open to him: first, to inform the British settle­
ments in India of the revolution in Holland, and of an impending
•i
Doctors did not usually hire ships on their own accounts. Egypt 5a, 
Baldwin to Dundas, Nov. 6, l7§7*
outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities as a consequence; second, 
to detain Montcsamp in Egypt as long as possible.
1
Baldwin had just learned about the uprising in Holland when 
the essentially pro-French elements controlled the states, and 
how the Princess of Orange had been insulted on her way to The 
Hague. He assumed that in case of an outbreak of war, Holland and 
France would certainly be against England and Prussia. He was, 
moreover, sure that the Dutch East Indies would be the scene of any 
Anglo-French hostilities, so he felt the urgency at Having to warn 
the government in India of the events. He sent the copies of the
letter by three different routes: to Jedda and Mukha (by sea); to
*•* 2 
Jedda and Mukha (land) to Muscat; and, to Damascus and Basra.
To accomplish the mis sion of keeping Montcamp in Egypt as
long as possible, he instructed Rosetti to keep the Frenchman in
Cairo for thirty days, and "..9 to amuse him with promises and ex-
4cuses and disappointments...” The Venetian merchant send word to 
Isma1 il* s k&hya that Montcamp had been sent to conduct a French ex- 
pedition to .Suez. The k&hya persuaded his chief to write a letter
A
Not only from local gossip, but also from the Leyden Gazette, and 
the Courier de I 1Europe which he sent to India.
^FO 24/l? Baldwin to the Presidency of Any One of the ^ritish Settle­
ments in the East Indies, Oct. JO, 1787.
3Baldwin did not actually mention Rosetti, but Magallon’s report re­
vealed the Venetian* s rCle. Furthermore, Baldwin was in Alexandria, 
and could not have done much in Cairo.
A „
Egypt 5 a* Baldwin to Dun das, Nov. 6, 1787.
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forbidding Montcamp*s departure. It was only after mucli work
by the loyal Magallon to get Isma/il to revoke his letter that
1
the traveller was finally allowed to leave Cairo for Suez. Even
in Suez there were attempts to forbid his departure until Magallon
persuaded Ri^wan Bey to give him leave.
Montcamp and Magallon were very annoyed at the delay, and even
more so that it should have been the British, so unimportant in
Egypt, that were responsible for it. "Vous voyes. ... comment les
anglais, qui ne sont presque rien en Egypte. font encore un dernier
2
effort pour nous faire echouer.(*
The effort was an expensive one for Baldwin. The cost of sending
3
the three dispatches amounted to 4*450 Turkish piastres. To detain 
Montcamp was also expensive: 160 piastres for obtaining information
of the identity of the traveller; 1,500 piastres as a douceur to 
Isma il Bey; 1,000 piastres to Isma il’s khhya, and, 400 piastres
4
to Rigwan Bey. The total in English money.amounted to £938.15s. 
Baldwin did not ask the East India Company for it, since the govern­
ment in London was equally concerned.
-i
Magallon1 s version of the incident conflicts with that of Montcamp. 
Both sources reveal the delay caused by the British, but the former 
claimed that it was with the help of the Customs Master Yusif Kassab
that he was able to bribe Isma il to revoke the orders he had given.
Corr. Cons., le Caire, 25* Magallon, Nov. 17, 1787.
^Corr. Cons., le Caire, 25, Montcamp, Nov. 8, 1787.
^At the r ate of 2s. 6d. per piastre*
4E0 2 4 / l ,  Baldwin to  Carmarthen, June 2o, 1788.
But Baldwin did not realize that Montcamp*s mission had been
to woo the Sharif of Mecca; this he did, a fact entirely unknown
to the British Consul. Montcamp was surreptitiously able to
intercept a packet of letters addressed to Baldwin that he gave
2instead to Mure, the French Consul in Alexandria. Baldwin did 
not seem to notice this, or if he did, he certainly made no mention 
of it in his reports to London.
On 31 July 1788, Baldwin announced the impending arrival of 
a second French ship (the "Venus*1 was the first) to Suez. It had 
come from Pondicherry with three hundred bales of piece goods, but 
somehow it never made the journey all the way to Suez; it turned 
back after reaching Mukha. Baldwin did not believe the French ex­
planation that the return of the vessel was due to bad weather; he 
was convinced that Montcamp had been delayed for so long at Mukha 
on his way to Pondicherry that he had persuaded the captain of the 
ship to turn back so he could hurry his message.
Almost a year later, the second -^rench ship actually docked 
at Suez. It was the *'Prince de Conde**, and had come from Pondicherry 
with 29,400 pieces of Bengal muslin.4 Baldwin was angry and frustrated
"1 0 
Mas son, Histoire du commerce francais dans le levant au xviii siecle,
p.581. Clement’s version does not entirely agree with this. He claims
that Montcamp*s mission was to send dispatches to the government in
Pondicherry. Clement, op.cit., p.265.
^AE, Bj, 113, Mure to de Castries, Nov. 4, 1787.
5There is no evidence to support Baldwin’s theory, Masson, op.cit., 
p.583* confirms the French version.
4Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Ju ly  7, 1789.
that, in view of the total lack of British trade on the route,
1the merchandise was allowed down with "little he si'bat ion".'
The Consul set his agents out to sabotage the ship, but Magallon,
ready for such an event after the Montcamp incident, stood in
2 *the way. The cargo was sold in Cairo. Baldwin desperately ap­
pealed to Dundas, probably his warmest supporter, to persuade the 
government to encourage British ships to use the Red Sea route.
He could not understand low ritain, a close friend of the Ottoman 
Empire, was not maiming use of such a practical route whereas the 
French were doing so, and without trouble.^
But he con timed attempts to emulate their activity. In 
August 1789 Isma 6 il Bey gave Magallon a commission to have a French 
ship take a tribute of wheat, biscuit, and rice to Constantinople.
* Urn an Aglia (chavush4 of Hasan Pasha) was appointed to work out the 
arrangements with Mure. But Baldwin went to sUmar and persuaded 
him to hire a British ship instead. Magallon complained to Isma‘a.1, 
but the latter was powerless to change the situation, v/hen the Brit­
ish shir> thins" sailed for Constantinople, it unfortunately met 
with disaster on the island of Tenedos in the Archipalego, and could
^FO 24/l? Baldwin to Carmarthen, June 21, 1789.
2
Corr. Cons., le Caire, 25, Magallon to Castries, June 6, 1789.
3 *
It is worth while here to note that despite Baldwin’s annoyance at the 
"Prince de Conde's” successful mission, Magallon complained that the 
cargo was too limited to satisfy the authorities in Egypt. Also, the 
"Prince de Conde" was the last ship sent by the Marseilles Company; after 
this, the establishment declined.
4A personal attendant who carried messages.
^  #Wil
not continue the journey, Isma il's wrath knew no hounds, for
he had to send presents to Sultan Selim to make up for the loss,
and he naturally directed his ire at BaldX'J'in. Undaunted, the
Consul and Rosetti offered to take the commission for the sending
2
of the presents, hut were brusquely turned down. It was at this 
point that Baldwin must have realised that the rule of Isma il 
Bey was of great advantage to the French community; he must 
have then begun to wish for the r eturn of Murad and Ibrahim.
The Departure of Hasan, and ultimate retuim of the Duumvirate
It has already been mentioned that Hasan Pasha was obliged 
to leave Egypt in 1787 in order to return to Constantinople be­
cause of the Russo-Turkish war. Baldwin had his fourth meeting
with him as the Kapudan-Pasha was leaving Alexandria, The Consul
3
went up to the ship to bid Jtasan farewell. Once again Baldwin 
asked him about British navigation of the Red Sea, and the reply 
was in the affirmative, but with the stipulation that only dis­
patches and not merchandise would be allowed. The Consul reported 
gasan's pessimism about leaving Egypt at so unpropitious a time,
•j
There is evidence, however, that some of the cargo was saved.
FO 78/l0, Ainslie to Leeds,July 28, 1789.
2Corr. *Cons., le Caire, 25, Magallon to Castries, Aug. 24, 1789.
3
Egypt 5&V Baldwin to Carmarthen, Oct. 16, 1787.
and told Baldwin, "Consul, I am disgracedJ
The departure of the Ottoman army, leaving Ismacxl Bey 
as shaykh-al-balad» provided an excellent opportunity for the 
Beys in the south to regain their positions. In November 1787 
news reached Cairo of the arrival of the mamluks of Upper Egypt 
at Agyut, Together with their men, they began to push slowly 
northwards, and threatened Cairo if Ismafiil did not consent to 
make peace. By February 1788, they had reached Ban! Suwayf, quite 
clearly determined never to return to Upper Egypt, and not to 
respond to Isma/ll's attempts at negotiation.
During this period, many mamluks loyal to Murad and Ibrahim 
pretended to desert to the opposing camp, but Isma6il arrested them 
despite their alleged vows of fidelity. Of the eighteen kashifs 
imprisoned by the Shaylch al-Balad, eight were given certain re­
stricted liberty. Of these, two became friendly with Baldwin,
Jl#n* fei?
and visited him several times; they were Qayjas Kashif, and Salim
Kashif. They took the Consul into their confidence, and explained
Ibrahim's great need for foreign allies. The rebels already had the
help of Russia, but did not seem to be very satisfied with Baron
Thonus, the Consul. They were anxious to win the friendship of the 
u 2
Emperor of Germany" and were willing to offer him commercial settle-
1
Baldwin, Pol. Rec., p .28.
2
Presumably that of Austria. 8'ome- connection may be seen with the fact 
that even ¥. G. Browne, the scholar and traveller, had referred to 
Rosetti, who was the Austrian Consul, as that of Germany. Browne, 
Travels in Africa, Egypt, Syria, p.37.
merits, and even a garrison in Alexandria, in return fox' a refusal
to a ccept peace with the Ottomans unless Egypt, under Murad and
Ibrahim, was proclaimed independent* The kashifs asked Baldwin to
be their ambassador, and offered to pay him any price. The Consul
had to refuse, because his n... station and duty admitted of no
choice,,,’1, but he wrote to London asking for advice on how to
1
deal with the problem.
The r61e of the Russians during the rule of gasan Pasha and 
immediately afterwards was an important one during the exile of 
the duumvirate. It has already been mentioned that it was to 
Thonus that the rebel Beys turned when they learned of the arrival 
of gasan Pasha in Alexandria in 1786. Rumours in Cairo after the 
Pasha's departure referred to the continued help of Russians, dis­
guised as mamluks in the entourage of Ibrahim, Another story re­
ferred to the arrival of a Russian officer in Alexandria from Con­
stantinople who hired a bedouin to take him to Mount Sinai; Bald­
win said it was quite clear that the Russian had been to Upper 
Egypt to join the rebel forces.^
On 31 July 1788, Baldwin reported that Thonus was in Xarte in 
disguise. He lad left Egypt and was headed for Leghorn. J A few
*
PO 24*/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, April 2, 1788, He never receiyed 
a reply.
2Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, May 21, 1787.
p^O 2 4 / l ,  Baldwin to Carmarthen, July 31* 1788.
weeks later lie reported the arrival of the Russian consul at 
Damietta on hoard a Russian frigate of forty guns. When he alighted, 
he explained that there was nothing to fear from his mission. 
Baldwin noted that the French agent at Bamietta, Ribaud, had gone 
on board the ship, strengthening the viewpoint that France and 
Russia were allied in their designs on Egypt. Thonus remained 
in Egypt for fifteen days, during which time he sent letters inland, 
presumably to the rebels, and waited for answers. He left 011 25 
August,
He returned on 9 September*!: Two officers of Isma4!! conferred
with him on board his ship. He proposed to them a peace between
the two factions ha the country, and offered to act as intermediary.
Somehow the officers, acting on the orders of the suspicious Shaykh
al-Balad to reach an a greement with the rebels, thus being in a
position to challenge the Porte. Convinced of his treachery, Xsma4il
2
sent him to the Citadel where he was imprisoned, and waited for 
orders from Constantinople as to how to tfeal with him, Baldwin 
then realized that the Russian fleet everyone had been whispering
^Egypt Baldwin to Bundas, Sept, 16, 1788, 
o
Ribaud was also imprisoned, but later released.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Bundas, Sept, 23* 1788.
1about was not going' to appear, since rumours had it that it had 
been destroyed. With the arrest of Thonus, the Englishman was con­
vinced of Russian complicity against the Ottomans: uThis long-
premeditated design of the Russians has now received the highest
2
stamp of authenticity.,f
With Thonus held by the government cf Cairo, the rebels were 
cut off from a source o f help. The situation was made worse by the 
execution of the Russian Consul which Baldwin reported in March 
1780. In the meantime, the Porte had sent Isma il orders to 
fight the rebels since they had gone past the territorial limits 
allotted to them by gasan Pasha before his departure. In Safa£ 
1203/Wovember 1788 an indecisive battle took place, in which many were 
killed and injured, but no victors apparent. The situation between 
the two camps remained deadlocked until the outbreak of the plague 
in early 1791 when the disease ravaged the country and upset the 
balance of power.
Baldwin claimed that the disease had come from Constantinople 
on a French vessel, nL* amiable Marie11. There were several infected
■1
The rumour must have reached London, for Leeds wrote a very secret 
note to Ainslie in early 1790 to warn him that a draft of a Russian 
project had been discovered. This was that a squadron would attempt 
to take Ottoman possessions in and around the Red Sea, to destroy Jedda, 
Medina and Mecca, and even to carry off the tomb of Muhammad. FO 78/ll, 
Leeds to Ainslie (cypher), Jan. 8, 1790,
^FO 24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, Sept, 23, 1788.
^Egypt 3a, Baldwin to Dundas, March 14, 1790.
slaves on board when it landed in Alexandria, Some died in the
city, and the rest ware sent to Cairo where Isma*il brought some
some for mamluks. Soon the illness seized the Shaykh al-Balad
and many of his followers. Isma/il died in March, and a large
number of his house and following also perished with him. In
Alexandria, the Europeans, who always practised a rigid enforcement
of quarantine, were spared, with the exception of the Spanish agent 
2
and his wife. In Cairo, a French merchant, a priest, and seven
3
of their servants caught it and died. It is perhaps noteworthy 
to add here that it was during this outbreak of the epidemic that
4
Baldwin worked on a cure for the plague that he was to publish later.
The rebel beys had somehow managed to keep away from the in­
fection, so that while their enemies were immobilised by the dis­
ease, they were busily gathering strength. On 8 July 1791, Murad 
and Ibrahim reached gilwan, and on 16 July, they entered Cairo.
*Btbman Bey Toppal, Ismael's successor as shaykh al-balad9 escorted 
the triumphant Murad and Ibrahim into Cairo, HSo are,most of the re­
volutions in Egypt performed. More like the defeat of a Minister in
1
Baldwin, Pol. Rec., p.252.
2F0 24/l, Baldwin to Leeds, April 16, 1791.
^Ibid.
^He enclosed the first draft of the cure in: FO 24/l? Baldwin to
Grenville, Sept. 17, 1791. See Appendix X for the list of Baldwin’s 
publioations«
^Baldwin had predicted this in April, ”... we look for / t h e  return of
the rebels/ in July next.” FO 24/1, Baldwin to Leeds, April 16, 1791.
England - by the desertion of his friends than the triumph of
powerful armies.'1^
By the end of July 179-1 , Eurad and Ibrahim were once more in
power in Egypt. They made their victorious way up to the Citadal
on 26 Dhu’l Qa ‘da 1205/28 July 1791 where the Pasha Muhammad
‘izzat clothed them in the traditional garments, and acknowledged
their right to rule. A short while later, in early gafar 1206/
September-Qctober 1791, an amnesty arrived from the Porte for the 
2 «* ~
duumvirate. Ibrahim once again became shaykh al-balad. and Murad 
resumed his former position as the effective ruler of Egypt.
Consular Activity
Baldwin was no doubt relieved at the return of the former 
rulers of Egypt. Isma4il's marked preference for the French, and 
his adamant determination to obey the Porte did not help the English­
man to accomplish much as Consul-General. He had not been totally 
ineffectual during the two and a half years of I s m a e l ’s rule, 
however.
In the early part of 1788, he announced that he had obtained 
an order from Isma4ilfs government to allow the East India Company
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Sept. 17, 1791*
2 «*Jabarti, op.cit., vol. 2, p.226.
1
dispatches and passengers to land at Suez. It is not unlikely
that Rosetti obtained the permission, for the Venetian merchant
lived in Cairo, and knew Isma*11 well; Baldwin, on the other
hand, remained in Alexandria throughout his stay in Egypt, except
2
for occasional visits to Cairo, He explained his decision to
live where he did by claiming he lad to keep a close watch on the
activity of the port, besides having to follow the movements of the
French, He was careful to add that he did not particularly enjoy
his life in Alexandria which was u... a perfect dereliction from
everything pleasant,.. **
Despite the permission for use of the Red Sea route, it is
remarkable how little advantage was taken of it. Aside from the
4
sending of the triplicate letters to the Indian presidencies its
further use was limited. On 13 May 1790, St. Leger and Colier
left London, and arrivedia Alexandria on 14 June. They carried
5public dispatches for India and went straight to Cairo where 
they arrived three days later. There Rosetti helped them to buy
■i
He annotmced it on 2 April 1788, Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dun das.
o
Wood, op.cit., p.173? erroneously claims that Baldwin spent the 
years in Cairo.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Morton, Dec, 18, 1789.
^See p.203, above,
^There is no evidence to support Hoskin’s statement that the two men were 
French agents, and Baldwin detained them purposely in Egypt. Hoskins, 
op.cat., p •431 n.65*
necessary provisions that amounted to 3>800 Turkish dollars in
value. They made their way to Suez, but were delayed in sailing
becaiise they could not find a ship to take them. It was not until
29 June that they were finally able to leave.
Baldwin was excessively annoyed that the route had fallen
into such disuse that it was becoming increasingly impractical
to use it in an emergency. He personally continued to use it in
order to keep the British in India constantly aware of European
affairs. On 6 November 1790, his letter to the Court of Directors
2
in London was to accompany a packet coming from India. In the
same letter he reported havingsent a dispatch to India on 2 July
In which he sent a report of events in Europe.
This despatch was addressed to the “Governor General or Presi-
3
dent of Any One of the British Settlements in the East Indies1*.
In it, Baldwin spoke of the current political situation of Europe,
and enclosed copies of the Leyden Gazette, the Courier de l 1Europe
and two Avignon Gazettes../, He also mentioned the need for a con-
stantly available vessel at Suez for emergencies. His suggestion
4was Ignored. Thus, in April 1791? when an English major was on his
■i
This included Rosetti*s services, as well as clothes and food.
The list of what was purchased is enclosed in Egypt 5a, Baldwin to 
Morton, July 2, 1790.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Morton, Hov. 6, 1790.
^EO 24/l, July 2, 1790. Baldwin sent the dispatches on two routes; 
via Aleppo on dromedary express, and via Jedda.
4
Major McDonald, See Chapter V, below.
way to India, he could find no boat to take hhn down the Red
Sea; he was obliged to change his route via Aleppo and Basra,
At the beginning of his residence as Consul-General, Baldwin
often used French vessels in Alexandria to send his letters to
Europe. He seemed to have discontinued the practice after 1790,
1presumably because of the interception by Montcamp, although he
never specifically gave any reasons for doing so.
In the absence of having any rigorous and regular work to do
as a Consul, especially since his services as agent to the East
India Company were negligible, Baldwin busily occupied himself
with any event he could seize upon to further British interests.
Two episodes were concerned with Moroccan princes that had come
2
to Egypt. On 20 March 1788, Mulay Sayid, one of the sons of Sidi 
Muhammad ibn fiAbdallah, the Sultan of Morocco, on his way back from 
the pilgrimage In Mecca, set up camp outside Alexandria. He had 
the unfortunate reputation of always being in need of money, a 
fact he was happily unaware of. One day, he decided to enter the 
city, and made a great ceremonial fuss as he did so, after which he 
made his way to the house of a shaykh. There he set up his court, 
and announced that he was ready to receive the visits of the foreign 
consuls. When no one appeared, he became very angry, and had to resort
See above, p. 205.
o
This was probably an error. Tt is more likely to have been 
Mulay Xazid.
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to sending letters to Rosetti, Mure and Baldwin, stating tliat 
he wished to Borrow money from them. All three men refused the 
appeal.
On 27 March Mulay Salami, another Moroccan Prince, arrived.
He had been away from his country for ten years, and was married
^ 2 "* 
to one of Murad Bey’s dancers. A±ter leaving Cairo, he went
to Alexandria. While he was there none of the consuls ventured
3 mto p ay their respects, so he instead went to see Baldwin, The 
prince wished to hire a ship to talce him to Tangiers, and showed 
his preference fox1 an English ship that was in the harbour. But 
the vessel had a cargo and was due to leave for London. Baldwin 
felt it incumbent upon himself, in order to promote Anglo-loroccan 
relations, to persuade the captain to divert his route and take 
the prince to his destination. He also arranged that the fare 
for the passage be paid in Tangiers, The Captain, Thomas Gooch of 
the ’’New Euphrates",was not particularly pleased with the arrange­




Baldwin did not mention that he had been called upon. It was 




^EO 24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, April 2, 1788.
Baldwin was convinced th a t he had la id  11. . .  a foundation
X
of advantage to the English interests in the Moroccan Empire”.
He contented himself with the thoughts that Mulay Salami had 
been so pleased with him that he had claimed Britain and Morocco 
were ”Ha?al Nahid”.^
An, other visiting dignitary that Baldwin interested himself 
with as a representative of Britain was Yusif Pasha, the Grand Yesir, 
who visited Egypt on his way to Jedda in 1795* The Consul re- 
pointed that he had paid his respects to the dignitarjr, and that 
their relationship had been very cordial. Yusif Pasha had been 
particularly interested in news of the war in Europe, a topic Bald- 
win prided himself in knowing well.
English travellers during the period were very restricted in 
number. One who went to Egypt, and had some contact with Baldwin, 
albeit remotely, was William Geprge Browne. He was a young man, 
just down from Oxford, and had arrived hi Egypt 011 10 January 1792. 
He was essentially a scholar, intent on learning Arabic and the 
political conditions of the country. Baldwin recommended his care 
to Rosetti in Cairo, and did not mention him until he announced the
24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, April 2, 1788,
2probably l,?Ahl Wahid”, or ”one family”,
^Egypt !5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Nov. 9? 1793*
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1death of the scholar later the same year. On 8 December, a
short while later, Baldwin found out that the news of the death
had been a mistake, and that someone else had been murdered in 
2
Browne's place.
In October 1792, Baldwin announced the death, certain this 
time, of Richard Usgate, the British vice-consul at Acre. His 
position was inferior to that of the consul at Aleppo, but since 
the Levant Company had relinquished its post in that city Baldwin 
was quick to realize that there would be no one to succeed the 
vice-consul of Acre. He therefore took it upon himself as "... 
the nearest qualified person in His Majesty's service...", to ap­
point Luigi I-Ialagumba who bad served as Baldwin's secretary and 
chancellor, to succeed him.^ Baldwin claimed to be willing to 
give the position to someone else if Grenville wished him to do
so, but hastened to add that it would be "... expedient to transfer
5the right of such appointment to the Consul of Egypt..." It 
is difficult to be certain that Baldwin did this merely to spite Ains­
lie, but the Ambassador's reaction was, naturally, that of great
Exactly when Baldwin reported this cannot be ascertained, for his 
Dispatch Ho. J2 to Grenville, in which it is contained, is not to 
be found.
Browne later published the events of his journey in Travels in Africa, 
Egypt, Syria.
^fhe factory in Aleppo closed from 1791 to 1803-
24/l? Baldwin to Grenville, Oct, 11, 1792.
5aid.
1anger at the presumption of his inferior.
In any assessment of Baldwin's consular activities, it would
benecessary to decide whether he engaged in trade or any form
of private business. His instructions explicitly forbade it, but
given his past experience as a shrewd merchant, several accounts
of his sumptuous way of living, and his comparatively low salary,
it is not unlikely he did indulge in commerce. One proof of this
may be seen in the case of the muslins he carried with him in 1786 
2
to Egypt. Another may be deduced from an incident recounted for 
totally different reasons by Magallon.
A French ship met with an English ship in the eastern part 
of the Mediterranean in April 1793- Since the two countries involved 
were at war, the French crew confiscated the goods of the English 
ship and took them to Alexandria. But the merchandise had been 
on its way to Bgypt to be sold by Baldwin to the serdar of Alex­
andria, Sayyid Muhammad ICurayyim.
Baldwin was infuriated, and reported the piracy to ICurayyim 
who informed Magallon's dragoman that the French captain involved 
would be arrested for the death of the three members of the crew
It was Abbott, the (former) consul in Aleppo from 1770-1783, who 
informed Grenville of this. FO 78/17, Abbott to Grenville, 1796, n.
^See Chapter III, above.
These included: 26 bales of cotton, and 2 ballots of tobacco.
Corn, Cons., le Caire, 25, Magallon, June 28, 1793*
of the English ship that were from Alexandria. Magallon tried 
to point out to hnrayylm that since the goods had not been delivered, 
the latter should not be responsible for hie loss; it was only Bald­
win who should be concerned about that. He also told ICurayyim that 
the story of the death of the three men from Alexandria had probably 
been fabricated by the British Consul. When the Egyptian official re­
mained adamant, Magallon complained to Muhammad ‘izzat th<e Pasha, 
who issued a ferman showing his disposition to the French, and his 
anger with ICurayyim for persecuting them. This did not seem pro­
tection enough, for the French consul in Alexandria, Citoyen Attier, 
insisted on having the merchandise returned to Baldwin.
The French merchants of Alexandria lived in constant terror 
of ICurayyim,* Be seemed to be a close friend of Baldwin, and always
2
sided with him in any strife with trenchmen. Magallon gave an
example of a dispute that once took place in 1792 between Baldwin
and a French merchant; ICurayyim was so angry with the latter that
3
he threatened to cut his head off.
Magallon complained that ICurayyim: "... n ’a cesse depuis qu'IL
est en place de nous inquieter..»" Ibid.
2 ^
ICurayyim, one of Murad Bey's closest supporters, continued to
terrorise the French community of Alexandria, especially after 
he became Customs Master. When the French forces landed in 
Alexandria they seised ICurayyim and asked him to compensate for 
his previous extortions. He refused, was sent to Cairo, and sen­
tenced to death. He died in September 1798. Jabarti, op.cit., 
vol. 3, pp« 62-3.
rr
■^Corr. Cons., le  C aire, 25, Magallon, June 28, 1793*
This one incident implies at least two commercial transactions 
of Baldwin; one with Kurayyim, the other with the French mer­
chant. Another business interest of Baldwin was one that he men­
tioned to the authorities in London; like his earlier desire to 
prove the importance of the Red Sea route to Britain, it xfas hidden 
behind the obvious aims of self-interest that no doubt made his 
plea less likely to be taken seriously.
In 1788 he reported that the French had started to export 
natron from Egypt. It was a cheaper form of saltpetre that could 
be used to make soap, glass, bleach-linen and gunpowder, and was 
available, in great abundance, in the lakes of Wadi Natrun. prom
September to November 1788, Baldwin reported that the French had
2
already exported 5,000 tons of the mineral to Marseilles. This 
mention to London of the produce was noted, and a statement made 
to the Committee of Trade.
But Baldwin also asked for permission to export the mineral 
himself to London. When no definite answer came whether he was 
allowed to do so, he engaged Hunter, the owner of the British vessel, 
"Pollard”, to see whether it could be effectively sold in England*. 
But Hunter took a great deal of natron to England, and while there
-j
Baldwin actually claimed to have discovered it himself in 1776,
He then had sent some of it to England for trial but he ”... was 
ruined by as laudable an endeavour another way...", referring 
to the 1779 caravan disaster. Fo 24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, Oct.7, 
1791.
^F0 2 4 / l ,  Baldwin to Carmarthen, Dec. 3, 1788.
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tried to obtain governmental privilege to be the sole importer. 
Worried, Baldwin wrote to Carmarthen, asking him to intervene, 
and restating his own earlier application to import the mineral 
himself.
An examination of the inposition book of the Levant Company
during this time shows that Hunter had started to export natron
from Egypt as early as 1789? Richard and W. Lee, Baldwin’s agents
in London, on the other hand, also commissioned a good deal of
2
the produce during the years 1790 to 1794-
In 1789, Baldwin reported that France had already shipped 
eight million tons of natron that had supplied three hundred 
soap manufacturers in Marseilles, saving one-third of their oil 
consumption. Once again he urged Carmarthen to put his ea@Q before 
the Council for Trade, since the mineral imported into Britain 
would be of great national benefit.
in 1790 and 1791, Baldwin began to load ships with natron 
and send them to England, In 1790, the "Ceres" carried a great 
deal ofthe mineral consigned to William and Richard Lee who were
prepared, if necessary, to submit it to the government for in-
4 nspection* In 1791, the "Rossetti was sent out of Alexandria to
11bid.
SP 105/171, Impositions Book.
^FO 24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, June 21, 1789- 
^FO 24/l, Baldwin to Leeds, May 17, 1790.
England with the produce.'*'
The appeals that Baldwin sent to London for a consideration
of importing natron seemed to have received little response. In
a detailed report on the trade with Egypt in 1790, the Privy
Council mentioned flax, saffron, senna, and various drugs, hut toially
2
ignored the mineral Baldwin sought to promote. It is interesting 
here to note that in this report on trade, no possibility whatsoever 
seemed to have been given to reviving the Red Sea commerce with 
India.
As Baldwin continued to export natron privately, with commissions 
to his agents Lee in London, he encountered great difficulties with 
the import duty in Engiand, and he began to find it very expensive, 
often obtaining little profit from the transaction. In October 
1791? he sent Edmund Tate of the "Levantto London with much natron 
on board. He urged the government in London to overcome its reluctance, 
arguing that all new things are usually accepted with hesitance, de-
H
spite enormous potential benefits. In all experiments, my Lord,
3
there are infinite difficulties to surmount..." Once again, he 
^EO 24/l, Baldwin to Leeds, March 21, 1791.
^B.T. 6/73, Reports of Lords of Comm, of Erivy Council, Council 
to the Duke of Leeds, Oct. 17, 1790.
^EO 24/l, Baldwin to Orenville, Oct. 7, 1791-
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seemed perplexed that his government should be so loathe to seise 
upon great commercial interest, but, characteristically, did not 
allow the fact that his ideas were being ignored dampen his en­
thusiasm for a venture he was firmly convinced of.
His wife had not been able to stand the weather of Alexandria,
and so he sent her home to England in 1791. There she met with
his agent, Richard Lee, to discuss the trade he lad been (Carrying
on. Lee sent Jane Baldwin a detailed list of the import duties
he had had to pay for the natron, revealing the fact that these
taxes amounted to considerably mo re than the Consul's annual 
1salary. But Baldwin did not seem to worry unduly about the tax­
ation, for in a letter to Bun das he referred to his own unceasing 
attempts to promote Anglo-Egyptian trade. He reported the success 
of his efforts, and proudly pointed out that he could now contribute
to the revenue of England, since the duty paid on the|natron was
2
higher than his salary as Consul-General. He also claimed to 
have employed many ships to come to Alexandria.
In 1788, when a Committee of the Privy Council was appointed 
to enquire about the slave trade, Carmarthen was asked by the Lords
Egypt 5a, Lee to Mrs. Baldwin, Bec. 14, 1793. In this report, Lee stated 
that Baldwin had imported 183 tons in 1792, and 561 tons in 1793- The 
total duty paid for the two years was £1,486. 15s. Particulars on the 
duties paid ... on goods sent ... by George Baldwin Esq. from Alexan­
dria In the course of nine months. Enclosed in Egypt 5a, Lee to Mrs. 
Baldwin, Bee. 14? 1793.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Bundas (copy), Mov. 9, 1793.
■^Eor a list of the ships that went to Alexandria during the years 
from 1786 to 1793? see Appendix V H .
of the Committee of Council for Trade for an acoount of that trade
in Egypt, The Minister referred the request to Baldwin, instructing
him to give an account of the caravans sent from Egypt to Africa,
the trade of the continent and anything else that was pertinent.^
This the Consul did in A Memorial Relating to the Trade in Slaves.
2
Carried on in Egypt.
Baldwin's Relationship with British Officials; Ainslie,
Dundas, and the Court of Directors
In formulating a general view of Baldwin's relationship with
British officials, one has to take into account the great distance
that separated Egypt from Constantinople and London, it may help
to explain the divergence of opinion the Consul seemed to encounter
so often. By far the most violent was that with Ainslie; it has
already been mentioned how totally opposed in view the .Ambassador
and the Consul were. Baldwin* s warmest relationship was with Bun das,
who, greatly admiring his work, continued to give him his support,
3
albeit somewhat indirectly. The most enigmatic of Baldwin’s 
contacts was that with the East India Company; while it was pleased
^PO 2d/l, Carmarthen to Baldwin, Oct. 3# 1788.
^The Memorial m s  written 011 21 June 1789, and later Tfcas incorporated 
in Political Recollections. See Appendix X.
Bundas only wrote to Baldwin once; the Minister*s friends conveyed 
to Baldwin his appreciation of his endeavours. The letter itself is 
not to be found today. In 1931, it was listed by Purber, Henry Bun das,
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with the Consul*s efforts, it maintained a steady attitude of
indifference to remuneration, whether pecuniary or verbal.
Much has already been stated about the constant friction
between Ainslie and Baldwin. Both men complained to London,
but it was the Consul who summarised the situation in a few lines:
"He treats me . as if the cause we serve m s  not the same. Or
as if he regarded my commission as not coming from the King, I
1have not deserved this contempt from the Ambassador."
Baldwin's relationship with Carmarthen is a difficult one to
assess. At first, the Minister was obviously pleased with the
Consul's endeavours to obtain a ferman .from gasan Pasha for the
rights of Hnglish dispatches, as well as for his firm anti-French
attitude. He graciously announced to the Consul that he had won
2
"His Majesty's approbation". At this, Baldwin was, of course, "...
elated beyond expression..." He characteristically added: ’‘Duty
is anxious... until it is approved, but approbation makes us eager.
First Viscount Melville, p.317, as being in the possession of the 
Viscountess Melville, In February 1968, the Viscountess claimed 
that she had sent it, along with many others of the Melville Papers, 
to the Scottish Record Office. The dispatch, however, is not to be 
found in the latter.
^FO 24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, Sept. 23, 1788,
FO 24/l, Carmarthen to Baldwin, Feb, 1, 1788.
^FO 24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, June 21, 1788.
hbid.
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But a few months later, he began to clamour for permission
to visit England in order to communicate his theories and ideas
•]
about the British rOle in Egypt, This he did hy asking Bun das
to intercede with Carmarthen on his behalf. When no reply arrived,
he was silent on the subject of a leave of absence for a year. In
July 1789, he explained that his wife was not constitutionally able
to withstand the weather of Egypt, and was impelled to leave the
country. Baldwin then admitted that one of the reasons for his
wanting to go to England was to be able to accompany her; another
reason was his desire to secure for himself some kind of a home in
2
England where he could retire to. He himself had undergone a 
severe illness at the end of 1788 that took him to "the brink of
3
the grave". With the outbreak of the plague in 1791, when he was 
confined to quarantine for ninety days, he once again pleaded with 
Bundas to obtain permission for him to go to some neighbouring island,
explaining that the consulate at the time had no pressing work to be
4 5done. When Bundas did not answer, he wrote to Grenville asking
i
Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Bundas, Sept. 23, 1788.
^Sgypt 5a, Baldwin to Bundas, July 7, 1789. Mrs, Baldwin left in
1791, accompanied by hersister, Mrs, Montgomery.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Bundas, Feb. 23, 1789.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, July 4, 1791.
^William Wyndham Grenville (1759-1834). In 1789, he was successively 
Speaker of the House of Commons and then Secretary of State for the
Home Beparimeht. In 1791, he became Secretary of State for the Foreign
Office, and remained in the office until 1801 when he resigned. He 
also held the position of President of the Board of Control from 1789-1793*
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for leave to go to Cyprus. He promised to appoint an agent
2
to forward dispatches from Su.ez during his absence.
Finally, in January 1792, Grenville granted him a leave of
3absence to go to Cyprus, but the permission arrived when the 
island was ravaged by the plague, and Baldwin was forced to re­
main in Alexandria. He wanted to make sure that he was only de­
laying his trip, for he told Grenville: ”... I trust that lour
Lordship will permit me to take it for a rule upon any similar 
A
emergency.”
A year later he pleaded with Grenville’s secretary to inter­
cede on his behalf to give him leave to return to England because
5of private reasons. His brother, James Baldwin, captain of the
”General Cooke”, one of the East India Company ships, had died.
The inheritance of £25,000 was to be divided between Baldwin and
his brother’s orphans. The latter were anxious for their uncle
6
to return home in order to help them. The Consul was also suffer­
ing once again from his badly-deteriorating health, and desperately
1]?0 24/1, Baldwin, to Grenville, Oct. 7, 1791.
2F0 24/1, Baldwin to Grenville, Sept. 17, 1791.
^F0 24/l, Grenville to Baldwin, Jan. 1792.
^F0 24/l? Baldwin to Grenville, Nay 20, 1792.
^Fo 24/l9 Baldwin to Goddard, Nov. 9, 1793.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Nov, 9? 1793*
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needed a change of air after seven years’ service in Egypt.
"For Gibraltar or any of the garrisons abroad are places of re­
creation and delights compared with Alexandria in the midst of a 
desert devoid of society or comfort of any kind."
He kept a respectful distance with both Carmarthen and Gren­
ville in his letters, but, with bundas his tone was different.
He was openly and sometimes exuberantly candid in his expression
of admiration for the latter, and confessed; tlI am a mere child
2
in my affections... You are benevolence and sensibility." He
tried to flatter Dun das (and probably him self) when he received.
Carmarthen’s letter of approval in 1788. He attributed the praise
to Bundas, saying "I can irace in them, the liberal and vigorous
spirit of my Patron". He added; "1 am sensitive of your favour,,.
Have 1 another friend besides?"^' Despite the fact that Dundas,
whom he obviously considered his patron, had written him only
the Consul claimed that his own "... affection and gratitude are 
5the same".
There is no doubt that the Minister was Baldwin’s champion 
in London. He was far-reaching in his views of India, and for long
^FQ 24/l? Baldwin to Goddard, Hov. 9> 1793.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, July 7, 1789.
'’ibid., June 21, 1788.
^Bgypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Sept, 16, 1788,
^Ibid., Hov. 9, 1793.
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remained alone in his stand that Egypt was of great importance
to England for that reason. He had been introduced to Baldwin
1
by Governor Johnstone when he needed information about Egypt
2
in 1785. Johnstone1s family, including the Pulteneys, had 
befriended Baldwin and M s  wife; they were also friends of Bundas.
So there was a certain IMount of mutual friendship, besides need, 
in the relationship.
The Consul's dealings with the East India Company during 
the years he served in Egypt gave the impression of being slightly 
chaotic. In 1786, the Company had employed Baldwin on the condition 
that after one year he would have concluded a commercial treaty 
with the Beys. In 1787? he asked for an extension of the time
limit, since the situation in Egypt was not inducive to any nego-
3tiations.
After his expedition of the triplicate message to India in
1788, he asked Carmarthen, and not the Court of Directors, for
remuneration; the latter had ceased to communicate with him. He
complained to Dundas* "1 live in a state of absolute excommunication
4:
from all creatures and correspondence of the East India Company".
See Chapter III, above.
p
These included a certain Hiss Pulteney, who was constantly mentioned 
in Baldwin's letters to Dundas* as a particular friend of Jane Bald­
win. She was probably the niece of Johnstone, daughter of Sir William 
Pulteney.
^Egypt 3a? Baldwin to the Court of Directors, July 2, 1787.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Ju ly 31? 1788,
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The Company had stopped sending ships to and from India, and Bald­
win turned to Bundas with apprehension. "... there is some mystery
1underneath which your authority and penetration must overcome." 
Baldwin could find no reason for the Company1 s lack of interest 
in the very route it had tried to promote for its own good. The 
fact that Cornwallis, who was now Governor-General in India, agreed 
with the Consul that the route was an excellent one and should be 
exploited, did not seem to affect the Court of Birectors in London.
Baldwin considered that, since he was waiting for a propitious 
moment to conclude the desired treaty with the Beys, he would still 
be considered an agent of the Company. But when he presented a 
bill for expenses in 1789, he was refused: "... the Committee having
some doubt whether till then he can be considered duly authorised 
to draw for a continuation of his salary, and allowances, decline
2
offering an opinion as to the acceptance of the following bill..." 
Baldwin complained to Bundas, thinking that the reason his expense 
allowance was discontinued was due to the fact that he had lived in 
.Alexandria, instead of Cairo, as he had been ordered to. He explained 
the importance of having to live in Alexandria, and to prove the 
hardship he endured there, he dramatically complained of the fact
1Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Bundas, June 21, 1788.
2
Egyp^ 5a. At a Committee of Accounts, May 13, 1789. His expense 
allowance was £760. After 1789, this was cut out of his payment, 
and he received only the £500 per annum as salary.
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that he had not eaten a piece of beef for four y e a r s . B a l d w i n  
continued to draw bills on the Company, despite the earlier re­
fusal to acknowledge them. When no answer appeared from London, 
he displayed his characteristic sense of the practical? "i have
p
thought that what is unanswerable is granted.1
But he must have felt hesitant about it all the same. In 
April 1793? the "Drake” sloop arrived in Suez, from Bombay with dis­
patches for London. Baldwin immediately sent a copy to London, 
and another by Tatar to Ainslie. He decided that even if the Com­
pany refused to pay for the expense, he would go ahead with it.
With much bravado, he stated that he would ”... take it upon myself 
... to serve my country..,"
The French declaration of war 011 Britain had recently reached 
Baldwin1 s ears. He decided to send news of it as soon as possible 
to India. So, when the "Drake" returned to Bombay it carried with 
it Baldwin1s message. Once again, as in 1778, the British in India
had advance warning an European affairs, causing them to save their
4possessions 111 Pondicherry.
1
Egypt 3a, Baldwin to Dundas, March 14? 1790. He had not been;'-in
Egypt for four years yet, and it is not unlikely that he ate a great
deal of mutton.
2Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Morton, Dec. 17, 1790.
JEgypt 5a, Baldwin to Morton, April 10,1793.
h o  24/ I ,  Baldwin to G re n v ille , A p ril 10,1793.
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Baldwin's Dismissal
In early 1792, Grenville was beginning to question the 
utility of the Consulate in Egypt. He was worried that the £1,450 
per year that Baldwin received far outweighed the services he ren­
dered. He turned to Bundas for advice, asking him5'...howfar the
interests of this country in its connexion with the East Indies
1are promoted by his being continued in Egypt..." He also brought
up the fact that if it needed Baldwin, the East India Company, and
2not the Civil List should be paying his salary.
Bundas was well aware of the importance of having Baldwin
— 3continue in Egypt, m  November 1790, Abercromby, was given a
4memorial by Join Taylor : Considerations on the Propriety and
Practicability of sending disnatches from India by the way of Sues, 
and from England to this country by Hie same route. A year later,
Taylor urged Bundas to consider the essay, adding M... 1 could not
■j
Egypt 5a, Grenville to Bundas, April 1, 1792.
^Fortesque Mss., vol. II, appendix V, Grenville to Bundas (copy),
Jan. 25, 1793. £500 was paid by the Secret Service and £950
by the Treasury.
^Sir Ralph Abercromby (1734-1801), the British soldier who, early 
in his career, had shown sympathy for the Americans in their struggle 
for independence. But, following the outbreak of the war inl793, 
he was actively engaged in the fighting. In 1800, he was sent to 
Egypt. On 21 March 1801, after leading the forces for the landing 
at Abu Qir, he was fatally wounded in ;a surprise attack by the French. 
He died seven days later.
^See Chapter II, above.
5Contained in  Home M is c ., 436.
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help being astonished at the little attention paid to the navi­
gation of the Arabian G ulph. And generally to the commmication 
with England by the isthmus of Suez.1'**’ He was convinced that 
the only reason the route had fallen into disuse was u... inter­
ested motives ... and that private interest stands in competition
2
with public good....”
But Bundas was preoccupied with other matters, and did not 
seem able to find a suitable source of income for Baldwin, since 
both Grenville and the Court of Directors were unwilling to sponsor 
him. So just two months before Baldwin'was to send his important 
dispatch on the "Drake” to Bombay, Grenville was writing a letter 
of dismissal..
"I am commanded by His Majesty to acquaint you that His Majesty 
has no further occasion for your services as Consul-General in Bgypt. 
And I am further to inform you that it is His Majesty’s pleasure 
that your allowance shall be continued till the first day of May 
next.
^Ibid., Taylor to Dundas, July 20, 1791. 
2Xbid.
^FO 24/l, Grenville to Dundas, Feb. 8, 1793.
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THE LAST, MOFFICIAh TSARS 1793-1798. AND EPILOGUE
Maintenance of the Consulate and Departure of Ainslie
Grenville's letter of dismissal, which should have reached 
Baldwin at the same time that he was sending news of the French 
declaration of war to India on the "Brake", somehow did not ar­
rive in Egypt • The Consul had no way of knowing he had been re­
lieved of his position until 10 March 1796, when a duplicate of 
the original dispatch arrived. Whether Baldwin really did not 
receive the 1793 dismissal cannot be ascertained; what is sure,
however, is that he continued to act as consul until 1796, and
1did not finally leave Egypt until 1798 , a few months before the 
French expedition.
The few extra years of his residence were fruitful, and 
ironically proved the value of official British representation.
These years also marked the end of Ainslie's rdle as Ambassador, 
and the arrival of new and unprejudiced representatives in Constant­
inople. Ainslie asked for leave to return to England in 1793* and 
left in the early part of 1794. He was succeeded by Robert Liston 
who arrived in Constantinople in May 1794. Baldwin contacted him 
immediately, and sent him a flattering message asking for his help
Not in 1796 as Marlowe, Angio-British Relations, p.12, claims.
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in the transaction of a commercial treaty with the Beys. He 
tried to persuade Liston that his aid u... will make a pi’incipal 
figure among the objects of your first negotiation with the Porte”.
The 1794 Agreement with the Beys
After remaining silent on the subject for a long while, 
Baldwin in 1794 announced the conclusion of a commercial agreement 
with Murad and Ibrahim, His secretary, Bichard Willis, actually 
made the announcement, since Baldwin was suffering from eye-in­
flammation at the time. Very Utile is known of the negotiations 
that preceded the signing of the agreement. It has already been 
noted that an emulation of the fruguet agreements was one of the 
instructions given to the Consul in 1786; it has also been seen 
how the Ottoman expedition, the continued civil war and the plague 
were not conducive to any form of settlement with the ruling Beys.
After the return to power of Murad and Ibrahim, Baldwin, who had
2
earlier claimed to be in their confidence, began to pave the way 
for the re-opening of the Red Sea trade to British merchants. The 
Consul must have felt extremely disappointed that he was too ill 
at the time to announce triumphantly yet another service for his 
country, but his relationship with Willis was cordial enough to
^PO 78/l5j Baldwin to Liston (extract), 1794* n.d.
‘T O  24/l, Baldwin to Carmarthen, April 2, 1788,
accept a substitute.
Willis probably made Baldwin's acquaintance in Constantin­
ople when the latter fled Egypt after the caravan disaster of
1
1779. Until then, Willis had been a close friend of Ainslie,
although the ledger books of the Levant Company indicate that
he had also been Baldwin* s business associate, and a highly-
respected member of the community of English merchants in the city.
During the months that Baldwin spent in Constantinople trying to
obtain help for the recovery of his losses, he, very much to the
anger and annoyance of the Ambassador, "seduced" the young Willis
to his side. When Baldwin left the city, he made his new-found
friend his agent, and even left the young Jane Baldwin in his charge
Very little is known of Willis in the ensuing years apart from the
fact that he had a constant battle with Baldwin's creditors who
pressed financial claims that could not be paid. In 1779, Willis
himself was declared bankrupt. He continued to do business with
Buccianti, Baldwin's agent in Alexandria, for the account book of
the Levant Company shows that the arrival of a ship from Alexandria
to Constantinople on April 1782 with a consignment for Willis from 
2Buccianti. He finally left the Ottoman Empire in 1783 and went to 
-1
He had arrived in Constantinople in 1774; in November of that 
year he was given the oath by John Hurray. SP 105/186, Chancery 
Register, Hov. 22, 1774.
2SP 105/ 204, A p r il 1782.
England. Wo mention is made of him after that apart from the 
fact that Ainslie, knowing Willis was in Vienna after Constantin­
ople, wrote to his counterpart there; he asked Murray Keith to
find out whether Willis was there to solicit Imperial help for
1the Red Sea project.
When Baldwin left England in 1786, it is significant that 
the Englishman he took with him to act as vice-consul was Thomas 
Turner, and not Willis. Wo mention whatsoever is made by Baldwin 
of Willis’s arrival in Egypt. The first reference to him was 
with the announcement cf the agreement with the Beys, Willis acted 
as the Consul's private secretary, and not in any official r£51e.
It may be safe to conjecture that somewhere around 17-931 or 1792, 
when the older man's health began to fail, and. his wife was ob­
liged to leave because of her own ill-health, Baldwin sent after 
his old friend.
The announcement of the agreement was made to Grenville, to 
Dundas, to the Government of Bombay, to Robert Liston, and to the 
Court of Directors. To all but Grenville and the Ambassador in 
Constantinople, it must have come as a surprise. Liston had written 
to Grenville in 1794 saying that Baldwin had nearly finished con­
cluding the agreement. He was finding it difficult to ^ t the nec-
Ainslie was worried about Baldwin's connection with Baron d'Herbert
Rathlceal, and thought that Willis had been trying to enlist his aid.
FO 26l/4, Ainslie to Keith, April 2, 1782.
essary sanction from the Porte, and asked the Ambassador for advice.
Liston, new to his post, told the Consul he would delay opinion on
the matter for a while. Then, all of a sudden, he received, not a
rough draft, but the copy of the concluded agreement. nThe active
zeal of this gentleman has however in a great measure precluded de~
1liberation1', he wrote to Grenville. Liston was greatly embarrassed 
at the fait accompli and earnestly sought advice from London.
i i I ■ i w in i if i ii »
Baldwin had previously explained to Liston that the Beys were
displeased with the arrival of dispatch boats to Sues, and showed
their feeling by levying unfair taxes. When the Consul complained
about the extortions, the Beys answered: ’¥hat are these emptjr
2ships to us?1 Baldwin realised that they were eager to have mer­
chandise, and so offered to sign an agreement.
The agreement was concluded on 22 Hajab 1208/28 February 1794. 
It had eighteen clauses, as did that of Tr\X;guet with Murad, and fol­
lowed almost identically the text of the preceding French agreement.3 
Britain had most-favoured nation status, and was offered help and 
security from the Beys for its Suez trade. The preamble acknow­
ledged English capitulations, and the rights of the British to navi-
^FO 78/l6, Liston to Grenville, Jan. 24, 1795.
^F0 7S/l6, Baldwin to Liston (extract), Oct, 30, 1794.
3
See Chapter 1±, above.
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gate to all ports of the Ottoman Empire. Two significant differ­
ences with the Truguet agreement can be seen: first, Baldwin
did not make any supplementary agreements with the Customs Master 
and a b edouin chieftain, and second, Baldwin did not actually sign 
the agreement, but instead was mentioned in the preamble:
■ In the name of God I Amen!
It being well known that the subjects of the King of 
Great Britain are authorised by sacred Capitulations, 
from the Sublime Porte, to navigate their ships to 
all - and any of the ports in the Grand Signior's 
Dominions and for the Purposes of trafic to settle 
in all, or any of the Cities, or places of the Turkish 
Empire, as reference being had to the 1st, 2nd, 14th 
and 21st articles of the said capitulations more parti­
cularly .set forth. And it being the desire of the 
English merchants to icturn to Suez with their ships 
and to carry on trade, as in the other parts c£ the 
Grand Signior*s Dominions, provided the same security,
6c protection can be given to their persons and effects: 
and the said George Baldwin, settled In Egypt as Consul 
General, for the King of Great Britain having manifested 
this desire to the Beys in power;... They... considering 
the Interest i of the two nations to require a good under­
standing,., and the said Consul General, giving assur­
ance... that the same will be confirmed by a firman from 
the Sublime Porte... His Lordship Ibrahim Bev Shieck il 
Bellad in Cairo... and Hurad Bey formerly Emir 1Hadje... 
on the one part & the most distinguished among his...
Peers,George Baldwin Consul General for the King of Great ^ 
Britain, on the ether part, have voluntarily agreed: ...
For goods coming from India, the duties of 3°/o fixed accord­
ing to capitulations were to be paid to the officers of the Pasha. 
Ail additional 6°/o was to be paid to the Beys, 3°/o by the English 
merchants, and 3° /o  by the purchasers. It was most important to
Egypt 5a. For a translation of the complete text, see Appendix V±II.
the Beys that a sizeable amount of goods should arrive regularly 
in order to make the whole project worthwhile.
Thus two items concerned with 'the agreement needed to be 
attended to immediately: the first was that ships should begin
to arrive at Sues as soon as possible; the second regarded the 
stipulation that the agreement needed the sanction of the Porte 
in a ferman.
To make sure that the presidencies in India were aware of the
need of the Beys to have merchant ships at Suez if the dispatch
route were to continue, Baldwin sent Willis to Bombay to explain
the situation personally. He told him to stress the fact that the
Beys were anxious to have the trade resume as soon as possible.
Willis was to remind the government of Bombay that the treaty would
"... open new sources of prosperity toour possessions in India...11,
and would be u... an important vehicle of intelligence and corresp-
1ondence between England and India". But unfortunately, Willis
2
never reached Bombay, for he died onthe way there.
Baldwin 'also sent similar pleas 'to the Court of Directors, 
but it seemed that no one was interested enough. In April 1795, 
"Panther”, the East India Company cruiser, arrived at Suez, it 
carried dispatches for England, but the packet m s  stolen by Arabs
Home Misc., 634, Baldwin to Pres. & Council of Bombay, July 24,
1794.
^FG 78/l6, Liston to Grenville (cypher), June 16, 1795.
1on the way to Alexandria, and one of the passengers was murdered.
The Beys showed no concern for the fate of packet boats, and did
little to help, despite the earlier agreement with Baldwin. The
Consul realized they wanted cargo, and desperately warned Dundas
that if the trade did not begin soon ”... this your fostered and
2
profitable passage to India will be lost”.
The other important stipulation for the effectiveness of the 
agreement was the sanction of the Porte. For this, Baldwin needed 
the help of Liston in Constantinople, The .Ambassador anxiously 
pored over the files of the Ainslie-Baldwin correspondence, trying 
to assess the relationship, and what his own rdle should be. He 
came to the conclusion that Ainslie had not been totally at fault. 
His 1786 instructions presupposed the Porte's sanction of a Treaty; 
Baldwin demanded it after the agreement had been signed. The pre­
dicament the Consul had placed him in was precarious, for the Porte 
remained adamant in its opposition to the Red Sea navigation.
Baldwin also urged Grenville to press claims for the Porte's 
sanction through Liston, It was necessary, he explained to the
Minister, to ”... shield the conscience of the Beys”. He also
•\
T£e packet was retrieved later.
2W0 l/344, Baldwin to Dundas (copy), April 17, 1793.
24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, Oct. 10, 1794.
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clarified the situation further by stating that in Egypt "... we
treat with a sort of double government seeming dependent, but
1independent in part’*. But the reaction from London to the agree-
2
ment and its possibilities was never to be expressed. Since 
Baldwin was no longer a Consul as far as Grenville was concerned, 
he was uninterested in communicating with him.
Continued Consular Activity
Baldwin must have had some inkling of his dismissal before 
1796, for he underwent much trouble with his salary after 1793.
When Lee, his agent, went to Grenville's office to receive payment 
of his salary for 1792-1793? be was refused the money on the grounds 
that Baldwin's post was of "more charge than utility". But finally 
Lee received the salary. In early 1794 the agent went once again 
for the next annual payment. The secretary at Grenville's office 
said he could not make out the money order; it would have to wait 
for authorization from the Minister himself. Lee was assured the 
money would be paid, so he went repeatedly to the office, hoping 
each time to be rewarded. When ^renville did not send an authori­
"^ FO 24/1 , Baldwin to Grenville, Oct. 10,1794.
2It is perhaps noteworthy that the French sources of the time make 
no mention of the signing of the agreement, although the March 1775 
agreement had been copied and sent to France. AS, B^, 335.
^F0 24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, Oct. 10, 1794.
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1
zation, Lee wrote to him, and asked for Baldwin’s salary. In 
October 1795, Grenville wrote to Baldwin reminding him of his dis­
missal, enclosing a copy of the March 1795 dispatch, and promised
2
him payment only for the year ending in June 1795. Baldwin
pleaded with Grenville that he had not received the earlier order
of dismissal, and needed to be paid for his services up to and
including 10 March 1796, when the duplicate arrived. When he
received no answer, except for a supplementary payment in January 
41797, Baldwin appealed to Dundas saying he would be in a "dreadful
5
situation" if his bills were not paid.
It has already been mentioned that Dundas was Baldwin’s main 
champion in the government. I he Consul's friends also pleaded with 
Dundas to help the unfortunate mania Egypt; William Pulteney asked 
his friend to intercede with Grenville for the continuance of the
g
consulate in 1794. A few days later, Dundas wrote to Grenville, 
and stressed Baldwin’s r61e in the winning of Pondicherry a second 
time, and admitted; "... I did feel a little awkwardness in the
^EO 24/l, Bee to Grenville, March 16, 1795.
^ 0  24/l, Grenville to Baldwin, Oct. 30, 1795.
JE0 24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, March 29, 1796.
4]?0 24/l, Receipt from Lee, Sept. 25, 1797.
^¥0 l/544, Baldwin to Dundas (copy), April 17, 1795.
f
Bgypt 5a, Pulteney to Dundas, Aug. 1, 1794.
246.
recolleotinn that, about the same time of his doing that public
service, he would receive his letter of dismission”. As far as
payment went, Dundas agreed that it was the responsibility of
the Indian Treasury, "... for the poor man must not be allowed
2
to fall between stools".
How Baldwin managed to live without his salary is indeed 
perplexing. It has already been mentioned that he was engaged 
in some form of private trade. Also, his interest in the export 
of natron, and the shipments to his agents in London, indicate a 
certain amount of personal profit. There is, besides, some evi­
dence that he participated in a commercial transaction with Jezzar 
Pasha of Acre. The Pasha applied to Baldwin for arms and ammunition 
to defend himself against the French whom he suspected of having 
designs on his territory. Baldwin obtained the goods for him 
through his agents In London. But Jezzar Pasha paid for them in 
products, and not money. The exact nature of the goods paid is not
known; Baldwin mentioned, however, that Bonaparte, after entering
3Egypt, confiscated them and had them sold.
^Fortesque MSS, vol. II, appendix V, Dundas to Grenville (copy), 
Aug. 17, 1794.
2Xbid.
Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Oct. 9, 1799. There is no indication 
as to the date of the commercial transaction.
Despite the lack of obvious financial resources, Baldwin 
managed to be very active during the five years when he was 
officially dismissed, and was able to do a number of services 
for his country. After the outbi*eak of war in 1793, the route 
to India via Suez was used considerably more often than in the 
previous years. On more than one occasion, the Consul was re­
sponsible for aiding the couriers from Suez to Alexandria on their 
way to England.
On 17 April 1794, shortly after the agreement with Murad 
and Ibrahim, the cruiser "Panther" arrived at Suez. It had come 
from Bombay, and carried dispatches for the Court of Directors in 
London. Baldwin helped with the carrying of the packet to Alexan­
dria, and added a copy of his recently concluded commercial agree-
•j
ment to the letters. The "Panther" remained in Egypt until August;
2
it was on this ship that tfillis made his ill-fated journey.
There is a rather vague note in the French sources of two
other British ships in Suez during the month of April 1794 that
Baldwin did not mention. The fii*st came from Bengal, and the s econd
3from Madras, the latter having a Minister on board.
■i
Egypt 5a,Baldwin to Dundas (copy) , ■ April 28, 1794.
2
Despite the fact that Willis’s going on board the ship on 1 September 
1794 was entered in the log-book, no mention of his death was conse­
quently made. Add. Mss. 19290/"Voyage from Bombay to Suez", 1794.
^Corr. Pol., Turquie, 187. Vidal to Vidal, 2 floreal 2/21 April 1794.
The writer of the dispatch was a partner in the Cairo firm of Autran, Vidal 
et Cie.
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A year later, the “Panther” returned t) Sues on 6 April
1795. ‘the packets it was carrying were stolen. the ship remained 
at Suez for a short time. In the meantime, Major MacDonald, who 
had previously acted as courier between India and England, arrived 
in Alexandria on 1 May. He told Baldwin that he was on official 
duty, a fact for which he had no proof,, and could only rely on Bald­
win's good faith. He also had no letters of credit, and asked the 
Consul for money. Baldwin decided to trust him implicitly. He
helped him in his journey to Cairo, he introduced him to the cap-
2
tain of the "Panther”, and gave him money. The Consul also sent 
a message to India of the news of the recent subjugation of Holland 
to Prance.
The real nature of Major MacDonald's business was entirely
4
unknown to Baldwin. In 1791 , after he passed through Egypt he
had sent a long memorial to Dundas in which he promoted the idea of
5
a British occupation of Egypt. He also wrote to Cornwallis who
6
approved of another visit to Egypt. He therefore left Madras on
■j
See above, p. 242.
p
EO 24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, May 12, 1795. Baldwin referred to it 
as "Public Money".
\ o  1/544, Baldwin to Dundas, May 12, 1795.
^Seee Chapter 1Y, above.
5Eurber, op.cit., pp. 117-8.
^Add. Mss. 19289, "Voyage to the Red Sea”, Sept. 1794.
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9 February 1793 and. arrived in Suez in April of the same year.
From Suez he went to Cairo where he met with Rosetti who had
received word from Baldwin to show him the text of the commercial
agreement with Murad and Ibrahim. ^acDonald refused to do so,
and claimed: "...I was-... unwilling to interfere, having myself
1
digested a plan which I proposed laying ... before the Beys".
His plan was to have a British settlement in Upper Egypt,
and for this he needed to have an interview with Ibrahim Bey.
Rosetti arranged for a meeting during which MacDonald bad a ’’long
and private audience".^ Ibrahim, according to the Englishman,
"... argued every point distinctly, and in a manner which convinced
me he had paid serious attention to the proposal". But the Mamluk
asked that the proposal be kept secret from Murad "... until he
could prepare him, fearing his vivacity and his bigotted zeal,
4for the Mahometan religion".
The contents of the meeting were recorded by Rosetti at 
5
Ibrahim's request. In it, it was agreed that Ibrahim would author­





^For the complete text, see Appendix IS.
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purposes of receiving and forwarding 6-ispatches to India. It 
was also agreed that a direct trade between India and Egypt 
would be allowed, and that no import duties would be levied.
The establishment would be granted the same privileges that the 
British resident at Basra enjoyed; these included immunity, 
the right of judging all those in his employ as well as all 
English persons, and the right to navigate on the Mile. The 
residents and agents would be allowed to have up to one hundred 
soldiers for their own security, provided they acknowledged the 
superiority and authority of the governing beys.
Ibrahim enquired as to whether this agreement meant an 
automatic cancellation of the previous one concluded with Baldwin. 
MacDonald could not go so far as to confirm it as such, since he 
needed the formal consent of London.
A year later, the "Swift" arrived at Suez on lb April. It 
carried passengers who wanted to xeach Europe in a great hurry.
They asked Baldwin to hir e two vessels; one party went in the 
direction of Xante or Trieste, the other to Malta or Leghorn. When 
he reported this to Dundas, Baldwin anxiously, yet not without em­
phasis, remarked: nI will not say, Sir - that you cannot do without 
me in Egypt - but you cannot do without a consul - And 1 may say - 
let him do as well as I have d o n e . B a l d w i n  then asked the captain
^F0 24/l»  Baldwin to Dundas, A p ril 21, 1796.
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of the vessel to wait at Suez in order to carry news of the © r  
in Europe to India. The captain agreed to wait, but only for 
ten days. But Baldwin was not ready in time, and the "Swift" 
had to leave. In the meantime, the Captain had had a difficult 
time at Suez because of the exorbitant demands of the aut lenities 
there. He left it all to be sorted out and paid by the Consul, 
who would in turn be reimbursed by the East India Company. But 
the Consul found this very trying, especially since his funds 
had been cut off from London, and the Company owed him a few thou­
sand dollars for past services. "I have in my nature a kind of 
disregard for these things andw>uld often prefer to bear an op­
pression myself than use arguments with my high-spirited country-
H1men..."
The Consul continued to warn London and Bombay that the Beys 
were increasingly furious at the lack of cargo on British ships, 
and would probably cease to allow any ship into Suez. The Pasha 
in Cairo had sent Baldwin a message saying he had complained to 
the Porte about the use of the Red Sea route by the British. Bald­
win mentioned this to Dundas, and added u... as I did not buy off
his indignation by a present, he will give colours to his com-
2
plaint which may produce some effect".
HfO l/3 4 4 , Baldwin to Gov. Gen, of Bengal, May 15, 1796.
2XMcL.
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In Hay 1796? Baldwin was to use the route once again for 
purposes of quick messages to India, and could proudly point 
out to yet another service for the benefit of his country. Hr. 
Villkham, the British resident minister at Berne, wrote to Baldwin 
telling him that the Butch squadron had left the Texel bound for 
the Cape of Good Hope. The letter was addressed to the British 
Consul in Egypt. Baldwin, who had by now received news of his 
dismissal, woefully remarked: "Although no more than the shadow .
of that exterminated being - I could not think myself .', dispensed 
with co-operating..." He sent the information to India. The 
"Ply" cruiser was at Sues, so it carried the dispatch that also 
enclosed English newspapers that Baldwin had recently received 
from Leghorn. Baldwin decided that if the information proved useful 
"... England may have to owe another obligation to Mr. Dun das for 
persisting in fixing a watch-house in Egypt - in a way - whose con­
quest and security rebrate on the vigilance of a good watch-man,
2
He has had a faithful watchman and Mr. Dundas shall do him justice."
hlien Baldwin's dispatch reached Bengal, a British squadron 
was sent to the Cape which captiired the Butch fleet. Once again, 
a major victory depended on the use of the route.^
'wo 1/344, Baldwin to Dundas, Hay IS, 1796.
2_,
lbxd.
^Baldwin, Pol. Rec. ,  p ,29.
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Thainville's Mission and Baldwin's RQle
Watching the actions of the French, and reporting them to 
London had always been one of Baldwin's main preoccupations.
With the exception of his attempts to thwart Thainville's mission, 
the last period of the Consul's stay in Egypt was noticeably free 
of interest in the French. The main reason for this was that after 
1791 , with the return of Murad and Ibrahim to power, the fortunes 
of the French community waned considerably.
When gasan Pasha had been in Egypt, he "borrowed" a great 
deal of money from the French, most especially from Magallon, and 
never returned it. Two years later, the Frenchman went to France
1
to secure some form of indemnity from the Government for his losses.
With Isma/il as shaykh al-balad, the French received much greater
favour from his rule. A1though he also borrowed money, he managed 
2
to return it. He even petitioned Magallon - secretly, in his
harim, so no one would overhear - for French military aid to over-
3
come the possibility of a return of the rebel Beys. After the 
death of Israa*il, the new rulers, rapacious to begin with, exerted 




Corr. Pol., Turquie, 179» Magallon to Lucerne (copy), March 6, 1789.
3
He asked fox’ engineers, artillery officers, ammunition-makers etc. 
Magallon was instructed to d eal with the matter delicately, aid not 
to promise anything to the Shaykh al-Balad. Corr. Pol., Turquie, 
179* Pro jet de reponse a M.' Magallon, May 1789.
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in daily terror of the Beys, and suffered innumerable pecuniary 
damages, Phe French Revolution did nothing to make the situation 
more tolerable; it split the shaken community into two camps of 
royalists and republicans, each side distrustful of the other.
In 1793j Magallon who had always teen Murad's friend, re­
turned as Consul-General to Cairo. At first, he had enough money 
to keep the Beys happy, but when it began to run out, abuses were 
poured on the community. In 1795, there was a general French exodus
from Cairo led by Magallon; the community felt more secure in Alex-
2.
andria where they were relatively far from Murad and Ibrahim. But
from 1793, even Baldwin admitted that all commercial activities of
2
both the French and the British were at a complete halt.
In October 1795, Baldwin informed Grenville that Liston had
%
witten to him from Constantinople warning him of the forthcoming 
visit to Egypt of Dubois Thainville, the brother of Fouquier Ihain-
4
ville, the Public Prosecutor of Prance. The Ambassador had heard 
that the aim of the mission was primarily to negotiate with the Beys 
for a regular passage and trade of the Red Sea, "... in order to
Charies-Roux, op.cit., p.335.
^PO 24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, Bov. 9, 1793.
3The Ambassador must have known of Baldwin’s dismissal.
^PO 2 4 / l ,  Baldwin to G ren v ille , Oct. 3? 1795.
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strengthen Tippoo, and finally to annihilate the British dominion
1in the East Indies...rr Baldwin was willing to act to thwart any 
success of the French, hut reminded Grenville of two facts; "I 
have credit and argument enough with the Beys to stand against 
aiy argument or credit that Tinville may bring with him, excepting 
that forcible argument of cash...", because ,f... I am made impotent 
by the suspension of my bills at Tour Lordship's office for three 
years salary...” The other reminder concerned the disuse of 
the agreement of 1794: the Beys were angry, and if Thainville's
mission was to be destroyed, British merchants had to start coming
3
to Sues.
The French archives show no evidence of Thainville’s visit 
being what Liston suspected and Baldwin claimed it to be. The French­
man's purpose seemed to be to help his countrymen in Egypt by putting 
pressure on the Beys, and if necessary, to threaten them with the
Republic's recent conquests if they refused to return the money they 
4had stolen.
Itfhen Grenville did not answer his letter, Baldwin proceeded, 
not uncharacteristically, to act on his own to spoil Thainville's
Baldwin, Pol. Rec., p .50.
24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, Oct. 3 9 1795.
^FO 24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, Oct. 3? 1795.
^Corr. Pol., Turquie, 191. Instructions donnees par le cito.yen 
Verinac envoye extraordinaire de la republique fran^aise... au citoyen
Thainville en 1'envoyant aupres des Pacha et Beys d ’Sgypte. Thermidor
STdSy-^-g* 179 5.
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visit. Alone in the country, cut off from any friends except 
for Rosetti, he had to cling to his convictions even more strongly 
than usual, and somehow had to act on them in order to prove him­
self. What he actually did is difficult to assess. He claimed 
that he counteracted the mission. "Tinville is known to have 
said, upon his return to Alexandria disappointed, 'lls ne nous 
veulent pas de gre, ils nous aurons de force1 'Mais, comment 
ferez vous pour embarquer vos troupes sur la mer rouge?1 ’Nous y 
transporterons de vaisseaux en charpente.' It appeared here, 
that the Republicans were bent at this time upon the invasion of 
Egypt."1
From the French records, it may be possible to glean a little
of what Baldwin probably did. To begin with, one of Thainville's
first difficulties to surmount in Egypt was the disunity of the
French community after the Revolution. Some of the men renounced
2
their citizenship, and became either "Spanish" or "English". Over 
those who defected to England, Baldwin had considerable influence, 
since he himself was violently anti-Republican. Thainville reported
Baldwin, Pol. Rec., pp. 29-30.
^Taitbout became "English" in 1794 (Oorr. Pol., Turquie, 187) and 
Butot became "Spanish" in 1793- Ee had been Vice-Oonsul in Rosetta 
(Corr. Pol., Turquie 185). Rosetti was vice-consul for Spain.
3In 1794, when the new French flag was displayed in Alexandria over 
the home of the Consul, the Venetian and Ragusan consuls paid the 
usual compliment of displaying the flags of their own states. Those
257.
from Alexandria that the merchants there were in violent opposition
to each other, and it obviously was very difficult for him to
1present a concerted opinion of strength before the Beys. Bald­
win could have played a part in widening the differences of the 
French community, although there is no evidence to prove this.
Rosetti did do something that alienated Thainville from the
Beys, however. He had read an article in an Italian journal which 
cited the list of presents recently given by the French to the 
Sultan in Constantinople. He translated the article, and showed it 
to Murad and Ibrahim who obviously compared it with the lesser riches
Thainville had brought them; the comparison did little to promote
2
goodwill from the Beys.
It seems difficult now to believe that Thainville's mission 
failed because of Baldwin. The real reason for its failure was that
the Beys gave him promises which they broke within a few months.
That Baldwin and Rosetti helped to bring this about is not impossible,
who could even celebrated the occasion by cannon fire. Baldwin and 
the Dutch Consul stood together and questioned the validity and 
authenticity of the act. FO 78/l5, Liston to Grenville, Sept. 25, 1794. 
Again, on March 10, 1794 when the anniversary of the massacre of Paris 
and the dethronement of Louis XVI was being celebrated, the Venetian 
Consul concurred by displaying his flag and firing the artillery. 
Baldwin complained bitterly to Richard ¥orsley, British ambassador in 
Venice. FO 24/l, Baldwin to ¥orsley, Aug. 27, 1794.
1 *■Corr. Pol., Turquie, 192, Aux Gitoyens represantans du peuple. 15
frimaire 4/6 Dec. 1795.
‘LLbid.
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but a fair amount of the credit must be given to the rapacity of 
the Beys.
Hugh Cleghorn in Egypt
One of Baldwin's most important acts during his last five 
years in Egypt was his work in helping Oleghorn across the country 
in order to fulfil his mission that culminated in the British ac­
quisition of Ceylon. Hugh Cleghorn, a professor of Civil History 
at St. Andrews University, became acquainted with the Swiss Count 
Charles de Meuron, owner and colonel of the Swfss regiment (sup­
ported by the Dutch Hast India Company), that made up the large
1
part of the Dutch garrison of Ceylon. After the establishment
of the republic of Holland in 1793, and its alliance with France,
Cleghorn put forward the idea to Dundas to take over the Swiss
garrison for Britain, thus bringing the island under British domin-
2
at ion in a relatively easy and bloodless manner. Meuron had made 
it clear to Cleghorn that the transaction was possible. His brother, 
Count Pierre Frederic de Meuron, actually commanded the garrison, 
and could be counted on to transfer his loyalty to the King of Eng­
land. Dundas gave the plan his complete approval, but warned of
Hell, Cleghorn Papers, p.3*
p
Cleghorn's fear at the time, no doubt shared by Dundas, was that 
Ceylon would be used by the French as a base to support Tippoo 
Sultan.
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its urgency. So nn 1 March 1795, Cleghorn left England, went to
Switzerland where he was joined by the Count Charles de Meuron,
and with their party' went to Venice, and then sailed to Alexandria.
They arrived in Alexandria on 10 June 1795. Baldwin met them,
and led them to his house where he lodged them for the night. The
next day, he arranged for their departure to Cairo. While in Alex-
andria, Cleghorn noted that there were two ships from England in
the harbour, and many from all over Europe. He also noticed that
Baldwin received him and his party with the “utmost politeness
2
and cordiality". Cleghorn also gave some description of the kind 
of daily life Baldwin led; his house must have been spacious to 
lodge six extra people, and his table was "furnished with luxurious 
abundance". He told Baldwin of the urgency of his mission, and 
enquired about the Butch Consul. Baldwin said that the Dutch Con­
sul was expecting dispatches from Holland that had left on 1 April, 
and were to be sent out immediately to the East Indies via Suez. 
Cleghorn was worried that the Butch government had discovered his 
purpose, so he asked Baldwin if he amid find a solution. The Con­
sul knew that his Butch eolleague was hostile to the new Republic, 
and, being in straitened financial conditions, could be bribed to
^This was made up of: (a) Capt. Bolle, the aide-de-camp of Meuron,
(b) M. Choppin, the Secretary of Meuron, (c) Michael Hirowsky, 
Cleghorn’s servant, (d) Julius, a negro servant of the court. Neil, 
op.cit., p.46.
^¥0 l/36l, Cleghorn to Dundas (copy), June 10,1795.
^ Ib id .
deliver the dispatch to the English. If ‘the Dutchman, did not
actually give Baldwin the letters, he could he induced to inform
him as to their arrival, and they could he “stolen". Cleghorn,
deciding that the papers were of sufficient importance, instructed
Baldwin to obtain them, carefully adding that the courier could
be "attacked”, but not murdered. He authorised the Consul to
draw £;?00 for the procedure.
Cleghorn then went to Rosetta where he arrived on 12 June.
There he learned of the existence of a Mrs. Warschi "who calls
herself an Englishwoman”, and went to see her. She was an old lady,
but a very pleasant person, and claimed to be the sister of Mrs.
2
Wortley Montagu.
On 17 June, Cleghorn reached Cairo. Baldwin had already offered 
him Rosetti1s services in the city, but had cautioned that there was 
the suspicion that the Venetian merchant was in league with France. 
Rosetti remained with the Englishman and his party during the whole 
of their stay, although he did not lodge them at his own house. The 
first evening there, Rosetti invited them home for dinner, and after 
that, took them to Mr. Elias, Baldwin's dragoman, who lived in the 
Consul's house where they were to stay. Rosetti and Elias were con-
'ibid.
She was the sister-in-law of Edward Wortley Montague (1713-76)
an Arabic scholar, and son of the famous Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. 
Mrs. Warschi was an Irish widow, the daughter of Dormer (a merchant 
of Leghorn), and had lived in Egypt for twenty-two years. Her husband
stantly helping them, as was Marquetti Caravigio, an Italian from 
Smyrna.
Cleghorn liked Rosetti very much. The Venetian told him that
^  l
it was he who had obtained the 1794 agreement with Murad and Ibra-
1him; he claimed to have acted on a commission from Baldwin.
Rosetti, together with Baldwin, convinced Cleghorn of the importance
of the overland route through Egypt, and the significance of having
British cargo ships at Sues. Cleghorn told Dundas of this, and added
that Rosetti should share more of the honours of the work of the
British in Egypt, since he lived in Cairo. He described him to Dun-
2
das as a "zealous friend to the English nation".
When Cleghorn left Cairo for Sues, Rosetti sent two of his
3men to help him. He also applied to the Pasha for letters of re­
commendation to Jedda, and p ersonanly wrote letters to residents 
and merchants there to help Cleghorn. He did not forget to send a 
letter to the agent of the East India Company at Mukha to furnish 
Cleghorn with a ship when he arrived.
In Suez, the party lodged at Elias's private dwelling. They 
had been detained in Cairo because Ibrahim Bey had wanted to send a
had been French; her son was, at the time of Cleghorn's visit, 
a prominent merchant of Rosetta. Anon., A non-military journal, or 
observations made in Egypt by an Officer upon the Staff of the■ im i Hm.ii ininnm. i^. ■ ■ aTmm v wtinw ~rr***r* - -1 • *' • T'-T nTTi' it r i n 11    • • •■•" ~-i 11 i —r i —t- — IJ ■    ■ — ■ —— ■ ■ —* '*»■ '■ ■■—■
British Army, p .8.
•^This is not unlikely although Baldwin never mentioned it,
^WO l/36l, Cleghorn to Dundas, June 25, 1795.
^gali^i, who had replaced Muhammad ‘izsat in 1794.
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X
courier to Mecca by the same caravan. But Rosetti had seen
to it that they had letters from Murad Bey to Muhammad Agha,
the governor of Sues, so their stay there m s  not -unpleasant.
2
Muhammad sent them a present of sheep and fowl.
They finally left Suez on 9 July for Jedda, and from there 
went to Mukha where they arrived on IS August. After a very rough 
crossing, they reached Tellicherry; there they heard that a 
British force had already gone to Cession, and open warfare was 
consequently imminent. Cleghorn immediately sailed to the island and 
informed the British regiment of the impending agreement with the 
Swiss garrison. Mien Meuron1 s forces withdrew their support of 
the existing government in November, the governor of the island put 
up a gallant but futile show of resistance, but there was lit tie 
bloodshed to speak of. Ceylon finally surrendered on 16 February
1796.
The quick and agile manner in which the island was acquired 
for Britain was largely due to Cleghorn, but it must not be over­
looked that Baldwin* s aid, for use of the overland route and. for the 
waylaying of the Butch message, was valuable. On his way back from
V o  l/36l, Cleghorn to Dundas, July 3, 1795. 
Weil, OT3.Cit..». p. 76.
V o  1/344, Baldwin to Dundas, July 24, 1795.
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Ceylon, Cleghorn also went through Egypt. He arrived in Suez
1
on 15 April 1796, and found that Rosetti had sent horses,
camels and a suitable escort to tahe him to Cairo and Alexandria.
2
Baldwin helped to arrange for a passage to Europe.
Carlo Rosetti
One of the most fascinating, yet enigmatic, characters in 
the story of the British in Egypt during the period under study 
was Carlo Rosetti. He had lived for a long time in Egypt, and 
at one time was the trusted adviser of both Ali Bey and Muhammad 
Bey Abu’l Dhahab. He continued to influence the Mamluks after 
1795, although he did not carry the same prestige as with the 
other Beys. As a Venetian merchant, he was interested in the Red 
Sea trade, and his r61e in thwarting Baldwin's plans for it in 1779 
has already been mentioned. He had very little national-'loyalty, 
and served whatever state could be of use to him. Still, his commer­
cial interests must have declined a great deal for him to have to 
resort to becoming an ally of Baldwin when the latter became con­
sul-general, But he helped a great deal, and managed to incite 
the French community to hate and fear.
1
Neil, op.cit., p.285.
2Jbid. ■ p . 2 8 6 .
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From 1795 onwards, he began to be noted in London. Oleghorn
did much, to change the shady picture previously dram of him
by Baldwin; "... X could not entertain a doubt that the character
given me of Mr. Rosetti proceeded upon mistaken apprehensions of
1
his political principles.". At the time of Oleghorn*s visit
Rosetti was consul concurrently of Austrian and Russia, and charge
d* affaires for Spain. Yet he wished to be recommended to Dundas,
which Oleghorn obligingly did; he told the Minister that Rosetti
".. • would be highly gratified if you would have the goodness to
communicate to the Imperial Minister at London the zeal with which
the Consul at Cairo forwards the views of as such as carrying
2publiclc dispatches to India". He also claimed that Rosetti*s 
personal influence with the Beys had been invaluable to him during 
his journey through Egypt.
Rosetti had also suggested to Oleghorn a method whereby Eng­
land could win Murad1s favour. One of the Bey*s ships that carried 
gi^ ain from Alexandria and was managed by Oreelc sailors, had recently 
been seized by a Maltese pirate. If England could arrange to have 
the ship returned to the Mamlik, it would win the gratitude of the 
ruler. Rosetti suggested that Cleghorn should mite to the British 
Consul at Malta. But Cleghorn knew William Hamilton, the ambassador
1
Neil, op.cit.. p.70.
^W0 l / 3 6 l ,  Cleghorn to Dundas, June 25, 1795.
3rbid.
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1in Naples, and instead wrote to him.
Cleghorn also received suggestions from Rosetti as to what
gifts from Britain would he suitable for Murad and Ibrahim, in
order to secure friendly Anglo-Egyptian relations: pistols and
guns with plain designs in order to differ from those of the
French. ,fBut the most agreeable present to Mourad Bey would be
an elegant pleasure boat, with a room for his ladies, ornamented
with mirrors, having Venetian blinds and covered with damask. He
has built a 60 gun ship for the idle parade cf the Nile and perhaps
2
some English naval stores might be highly valued.”
When Cleghorn was in Sues waiting to leave for Jedda, he
wrote to Rosetti in very warm tones. nI shall never be able to
discharge the debt of gratitude which I owe you..." He accepted
the fact that the Venetian had nmore or less" admitted to being
in secret correspondence with members of the Convention, but was
A
personally opposed to the violence of the Revolution. '
It has already been established that Rosetti shared Bald­
win’s commercial interests, the best example being the rivalry
*1
Cleghorn to Hamilton, June 26, 1795. Contained in Neil, op.cit.,
pp. 67-8.
WO 1/361, Cleghorn to Dundas, June 25, 1795.
3Cleghorn to Rosetti, July 6, 1795. Contained in Neil, op.cit., 
pp. 83-4.
PP* 69-70.
in 1779 that ended with the Englishman* s abandonment of the
Red Sea trade. Baldwin’s interest in the export of natron has
1already been mentioned. Rosetti also had an interest in this
trade, for he told Cleghorn of it, and said he had already in
farm a large district on the banks of the Rile where the mineral
2
was to be found. Rosetti also assured Cleghorn that he would be 
willing to supply England with a great supply of natron, and would 
be able to obtain a monopoly on its export from the Beys. He 
joined Baldwin in expressing the importance of depriving France 
of this product.
Another branch of trade that interested both Baldwin and 
Rosetti was the export of wheat from Egypt. In March 1796, Bald­
win, in one of his last desperate efforts to prove the value of 
his defunct office, told Grenville that there was a surplus of 
wheat in Egypt. He knew that England was suffering from a great 
shortage of the cereal, especially when it came to supplying the 
forces in the Mediterranean, and as Consul-General, he was willing 
to supply his country with all it needed. In June 1795, he had 
asked Lee, his agent, to contact the Privy Council with the sug­
gestion. Baldwin argued that if he had been able to send wheat 
from Egypt in 1795, the government would have saved £1 million.^
1See Chapter IV, above.
Q
Rosetti had also been given a monopoly an the trade of senna by Murad. 
Description 1 1 Egypte, vol. 17, p.351*
■%0 l/36l, Cleghorn to Dundas, June 25, 1795.
^EO 24-/1, Baldwin to Grenville, March 29, 1796.
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In 1796, the harvest in Egypt was excellent, and Baldwin was
anxious to prevent the French from obtaining it.^ He suggested
that a ferrtian from the Porte allowing the export of wheat could be
2
obtained in return for a promise to pay in bullion. The enter­
prising Consul already could name a correspondent in London, John 
Barker, who could act on his behalf for the commission.
Rosetti was plainly interested in the export of wheat to
England as well, for Cleghorn mentioned the abundance of the product 
more than once in his letters. Since he spent a great deal of time
with the Venetian merchant, it may be deduced that it was from him
that he obtained his interest and information. Baldwin and Rosetti's 
interest in the trade came to nothing, despite the fact that the 
suggestions were taken into consideration. In January 1796, the 
Privy Council decided that it would not be expedient to send the 
grain from Egypt to the fleet and garrison at Gibraltar, since 
there were no means there to grind and dress wheat or barley.
^According to Baldwin/ Thainville had "inundated" Egypt with French 
money, in order to buy the surplus wheat. Ibid. France did, indeed, 
import wheat from Egypt at this time. Description de 1'Egypte, vol.
12, p.148.
2The government in England would also have to send many presents for the 
Beys that should include "... several sets of firearms, ... of guns, 
pistols and carbines. Ho yellow metal about them of plain and good 
workmanship besides a dozen of brass field pieces, not weighing more 
than four cwt. each to the amount in all of five thousand pounds."
Ibid. FO 24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, March 2 9 ,  1 7 9 ’6i
1/759, January 16, 179 6^and T. 1/760, January 29, 1790.
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When Baldwin received the duplicate of the o r ig in a l
letter of dismissal in March 1796, Rosetti lost no tine in
contacting the East India Company and offering his services as
agent. He also took it upon himself to act for the British in
Cairo. In August 1796 he wrote to the Secretary of the Secret
Committee in London to tell him of two xecent services he had
provided for Englishmen in Egypt. The first was to William George
Browne who had been travelling in Upper Egypt when he was robbed.
Rosetti immediately obtained the help of ‘Uthman Bey, the governor 
2
of Upper Egypt. The second was to Samuel Johnston and William 
L. Gardner who had arrived in Cairo on 22 July 1796 with dispatches 
for India. Rosetti took them to Sues, and from there hired a boat 
to take them to Jedda.
In June 1796 he wrote to Sir John Shore^' saying he had 
served the Company for fifteen years. He untruthfully claimed to 
have cooperated with the British to have the Red Sea trade developed, 
and added an account of his r61e in the signing of the 1794 trade 
agreement. At the time of writing, he was arranging for Captain
1
See Chapter IV, above.
2
Egypt 5a, Rosetti to W. Ramsay, Aug. 6, 1796.
Ibid.
Sir John Shore, 1st Baron Teignmouth (1751-1834), Governor-General
of India from 1793 to 1798.
1George Downie to take a dispatch to India. Four days later, he
wrote to say that Downie bad been delayed because the Arabs of
Yenbo had seized on a well-loaded boat from Jedda, aid the Beys
in Cairo had consequently forbidden boats to go to Jedda. But
Rosetti managed to get special permission for the Englishman to go
through the Red Sea, but only after great difficulty. He urged
the East India Company to send commercial boats to Suez in order
to facilitate the journey for dispatches.
Rosetti seemed to have more luck than either Hughes or
Baldwin in winning the recognition of the Company. Shore concurred
with Rosetti1 s reminder that the Red Sea trade should be opened,
and at the same time promised to send Rosetti's letters to the Court
of Directors in London, so that consideration of his help would 
2
be noted.
In May 1797 Rosetti wrote to the secretary of the Secret 
Committee once again. He had received a letter from Captain Speak 
of the ‘'Panther11, saying he was on his way to Suez from Bombay. Rosetti 
gave the message to Murad and Ibrahim, and was able to obtain letters 
of recommendation. A month later, he received the dispatches and
Egypt 5a, Extract of Bengal Pol. Consultations.
^Egypt 5a, Extract of Bengal Pol. Consultations, Oct. 24, 179b.
^Egypt 5a, Rosetti to Ramsay, May 10, 1797.
sent them to Baldwin who in turn forwarded them to London.
The next year, dispatches arrived on the '’Intrepid", Once
again, Rosetti helped in expediting them on the overland route,
told London of his efforts, and added the usual plea for cargo
at Sues. He promised in the meantime to keep the Beys happy
2
with presents, aid urged for suitable gifts to be sent.
Baldwin had left in March of that year, and Rosetti was anxious 
not only to be remunerated for his own services, but also to in­
herit the Englishman’s position as Consul-General. He argued that
3at any rate he was doing the work. His argument also extended
to sending a copy of Baldwin’s confirmation of Rosetti as his deputy 
4
on p March 1796.' Most of all, of course, he wished for Baldwin’s 
salary from the Company. He never received an answer.
Baldwin* s Departure and Proud Return
When the shock of dismissal hit home, Baldwin appealingly 
wrote to Dundas: "Conceive, sir, what ruin for a man who has never
thought of providing for the infirmities of old age, but has placed 
his dependence upon his zeal, and activity, and on the certain favour
^Mgypt 5a, Rosetti to Ramsay, June 12, 1797.
2
Egypt 5a, Rosetti to Ramsajr, Aug. 25> 1798*
^Egypt 5a, Rosetti to Ramsay, May 12, 1798.
^Egypt 5a, Rosetti to Ramsay, March 23, 1798.
1
and protection of government..." He could not conceive of the
destruction of the chancery of the consulate,or of the possible
confiscation by France. "It is the creature of the India Board
- the creature of Mr. Dundas ... Take it therefore to your own
2office, sir, and free it from ruin."
His health had seriously deteriorated. "My whole ambition
r?*
is to return to a cottage in England, and to finish in quiet.
\fnen no response appeared from London, his spirits became very
low as he finally began to realize he would have to leave. He
was far too depressed to be concerned about his personal wealth,
and how he would live in England without any form of income. He
simply left all his property behind^ and 011 14 March 1798, sailed
from Alexandria. Five days later, he arrived on the island of 
5
Patmos. From Fatmos he went to Chism e where he remained for 
twenty-five days.
It was as a sick, ageing and disillusioned man that he wrote 
to Dundas from there. "I have been forced by the effects of two
1F0 24/l, Baldwin to Dundas (copy), March 29, 1786.
Ibid.
PO 24/l, Baldwin to Grenville, March 29, 1786.
4He described this as; "My plate, and furniture, and a sum of money 
advanced on the security.of my dwelling house; making together a 
sum of £2000 ..." Egypt 5a? Baldwin to Dundas, Oct. 9? 1799.
5Baldwin, Pol. Rec., pp. 31“2.
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years constant illness to 32sign my employment and to leave
Egypt for a chance of recovering my health in a better air,
hut X do not hope even to be ever able to undertake any
publick service again. From Chisme he went to Trieste where
he heard of the Napoleonic invasion of 1 July. He claimed that
when Nelson's fleet had gone to Alexandria In June in search of
the French, the British admiral, "... not finding me at my post,
2
was compelled to quit the coast". He had been planning to con­
tinue his weary journey to England, but when he learned of the 
confiscation of all his belongings in Egypt by the French, he 
realized this would have been impossible. He decided instead to 
"retire from society into a corner of Italy, and to wait for a 
turn in the tide of affairs". On his way there he stopped in 
Vienna where he wrote to Dundas stating his case once again, and 
asking for enough money to live on for three years. "1 ask it for 
other purposes to vindicate the past, I ask it with a view to the
means of arranging a work already in my possession, requiring
4care, which shall do honour to your friendship for me..."
■1
¥0 1/344? Baldwin to Dundas, April 23, 1798.
2
Baldwnn, Pol. Rec., p.32. The letters brought by the British fleet 
were delivered to Rosetti. FO 7S/l9, Smith to Grenville, July 25, 1798.
3
Baldwin, Pol. Rec., p .34.
^Egypt 5a, Baldwin to Dundas, Oct. 9, 1799- The work was presumably 
Political Recollections.
He finally readied Tuscany where he settled down in an
elegantly furnished palace not far from Florence that cost him
1
only £20 a year,- for rent.' "I could be resigned to this fate,
since the owner of the palace had to resign himself to worse.
I clothed myself, amid this splendour, in perfect humility: X
would have clothed myself in peace, but the din of war was all 
2around me."
When he heard about the battle of Marengo he was very
disturbed, and decided to leave at once. He sought refuge in a
place not far from Leghorn. Soon after his arrival, a party of
Republicans reached the city, and Baldwin once again fled, this
time to the British frigate tlSanta Dorothea11 which was crowded
with fugitives; he had at the time i'ivv little more than a change
4
of linen...'1 in his pocket.
The "Santa Dorothea" cruised in the Mediterranean for a fort­
night, and then landed at Maples. Baldwin disembarked, and began 
to plan for a visit to Malta, where he knew the British forces would
•j
Baldwin, Pol. Rec.. p .35.
^Ibid., p.36.
314 June 1800. Napoleon’s great victory over the Austrians in Italy. 
^Baldwin, Pol. Rec.. P .37.
be, in order to offer M s  services in the case of an expedition
to Egypt. Instead,he received letters from the Gommanders-in-
1Chief of the army and navy. Admiral Keith’s letter was from Port
Mahon, written on 18 November 1800. He was asked to join them
at Malta, since they were going to Egypt, and needed his valuable
knowledge of the country. Baldwin’s instant reaction reveals his
enthusiasm: ’’Shall I make a merit of my readiness to embark upon
such an invitation? or shall I not rather shy - Nhat answer could
an honest Englishman, and a faithful subject, make to so honourable
a call - to so honourable a distinction - but, command.' 1 will 
2
shew the way]”
On 9 December, he embarked on H.M. frigate ”Greyhound” under 
the command of Captain Ogle, and arrived in Malta ten days later.
The next day a captured polacca from Alexandria was brought in.
Two of the prisoners were Tallien^ and Magallon. Baldwin knew that 
it was the latter who had seised his property after the arrival of 
Bonaparte in Egypt, although he bad been given the choice of deciding
 ^G. IC, Keith Elphinstoire (1746-1823), the British' admiral who had 
been sent to occupy the Dutch colonies in the Cape- of G-ood Hope and 
India, 1795 to 1796. In November 1799 he was named Cornmander-in- 
Chief of the forces in the Mediterranean.
^Baidwin, Pol. Rec., p . 39.
He was later to die at Abu Qir.
^Jean Lambert Tallien (1767-1820), a French revolutionary who accom­
panied Bonaparte to Egypt where he edited the Decade Egyptienne.
It was Men on who made him leave the country, after which his boat 
was captured by the British, He was sent to London where he remained 
till 1802.
what to do with it. He was reported to have said: nla France
1
est faite pour conguerir, et non pas -pour faire des compliments."
But now that he was a prisoner, Magallon asked to see his former 
colleague. Baldwin reported the conversation:
"J'y viens et vous y allez", he said.
"Oui, s'il plait a Dieu, nous v irons.'*
"Vous y trouverez de vos eff&ts.'1
"Quels effOts?" said I.
"Vos livres."
"BonI", said I, "mes livresj et le reste?"
"AhJ pour le reste", said he, "J'en suis f ache I "
"Vous n'avez jamais manque de rien, j'espere?" said he.
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I answered him, not caring to reproach him in that situation,
* 'la Fortune ne m'a jamais affectee. Je croyois seulement qu'on 
respectoit, par une loi -constitutional!e, 1 es eff§ts d'un diplomat.'"
Tallien ... said, 11II est vrai; mais vous allez vous~m@me vous 
dedommager."
"Et dans le cas que je ne me dedommage pas. " said I, ule 
Consul Bonaparte n'auroit point egard a la loi?"
"Monsieur," said he, "dans ce cas-la, je vais eu France, je
pourrois v confer pour quelq.ue chose; rappellez-vous de moi,
je suis T allien: vous avez entendu de moi?1'
■j
Baldwin to Dundas, Dec. 9? 1800. Contained in Baldwin, Pol. Rec., 
p. 58.
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And I said, "Certalhement, .je vous connois de nom. Je
n'oublierai 'pas au moins votre off re."
"Je suis homme d'honneur, Monsieur," said he.
1
And so ne panted.
On 21 December, the British party and Baldwin sailed for
Mamorice. Baldwin stayed with Lord Keith on board the "Foudroyant",
despite Abercromby1s suggestion that the Consul should remain with
him. On 28 December, they reached Mamorice. During the voyage,
Baldwin did all he could to inform Abercromby about Egypt. On
23 February, after having completed the necessary preparations,
the fleet sailed for Egypt, and reached Abu Qir on 2 March.
Although Baldwin was there during the b eginning of the expedition,
there is little evidence that he was engaged in anything specific,
other than being the expert on Egypt. His owniecollections of the
landing at Abu Qir are filled with great poetic outbursts of nation-
2
alistic expressions rather than details of the manoeuvres. He 
must have shared the life of the invading forces for Keith told him; 




"idii but ambition must have bounds.' If ambition were to have no 
bounds, ambition would overawe the world! Thenwho shall check am­
bition, but the sons of freedom? But who shall be worthy of freedom, 
but the virtuous? But who shall spurn at the impertinence of Gallic 
pride, but Englishmen? Then come on] - To work!" Baldwin to John 
Baldwin, May 19, 1801. Contained in Baldwin, Pol. Rec., pp. 102-3.
I b i d .  , p .116.
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Hhen the forces set up camp outside Alexandria, Baldwin
invited unnamed Arab chief s to see him. From them, he gathered
information about the present state of Egypt. They also promised
to help with provisions, cattle and horses. Abercromby charged
Baldwin with the organization of supplying the soldiers with
their needs. The former consul could proudly say later; "I put
things into a good train... The General has said sometimes to
the general officers about him; 'The army, Gentlemen, are greatly
1
indebted to Mr. Baldwin.'"
Baldwin did not remain for long in Alexandria. He was back 
in England in May, having proudly brought b ack with him the stand­
ard of the Invincible Legion of Bonaparte which the British had 
captured on 21 March. "He gained our trophy, and ever an honour­
able trophy it will be to England, since it is the achievement of
greater achievement, since it was won from the bravest warriors 
2
of the time."
X X X X X X
Little is known of Baldwin's life in England after May 1801.
He died an London in 1824.
*1
Ibid., p. 124. Baldwin was full of admiration for Abercromby, and 
when the latter was wounded, he said: I sat down on the sand to bewail
our misfortune." Ibid., p.134.
2Ibid.. p.145.
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Appendix I
Translation of a representation from the Ottoman
Porte to his Britanick Majesty's Ambassador.
It is certain that his Majesty the King of Great Britain 
as an ancient, and sincere Friend of the Ottoman Porte, can never 
approve of any circumstances, which may alter the ancient order 
of the State-affairs of this Umpire; nor of those particularly, 
which might give rise to a reciprocal coolness. - His Britanick 
Majesty's mercantile Ships, as well as those of the other Christian 
Powers, who are in friendship with the Sublime Porte, have never 
hitherto passed beyond the Port of Gedda, nor is there an instance 
of their having penetrated as far as into the Scale of Suez. - 
As the illustrious Towns of Mecca, and Medina are situated nigh 
the eastem-Goast of the Bay of Suez, all the Mahomettan Nations, 
and in particular the Ottoman Court look upon all that Shore as 
sacred. Besides this, there are upwards of hundred thousand Men 
of the Tribe of Urian, who inhabit all along the Bastern-Coast of 
the Sea of Suez and who (as it several times has happened) upon 
the occasion of a Shipwreck, or other distressful accident of some 
Mahomettan Vessel, have attacked her, ransacked the Cargo, and 
slaughtered the Captain, and Crew: and. as these People have no
settled abode, they fly away into the Deserts, and thus are out 
of the reach of pursuit, and. punishment. In the Year 1189 it was 
represented from Cairo that a small British Vessel was come, con­
trary to custom, to the Scale of Suez: on this intelligence it
was notified to the Predecessor of the said Ambassador to inform 
his Court that the Sublime Porte could not for many reasons, admit 
of such Ship's going into the Porte of Suez, and it was likewise 
recommended to him as also to the other European Ministers to forbid 
their respective vessels from going into the said Port: with which
they have promised to acquaint their respective Courts, declaring 
further that none of their Ships, for the future, should go thither. 
Nevertheless this year in the moon of Safar the aforesaid Ambassador 
sent a representation to the Sublime Porte through his First Drago­
man, containing an accoiint that there was arrived from the East- 
Indias a small British Ship of War, at the Scale of Suez where she 
had landed three British Gentlemen who had met with a very unfriendly 
treatment from the Principal People of Cairo. On this account the 
said Dragoman was put in mind that the Sublime Porte had disapproved 
of the Christian Ship's going into the said Scale, as also of the 
anterior declarations she had made upon the subject. But although 
that British ship's coming thither was irregular, yet out of re­
gard for friendship, an Imperial Command was issued, and sent thither 
by a Person dispatched on purpose, in order that the Persons who had
abused the aforesaid British Gentlemen should be punished: but
it was added, likewise, that no Christian Vessels should be thence­
forth allowed to go to Suez: that on their coming thither, they
should be obliged to return back to Gedda aid that 011 the contrary, 
every mark of protection should be shown to all the British Merchants; 
and Subjects that happened to go to Damiata, Rosetta, Alexandria, 
and Cairo: with which determination said Ambassador was desired to
acquaint his Court.
Now the Governor of Cairo Izzet Mehemmed Pashaw has repre­
sented that there are three British Ships come Lately to the Scale 
of Suez, and that on his mentioning to a certain Merchant Baldwin, 
the Sublime Porte's objection to it,the said Baldwin answered that 
these Vessels were come to the said Scale, because their Principals 
in India had not received any orders from their Court relative to 
this Inhibition; and that notwithstanding he / the said Pashaw / 
out of regards to friendship, has permitted the aforesaid British 
Ships to unload at two other neighbouring Scales Tor, and Cassir, 
and their Cargo also to be transported to Cairo; adding farther 
that the successive arrival of these Ships to the said Port gave 
room to discourse in all those jjlaces.
The aforesaid Ambassador our Friend is sensible that as it is 
now a year, and half since the Sublime Porte’s determination upon 
this subject was imparted to his Predecessor, the orders of his 
Court ought by this time to be arrived at those parts.
Though the concourse of Christian Vessels at the Scale of Suez 
may, among the Inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, give rise to inno­
vations which might destroy the good rules of this State, it is evi­
dent besides, that it trill prove prejudicial to the Revenues of the 
Custom-House at Gedda, upon which depends the maintenance of the In­
habitants of the two illustrious Towns Mecca and Medina. It is equally 
obvious thatin case any British Vessel happens to be Shipwrecked in 
those parts, and the abovementioned Urians should ransack the Cargo, 
and murder the Captain and Crew;' the said Ambassador, or his Successors, 
laying stress upon the articles of the sacred capilolations, would in­
sist upon the offender’s being punished. Besides this consideration, 
as the two illustrious T o m s  of Mecca, and Medina are the object of 
the Ottoman’s devotion, and the Basis of the Mahomettan Religion, 
and as the Sea of Suez offers a nigh access to those sacred Places; 
the unusual concourse of Christian Vessels thither, will be a matter 
of displeasure to all the Lawyers, and to the Clergy in Egypt, Higias 
and Arabia; and consequently the Sublime Porte is under an indis­
pensable obligation to prevent it.
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Wherefore the Sublime Porte desires the aforesaid im- 
bassador, our friend, to take into serious consideration the 
reasons alledged in this friendly representation; to write 
to his Court with earnestness upon this particular, and to em­
ploy his diligence in preserving the constaint friendship of 
these two Courts, on that footing upon which it has hitherto 
existed: and he is equally desired to notify to the SLiblime
Porte the answer that he will have from his Coiirt.
th
Received the 5 of May. 1'777.
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Appendix .LI
Translation of a Hattjr Sheriff, or Imperial (Sign Manual) Command, 
addressed to the Government of Egypt
he will not absolutely suffer Prank ships to c cne to Sues, 
nor carry on any traffic openly or clandestinely, between this 
town and Judda. The sea of Sues is destined for the noble pilgrim­
age of Mecca. To suffer Frank ships to navigate therein, or to 
neglect opposing it, is betraying your Sovereign, your religion, 
and every Mahometan. And all those who dare transgress will find 
their punishment in this world, and in the world to come. It is 
for the most important affair of state, and of religion, that this 
express and, irrevocable command is issued. Conform to it with zeal 
and with activity, for such is our royal will.
To our honoured, minister and illustrious counsellor, whose 
prudence, sagacity, and zeal directs the affairs of the world.; who 
is the pillar of glory and. of happiness; distinguished by the pro­
tection of the mo st high, our Vizir Ismael Pasha. Hay God perpetuate 
yo ur sp1endourI
To the most upright of judges, and Hie best of Mussulman com­
manders, source of learning and. of perfection; who is an honour to 
the laws and. to justice, adorned by the favour of the Omnipotent, 
our Holla of Cairo. May Cod. increase your dignities, and your virtues]
To the powerful and honourable commanders; asylum of most il­
lustrious suppliants: to whom is entrusted the execution of sovereign
mandates, the Sheik Bellad, and other ruling Beys of Egypt. Hay Cod 
perpetuate your felicity!
To the most distinguished of all glorious personages, idol 
of the public esteem; our co-operator and commissioner, sent by 
our Sublime Porte, the Capigee Bachi, Mustafa Tahir Aga. May Cod 
perpetuate your glory!
To the most venerable Doctors. To the Sheriffs VefaVe, and 
Beiirye. To the Chiefs of the Pour Sects; and to the Doctors of the 
Azhar. May your virtue be augmented!
To the Superiours of their Equals, the Captains, and renowned 
Officers of the Seven Ogiaks of Cairo. May your power be increased!
Dp on Hie arrival of this imperial command, ICnow ye that Suez is 
the port of Mecca and. of Medina, whose glory may Cod perpetuate unto the
end of the world! Cities illustrious for being the centre of all 
justice, and which give splendour to the law of the Prophet. There 
is no example that foreign nations, and the sons of error, have ever 
navigated in the Sea of Suez, It has been a constant custom, until 
these latter tines, for the English ships, and others who trade from 
India, to stop at Judda; but in the tine of All Bey, a small vessel 
came up to Suez, and on board was an unknown person, with presents 
for Ali Bey, and declaring that he only came there for freight. The 
English have imagined, that, authorised, by such a precedent, it was 
lawful for them at all times, and all seasons, to return; and we have 
seen, in the time of the late Mehemed Bey Aboudahab, several vessels 
arrive there with cargoes of muslins, and other Indian articles. A 
principle of avarice betrayed this Bey also into error. They repre­
sented to him an infinite accumulation of revenue to his customs, and 
he was debauched. Under this specious pretext the English vessels, 
and those of other nations established in India, continued, one in­
stigated by the other, to frequent the port of Suez; and the English 
went so far as to establish magazines. So it has been reported to u;
These facts and this innovation contrary to the policy of our 
state, aid dangerous ‘toour religion, 'came to our imperial knowledge. 
he ordered, consequently, that the English thenceforward should return 
no more to Suez, nor even approach to its coasts, having enjoined 
expressly that they should be made to return. V/e notified these our 
orders to the English Ambassador residing at the Sublime Porte, and 
required him to transmit them to his court. The answers which he re­
ceived., as well from his Court as the East India Company, contained 
severe prohibitions to any of their subjects to come to Suez after 
the beginning of the Creek year answering to December, 1778. This 
minister, in communicating these prohibitions to the Sublime Porte, 
did at the same time declare, by the mouth of his first interpreter, 
that in case of contravention, the effects of those who should contra­
vene might be seized, their vessels confiscated, the crews of the ships 
and the supercargo imprisoned and condemned to perpetual slavery.
While the Sublime Porte was occupied about these matters, remon­
strances relative to the same object arrived from Prince Surrour, 
Sheriff of Mecca. This prince deposed, that the Pranks, not contented 
to confine their trade to Indian articles, had also embarked on board 
their ships coffee and other products of Yemen, which t hey transported 
to Suez, to the notable prejudice of the city of Judda. That these 
strangers, over-running lands and seas, take plans of every place, and 
preserve them until a propitious moment. Then fulfil their design of 
conquering the country. That this having happened an India and other 
places, the Sheriff was justly alarmed for his own fate, and expressed 
the utmost inquietude and indignation.
All this has been con firmed to us by the doctors versed in 
history, whom we have consulted upon the matter. They have ex­
plained to us many events which have been brought about by the 
insidious policy of the Franks, ‘.le learn that in the year 900, 
the Portuguese, and afterward the hutch, did by long and perilous 
voyages arrive in India. That they there describ ed themselves as 
peaceable merchants, honest and inoffensive. These people were 
accompanied by men of learning; curious only, they pretended, of 
making useful and innocent researches. The Indians, a people of 
contracted genius, were the dupes of this appearance. Their 
principal cities, such as Ahmed Abbas, Bengal, Banaras, Surat, and 
Madras have been the price of their credulity, aid themselves are 
now under the dominion of these Pranks.
It was by such like procedure, that in the beginning of the 
year 400, and the time of the Fatimites, Hie Franks insinuated them­
selves into the city of Damascus. Their first disguise was as quiet 
honest merchants, who punctually paid the duties of custom. A dis­
sent ion took place in those days between the Patimites and the Abissides 
and the Franks, following their ordinary policy, availed of the occur­
rence to take possession of Damascus and Jerusalem, which they main­
tained for near a century.
Useff Saladin of glorious memory, appeared about the middle 
of the year 607? at the head of an army of Jobite Gourdes and Melouk 
Turks, and recovered Jerusalem and Damascus after most incredible 
labours, aid a horrible massacre of the human species. But without 
dwelling upon the history of ancient times, no one is ignorant of 
the inveterate hatred which the Christians bear to the Turks, whom 
they see with a jealous eye in possession of Jerusalem.
My God confound those in this world and punish them in the next 
with an eternal punishment, who, constructing this evil to be a good, 
approve the coming of the Franks to Suez! Keep before your eyes the 
example of India. Consider the end of things, aid suffer not this 
intercourse. Seek out those who secretly assist them, and punish 
them in such a manner as 1ms no example such as they deserve. You will 
not be permitted to alledge any pretence of justification. Imprison 
the captains of the Frank vessels, and, above all, the English, upon 
their coming to Suez, and seize their ships, for it is set forth in 
the memorial of the English Ambassador, in the answers from his Court, 
and in the verbal information of his first interpreter, that they are 
pirates and rebels to their Sovereign. They are such to my Sublime 
Porte, and as such they merit imprisonment, and the confiscation of 
their goods. You will give advice of your proceedings to the Sublime 
Porte, and we m i l decide without permitting any one tointercede for 
their deliverance.
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You, Vizir, already mentioned; know ye, that such is the 
Trill and pleasure of the Sublime Porte. The intimate part you 
have had in the administration of our government sufficiently 
apprises you of the importance of this object. You, Moll a, command­
ing Beys, Doctors, and Ogiacks, take proper Training, he recommend 
to you expressly and reiterately to watch with attention this inno­
vation so dangerous to the state, and to religion. Conform, there­
fore, exactly to our command, and let our voice inspire you with 
a due fear - If not - by God we swear, that you will incur our 
indignation, and the severest punishments shall be the fruits of 
it. You who are enlightened by the Mussulman religion: you who
are profound in history and the study of books, applaud these our 
orders - and If your counsel for the execution prevail not - inform 
the Sublime Porte of the cause and consequence.
Translation of a bond dr aim up in Arabic by order 
of tlie government cf Egypt; 1779
Upon our arrival at Sues with our ships and merchandises, 
in virtue of a firman, from his excellency the Basha, we landed 
the merchandise, part of which we conveyed to 9airo, and the 
remainder was plundered by the rebel Arabs of Tor, since which 
our effects have been sequestered in Cairo, and our persons 
arrested in the Grand Signor's castle, and a firman has been 
detached to Sues, and the ships feifed, aid the people confined, 
and this derives from an imperial command emanated from the 
sublime Porte, the contents of which import. 'That our ambassa­
dor in Constantinople has seconded the Porte in authorising that 
all such as should come to Suez should be treated as had happened.'
Ue have demanded a copy of this firman, and lave obtained it. 
After this We, the underwritten, attest and confess, that, hence 
forward, no English or Dane shall come to Suez, neither commit 
hostilities against the ships trading from Judda to Suez, and from 
Suez to Judda, nor against any City or Countryin the Red-Sea, in 
any manner whatever, or under any pretext, Neither have We any 
pretension on account of what the Arabs have plundered, nor claim 
whatever against the people, nor primates, nor governors of Cairo. 
And we have received entirely every thing, that was sequestered, 
and by God’s will shall depart from Suez for India, and if after 
our departure ships shall arrive of any nation whatever, to do hurt, 
is to be considered the act of the English, and we the underwritten 
responsible. And further, any Prank contravening, or claiming what 
has been plundered by the Arabs, by memorials to the Porte, and 
any demand made in consequence thereof, that such demands be disre­
garded, as we disavow the right, and the expenses incurred by the 
officers bearing such demands to be paid by us. In case, however, 
the firman arrive from the sublime Porte, permitting the ships to 
come to Sues, we will come with our merchandise, but without such 



















Table (made out by Baldwin) of 
cloth exported from India, 1768-1782



















Period during which 
imports to Egypt 
) were allowed
Eall due to the rupture 
with Erance
')
) Fall due to suppression
) of the trade to Egypt
')
TOTAL: 1,593 bales (value £318,S00)
288.
Appendix  V
Translation of a letter from Governor Rumbold to
____________ Ibrahim Bey, 1782 ___________
In the name of God etc.
To Sheik Ibrahim Sheilul Beled (Ruling Bey) of Grand Cairo:
.After offering such pretty words as the sheets of friend- 
ship are ornamented with, and such excellent expressions as 
are becoming to a person who sticks to friendship & unanimity;
& after presenting such prayers as will make shine the stars 
with friendship & embellish the high ranks with amity & sin­
cerity; The same prayers being designed for the person who 
consolidates the rules of the power of Grand Cairo, & of felicity 
with a just eye, and strengthens the pillars of prosperity & 
grandeur with his penetrating judgement, who is the raiser of 
the standard of security over the heads of the tribes & the poss­
essor of the means of sway and endeavour. May not his munifi­
cences be wanting over the subjects.
It is represented to you by the Governor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, 
Chief of the City of Madrass, known by the title of Chief Tenent, 
that in conformity of your demand & desire, that we should hinder 
the operations of commerce of the inhabitants of India; & of their 
going to Cairo, we have commanded to all the merchants of the Eng­
lish Company, that they should refrain from passing at Cairo by way 
of trade, and we do not doubt but that this will please you. Nov; 
it being evident that your satisfaction proceeds by our sincere 
friendship that subsisted between us and our superiors: As we send
every year by way of Cairo to England dispatches and persons belong­
ing to the Company, we do now dispatch from hence towards Cairo 
Mr. ¥ooley, His Britannick Majesty’s Officer, with a chest of writ­
ings with him, & we beg from your perfect amity, that you should 
pay due regard to the benevolence and sincerity of your predecessors, 
relative to the dispatches & to the persons that belong to the Eng­
lish Company that carry the dispatches, with your most careful &
kind assistance. After this, it is notified to you that the two
ships that are gone from hence, one from the part of the King of 
England, and the other from the Company’s, are bound for the City 
of Sues, & that the above mentioned Mr, Nooley on his passage to 
Alexandria must stop in said city of Sues, till the news of the said
two ships arrival comes to you, & then he’ll depart from thence.
Last year you had stop'd some goods belonging to the Pranks. It is
perfectly known for certain that you had delivered them to 
their owners after having been persuaded of the justice, 
and before this came to your hands. It is hoped that you'll 
continue in that friendship, that has been bonded between our
common predecessors. It has been wrote the 28th ..........
of the Hagira.
p
Translated by Peter Crutta
•i
British Embassy official in Constantinople.
Appendix VI
Iran s 1 ati011 of the agreement between 
  Truguet and Shaykh ha sir Shadid _
Le seise de la lime de rebiul ewel l 1 an de 1 ’egere 1199 
le 27 janvier 1785 en presence des temoins signes dessous, et 
du tres distingue Kouallem Joseph Cassab directeur general 
des douanes de 1 1 Egypte. II a ete convenu entre le tres honore.
El Hadgi Laser Chedid bedouin Cheikh arabe de le dependence du 
Caire, et le S. le Truguet officier frangais envoye en Egypte 
par le roi de France.
Qua lorsqu’il arriveroit des batimens francais a Sues Laser 
Chedid enverra ses gens armes au port de Sure avec tous les 
chameaux qui feront necessaires pour transporter et escorter les 
marchandises de ces batimens du port de Sues au Caire. Le gafar 
ou peage que les marchandises payent aux arabes sur cette route 
sera a la change du dit Cheikh Laser, ainsi que le sal air e des gens 
charges de les conduire et de les escorter sans qu’il puisse jamais 
s'eleven sur cet objet aucune discussion ou difficulty. Le dit 
Cheikh Laser Chedid est convenu solemnellenient qu’il previendra et 
repondra persomiellenient de tous les evenements facheux qui pourroient 
arriver a ces dites marchandises moyennent qu'on lui payers cinq 
pataques pour chaque charge de cliameau. Les qu'il arrivera quelque 
batiment a Suez le dit Laser Chedid fera dresser une piece juridique 
pas devant le cadi pour constater qu'il se charge et repond des raar- 
chandises dans leurs transport. Arrete et conclu entre le Hadji 
Laser Chedid et le S. de Truguet qui out signe le present ecrit.
XI a ete depuis ajoute a ces presentes conventiones que si tout 
autre que le cheikh Laser Chedid etait charge du transport de ces 
marchandises, le cheikh Laser declare qu'11 ne repond plus des 
evenements que des lors ne peuvent ^tre a sa charge.
Signe (Laser Chedid
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Appendix YII_
British Ships in.Egypt: 1786-1794
Lame Purpose
"Britannia"
"Lew Euphrates" loaded senna, myrhh
"Pollard" 1o aded natron, myrrh 
coffee, gum


















loaded 80 tons, 
natron


























loaded 44 tons natron; 
cotton, opium,
pistachios Alexandria
loaded natron, 165 
tons; cotton, 
ostrich feather,
wool Alexandria Hay 1792
L Indicates consignments to Rich. & VJ. Lee, Baldwin* s agents in London
* It must be noted that the dates given are not the ones when the
vessels landed in Alexandria, since they were dated later in the 

































90 tons; india bales
loaded natron, 226 
tons;asphaltarn,
coffee, gum Alexandria




loaded natron, 84 tons; 
gum, cotton, myrrh Llexandria
loaded natron, 344 tons. Alexandria 
brought dispatches Sues
loaded natron, 119 tons Alexaidria 
















Appendix V I I I
Translation of the agreement between Baldwin, and Ibrahim 
 ______and Murad, February 1794________ ________ __
In the name of God! Amen I
It being well known that the subjects of the ICing of Great 
Britain, are authorised, by sacred Capitulations, from the Sub­
lime Porte, to navigate their ships to all- and any of the ports 
in the Grand Signior's Dominions and for the purposes of trafie 
to settle in all, or any of the cities, or places of the Turkish 
Empire, as a reference being had to the 1st. 2nd. 14th. and 41st. 
articles of the said Capitulations more particularly set forth.
And it being the desire of the English merchants, to return to 
Suez with their ships and to carry on trade, 'as in the other parts 
of the Grand Signor's dominions, provided the same security and 
protection can be given to their persons and effects: and the
said George Bajdwin, settled in Egypt as Consul General for the 
King of Great Britain, having manifested this desire, to the Beys 
in power; They, whom God glorify, faithful viceregents at Suez, 
which is an Ottoman port, and subjected to the power of the Court of 
Constantinople, considering the interest of the two nations, to 
require a good understanding in this respect that the ancient inter­
course should be reestablished and the said Consul General, giving 
assurance, from its conformity with the spirit and express tenour 
of the sacred Capitulations, granted to the English nation, by the 
Sublime Porte, that the same will be confirmed by a firman from 
the Sublime Porte /which God preserve from all dangers/ His Lord­
ship Ibrahim Bey Shieck il Bellad in Caireo, whom God preserve, 
and his Lordship Murad Bey, formerly Emir Iladje (whom the Al­
mighty prosper) on the one part and the most distinguished among 
his Com peers, George Baldwin, Consul general for the King of 
Great Britain, on the other part, have voluntarily agreed:
(1) That the subjects of the King of Great Britain shall in all 
cases whatsoever, be treated on a footing with the most fav­
oured nation.
(2) All ships belonging to English merchants, have leave to enter 
into any port, within the government of Egypt. A duty of one 
hundred crowns or real abou taka, shall be paid for anchorage 
and every other fee whatsoever - by every merchant ship that 
shall arrive at Suez, small or great, excepting Kings ships 
and no more. And this shall be paid bjr the Consul in Cairo
to the Commandant of Suez, or to his vekil, that nothing more 
be demanded of the captain, his people or his passengers at
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Suez who are not to be stopped or molested 011 any pretence 
whatsoever, and the governor at Suez, appointed by the 
government of Egypt, is to assist them with everything, they 
shall have occasion for, at a just price.
(3) If any English ships should be wrecked in any port, or on any 
coast within the government of Cairo, the Governor shall be 
obliged to assist them with all speed and protect them in the 
recovery of their ships and their effects and the English 
merchants owners of such ships and goods, shall pay the people 
employed in such recovery and they are to receive the whole 
property recovered and pay the customs of the goods when sold 
as hereafter mentioned.
(4) English ships of war, employed by their sovereign, to convoy 
and protect the merchant ships, or on any other service are not 
to pay, either anchorage or any other duty and if the captains 
or any other, belonging to such ships, should go on shore, no 
one is to obstruct them or make any demand to avoid harm; but 
if it should so happen that anybody were to molest them, 01* do 
them injury, the governor of Cairo shall punish the offender, 
and such honours shall be paid to the captains of British ships 
of war, as their high station demands and they are entitled to 
pretend.
(5) Should it happen that the ships of the English merchants, 
should be unable to reach Suez, but obliged to anchor in the 
port of Tor or any other, subject to the government, of Egypt: 
The Governors of Cairo shall send people to defend their pro­
perty and convoy it safe to Cairo,
(6) And as it often happens, that ships cannot on account of con­
trary winds, proceed further on their voyage than Cosir, the 
Government of Egypt, shall take the same measure with regard to 
these as with regard to those in the port of Tor.
(7) Should it happen that any Musulmanor any subject of the Caireen 
government have any dispute with an Englishman and an3r injury 
ensue whether by words or blows, justice shall be done and if 
the Egyptian be in the wrong, the delinquent shall be traduced 
to Cairo and undergo the punishment, he may deserve, and if it 
appears that the Englishman is the agressor, he shall be sent 
on shipboard to the Captain who shall punish him, or to his 
consul, who will do justice, as the case may require such being 
particularly consented by in the Capitulations from the Sublime 
Porte.
(8) All English merchants as well those coming from England on their 
way to India or those coming from India on their way to England, 
shall be assisted with all kindness, no one shall stop or in­
spect their equipage or baggage, nor their letters but they are 
to receive all respect, be accommodated protected and swipplied 
at a reasonable rate, with provisions and water from any place 
they please and as much as they please, without hindrance or 
restraint.
(9) At all times when ships arrive at Suez, the agents appointed 
by the Consul General for that purpose shall go on board and 
take an account of the cargoes and receive the letters and the 
Governor of Suez shall be instructed to provide messengers to 
bring the same without delay to the Consul General at Cairo 
who will immediately give notice of the business of the ship 
to the government of Cairo. And the ships shall anchor, 
wherever they please and no body is to interfere with their 
advice or give the least impediment or go on board of any of 
the English ships, without the captains leave, and they shall 
load and unload, their ships, with their own people without 
the assistance of the natives of Egypt, unless they should be 
called for and shall appoint their own pilots and the ships 
boats loaded or unloaded, shall not be examined by anyone.
(10) ho persons on the part of the Governor of Suez, nor any one 
else, can examine the merchandise but only the officers ap­
pointed by His Excellency the Pasha of Cairo, and the highly 
honoured Beys, can take note of the bales and parcels, at­
tended by the Consul's agent.
(11) A faithfull account of the contents of each package, shall
be delivered by the Consul, to the said officers appointed as 
before and if any doubt should arrise, as to the fidelity of 
the same, many of the packages, such as the said officers 
may fix upon, may be opened and compared and if found to 
correspond, the rest may be received upon faith of the note 
and the custom settles thereon, that is to say, the linnens 
and druggs and every other article, the produce of India, 
shall be fairly estimated, according to their value_ and the 
amount calculated and agreed upon, three per cent of the said 
amount, shall be paid in money to the officer of the pasha, 
so much and no more being authorized and allowed by the sacred 
Capitulations, granted to the English nation, by the Sublime 
Porte, which God preserve from evil! And in consideration 
of the protection to be granted by the princes, governors of 
Egypt, "the objects of this treaty and of their engaging 
for the security of the persons and effects, once entered 
into their country and of their promise of recovering or in­
demnifying the English consul, for what may be plundered or 
lost, it is agreed that 6 percent more, shall be paid to the 
said governors of Egypt; that is to say, 3°A> at the charge 
of the English mei'chants, importers of the goods and the other 
3°/o at the charge of the purchasers, the said princes, re­
nouncing any further pretention whatsoever on said purchasers; 
this ^imposition paid formerly having proved detrimental to 
the English trade* But if there should arrise any disagreement 
about the equitable estimation of the goods, then the English 
merchants may be permitted, to send, back what they may deem
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overrated, to India, without paying any duty, at all. And if 
the English ships, should "bring to Suez any merchandise not the 
production of India, such as cloth, tin, and iron or other 
articles, the p roduce of Great Britain, on them only 3 per cent 
shall bepaid for custom, as Is established by the royal Capitu- 
lation, without any further imposition whatsoever.
(12) Should the English merchants not be satisfied with the prices 
offered for their merchandize at Cairo, they are permitted to 
export them to any other country, without being subj ect to any 
further duty whatsoever and nobody shall exact it and no body 
prevent the exportation of the same freely and without question.
(13) It being necessary for the English merchants, to have their 
property well housed and in safe keeping and the English merchants 
themselves, being desirous of living separately and conveniently.
The princes governors of Cairo, do promise, that a proper building 
shall be assigned to them for that purpose at Suez. And if not 
satisfied therewith, they may be allowed to build such conveniencies 
at their own expence: a second shall be erected for them at Bulacco,
or other pleasant situation near Cairo for the residence of the 
consul and factory and another at Alexandria, the consul and the 
factoi*y undertaking to pay rent for the same at a reasonable rate.
(14) And to prevent all illicit and irregular practices and for the
maintenance of good order, it is stipulated, that no person or
persons, shall be allowed to participate of the benefit of this
treaty, but such as His Majesty's consul general may pronounce to
be well qualified in conformity with the instructions he may receive 
from the Kings ministers in England. And for the same reason no goods 
shall be embarked on the English ships for India, but such as are 
manifested to the Consul and are confronted by the agent at Suez.
(15) As soon as the merchant ships arrive at Suez the governor shall
send people to convoy the cargoes to Cairo and shall take charge
of them and shall secure them from the depravations of the Arabs 
and they shall be carried with all safety and free from all danger.
Eor the princes governors of Egypt are answerable for their safety
and engage to ensure them against loss. The gDOds shall be brought
and. housed In the English okel and no there else.
(16) In case it might happen, that the trade should be suppressed and 
this treaty cease to operate, from whatsoever cause It might pro­
ceed; time shall be given to the merchants, to settle their affairs 
and to withdraw their persons and effects, at least twelvemonths 
and the princes governors of Egypt, shall aid them with their power 
to recover monies due to f^llegiblej merchants and obtain full just- 
ice in their demands.
(17) Neither merchants nor captains of the ships, shall be obliged, to 
make presents to the governor of Suez, to the officers of the Beys, 
who may accompany the caravan, or any other persons what so ever, 
the duties agreed to be paid on the merchandises, being all that 
can be demanded.
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(is) With regard to coffee, if it should happen, that there should 
he any on board for private use, or for presents, the custom­
ary duties should bep aid.
These articles being established with the mutual consent of 
the princes governors of Egypt / whom God preserve / and the British 
consul general aforesaid; They have hereunto affixed their names, 
high in honour and seals, as pledges of their serious intention to 
maintain the conditions with truth and fidelity, although the obser­
vance, be not to commence untill the arrival of orders from the 
Sublime Porte of Constantinople, which God preserve! Cairo the 
twenty seventh day of hejab in the year of the Hegira one thousand 
two hundred and eight.
Signed.
  Ibrahim Bey, Emir il Liwah, Gaimacan Mesr Saabeck
  Murad Bey Emir il Liwah, Emir Iiadje Saabeck.
Appendix IX
The minutes of the meeting between Major MacDonald 
 ________ and Ibrahim Bey, recorded by R o s e t t i ____
In consequence of the ideas communicated to me by Major Mac­
Donald 1 have proposed to his Highness Ibrahim Bey, and Murad Bey, 
the ruling chiefs of Egypt, the establishment of an English factory 
at Itenni and Cosseir for the purposes of receiving and forwarding 
dispatches from India and at the same time to carry on a direct 
commerce.
The said Bejs in the presence of the said Major, have authorized 
me to assure the Government of Great1;Britain in their name that they 
shall be well pleased with such au establishment, aid that they 
will grant them all the privileges that the resident enjoys at 
Bussorah - viz Immunity, the power of hoisting the flag and the 
right of judging, not only the native English, but all those who 
shall be in their service, the rights of navigating upon the Hile, 
small boats under English colours, without being subject to be visited 
except by consent of the residents or agents to whom those barks may 
be consigned provided they be answerable to the customs house.
At Gosseir and ICenni everything shall be exempted from duties.
It is understood that the said establishment shall be composed of 
mild and respectable persons, known to me, and for whom I shall be 
answerable, care to be taken not to give offence to the Porte.
It being necessary to remove the scruples of the Beys, I as­
sured them that England would at all times be their friend, and in 
110 instance would undertake any measure, but what should be to their 
advantage. Upon this promise, the Beys have agreed that the resi­
dents and agents may have from 50 to 100 soldiers for their further 
security. But they must acknowledge the Beys, the governor ap­
pointed by them, who resides always at ICenni on which the port of 
Gosseir is dependent.
This is the true and concise statement of the conversation 1 
had with the Beys. The knowledge and penetration of the English 
make it necessary fox’ me to point out the advantages they may de­
rive from such an establishment, as well with regard to commerce 
as in a political point of view, provided they employ prudent and 
capable persons, to cultigate a good understanding with those whom 
they will have to treat with. Por the political department it will 
be necessary they should be furnished with instructions to act on 
the moment, and as circumstances might require. And it is necessary
299.
that the government of India should "be directed to second and 
support the agents here as they will have to do with a government 
not to accustomed to act with much presight.
The agents should have the means of supporting their station 
with dignity, and on particular occasions to act with a degree of 
splendour,
Even the grandees of the country are under the necessity to 
live in a lib oral and generous manner to assure to them that marked 
superiority to which all of them ambitiously aspire.
Apart from his political life, the next great preoccupation 
of Baldwin was a concern into the matter of magnetic sleep. Around
1778? the teachings of Hesmei' had become very fashionable in Paris.
Hypnosis, or artificial sleep, was based on the theory that a mag­
netic fluid, stored up in the body, could be used by one person re­
acting on another; this was used as a cure for diseases. Baldwin 
became very much involved with experiments of this kind when he 
lived in Alexandria as British consul-general. He m s  aided in 
his eff orts by an Italian, Cesare Avena di Valdiere, who stayed 
with Baldwin in Alexandria in 1795. Three works were the results 
of this friendship and collaboration:
1
A. La Prima Hus a Olio which was a translation by Baldwin
of Valdiere1s original in the Italian. The title page
gives an indication of the content; 5'The Divine Traveller, 
exhibiting a series of writings obtained in the extasy of 
magnetic sleep. Most important to the integrity of the 
fact, Most interesting to the curious, Most consoling to
the afflicted and Most edifying to the dubious among mankind". 
In 1802, Baldwin had presented the British Museum with a 
copy of the original work in Italian, but apparently the 
interest of the public was so great, that he was called upon 
to transI at e it.
2
B. Tre Op ere Drammatlche, or Three Dramatic I oik s. The names
of the works are "II Trionfo di Melibeo"; "La Oipria Silene";
and "La Ooronazione di S i l e n e T h e s e  were written during 
the extasy of magnetic sleep; Valdiere was in a trance, and 
Baldwin wrote the effects.
0. Book of Dreams^ is the story of a series of dreams of a
sick orphan who was under magnetic treatment, Baldwin edited 
the work, and added interpretations; he t hen sold it and 
gave the proceeds to the orphan. The experiments were under­






to be u... ail easy dupe... who contrived to turn the 
Consul's weakness in this particular to good account11.
2 • Antiquity:
Although Baldwin, during his stayin Egypt, made no mention of 
it, he collected antiques. Ainslie seemed to be far more interested 
in Ancient Egyptian art, for he occasionally asked Baldwin to send 
him anything he could find that would, enrich his personal collection. 
However, the catalogue of the British Museum ascribes to George Bald- 
win a series of sixty lithographs of ancient art, enclosed in a 
bound volume entitled Baldwin' s ^hiseum. Sometime after his return to 
England in 1802, Baldwin did sell his personal collection of art 
at Christie's in London, so it is not unlikely that the volume is 
correctly attributed to him, although there is no indication as to 
who the Baldwin of the title may be.
5. the Plague:
li'hen Baldwin was confined to quarantine during the plague of 
1791, He busied himself with finding a cure for the disease. 1/hen he 
had sufficient evidence to validate his theory, he sent it to London.^ 
But he did not stop at that; he incorporated it into his collection 
of essays Political Recollections Relative to Egypt. In this, it 
appears as "Essay on the Blague, supported by a variety of evidence 
in support of the efficacy of oil", The method of rubbing olive oil 
on the sores, apparently advocated by Baldwin, m s  given to the Rev. 
Lewis de Pavia, chaplain and agent of St. Anthony's Hospital in 
Smyrna. Pavia passed on the information to the Count Berchtold of 
Vienna in 1797. Berchtold published it, and a copy was sent to 
the Royal Academy of Sciences in Lisbon, who in tupyi ordered it to 
be translated into Arabic, French, and Portuguese.^ The method was 
recommended to Citizen Desgenettes, Chief Physician of the French 
army in Egypt, and whose "Remarks on the use of oil in the plague" 
Baldwin included in Political Recollections.
4-. The Slave Trade:
In 1789, Carmarthen asked Baldwin to prepare a treatise on the 
slave trade in Egypt. This re stilted in Memorial Relative to the Trade 
in Slaves carried on in Alexandria, which was published* separately,
See Jane Baldwin's Obituary, Cent 1 email' s Mag as in e, vol. 12, 
London, 1839> P* 697.
^ ’O 24/1, Baldwin to Grenville, Sept. 17, 1791.
^"Directions for the Cure of the Plague", Annual Register,, London, 
s "'Memorial relating to the slave trade in Egypt.
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and also incorporated into Political Recoil actions. Baldwin gave 
an account of the number of slaves brought hito Egypt annually 
from Asia and Africa, aid lie also [Included information about the 
caravans sent from Egypt to Africa, what they carried, what kind 
of commerce they did; he ended it with a crude outline of the 
government of these countries, of Africa.
5• Other Works:
A. Philosophical Essays, dedicated to Governor John stone, one of 
Baldwin's main supporters in his political efforts in Egypt, 
This was written when Baldwin was in England following the 
1779 caravan disaster and before he received the appointment 
of consul-general in Egypt. The title page explains the reason 
for its composition: "It is the production of my hours ox
expectation: the amusements of those amounts of resignation
to an obstinate fate - which 5*0ur labours - which your pro­
tection have enabled me to overcome - ", It is made up of 
fourteen essays that deal with such varied topics as "On Time", 
"On water as an element", "On electricity", "On attraction" 
etc.
B. Mr. Baldwin's Legacy; to His Daughter. The title continues,
Or the Divinity of Truth, and includes "a series of writings 
obtained from the hand of 0. Avena de Valdiere, in the mag­
netic sleep".
6• Political hoiks:
A. narrative of Pacts Relating; to the Plunder of the English Mer­
chants by the Arabs and other subsequent Outrages of the Govern­
ment of Cairo in the Course of the Tear 1779 is a short description 
of the events of the caravan disaster. The title page describes 
more of the contents: "Premissed by some references to the con­
duct of Carlo Rosetti which have been made necessary by his being 
discovered to be a principal in advising and effecting the oper­
ation from the beginning to the end." The Narrative is followed 
by a long list of copies of the letters exchanged between Ainslie 
and Baldwin during and after the crisis.
B. Political Recollections Relative to Egypt.^ This is made up 
of a number of sections:
a* Prefaces This is based on a brief account of Baldwin' s 
early reasons to settle in Egypt, and an outli ne of the
■1
There are two editins of this: the first, published in 1801, and- the
second-, in 1802. The latter is the one used in this study since it has 
additions concerniig the British expedition to Egypt.
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major episodes of Iris residence there.
k* fetter to Bundas, (from Baldwin) that was started on
9 December 1800. In it, he suggested that the British
f forces land at Acre, and march along the coast to
Egypt. The reasons for this were: first, it would
be a good preparation for the troops to the climate 
of the country; and second, it would bring the British 
army into cooperation with the Ottoman forces, thus 
forcing the French to extend their line of defence.
The first part of the letter was not finally sent to 
Dundas, since Baldwin was in a hurry to join Abercromby 
and Keith. It was completed on 27 August 1801.
c* Considerations for the Army on an Expedition to Egypt.
This was written when Baldwin was on his way to halt a 
from Hamorice ii December 1800, and intended for Aber­
cromby. The two sections are: "As to the Climate";
and, "As to the Disembarkation of the Army", in which 
he pointed out the disadvantages of Alexandria, Abu 
Qir and Rosetta as landing places, and showed the 
qualities of the bay of Acre.
d, Letter to Abercromby, (from Baldwin) dated 1 February 
|.801, and. written on board, H.M.S. "I’oudroyant" at Hamorice. 
In this Baldwin warned of the possibility of the army 
becoming infected with the plague, and enclosed, his
own work on the disease, aid how it could be cured.
e, A narrative of the British Campaign in Egypt in the 
Spring of 1801 in a letter to John Baldwin, Esq., Baldwin1 s 
cousin. This was written on 19 May 1801, and a supplement 
continued the narrative on 27 April 1802.
f, Letter to Dundas (from Baldwin) written on 27 September 
1801 advocates the "expediency of retaining Egypt under 
the controul of Great Britain".^ Baldwin was concerned 
with the aftermath of the victory at Acre; he foresaw 
more trouble ahead. "... the political cauldron is com-
•j
See Chapter V, pp.
2
B al dvr in, Pol. Rec., p. 159 •
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pounding of greater events. More is foreboding:^ 
more 'bubble bubble'; more 'toil and trouble'."'
He was convinced that France would never lose her 
desire to be the "arbiter of Turkey". 2 Bonaparte, 
according to Baldwin, "... did not turn from his 
design. ^He carried it boiling ii M s  stomach to 
France,"k It was up to Britain now to keep Egypt 
under its aegis, and derive from it all the commercial 
benefits It could bring. "If it can be held to Bn gland, 
she may talk of jewels in her crown, but a brighter 
than this she M i l  not possess."4
g. Speculations on. the Situatl gi and Resources of Egypt:
From observations began In 1773, end continued, as owoor-
tmiities favoured until the year 1781. These reflections, 
thrown together in the year 1783. The tract is a detailed, 
if somewhat short, outline of the position, trade, re­
sources, aid government of Egypt. Written at the request
of the India Board In 1733, it contains a prophetic analysis 
of the importance of the country to England and to France, 
and how the latter could easily conquer it. There are nine 
chapters:
Chapter 1. "As to its situation relative to other parts of 
the globe."
The unique geographical position of the country 
is the subject of this chapter. Its central 
location gave it quick and easy connection with 
Africa, India, Europe, and even some parts of 
Horth and South America, Baldwin pointed out 
that it could be reached from Asia, Africa and
Europe within ninety days; it could serve as
a link between England and Its possessions hi 
India in sixty days, "... and in one hundred 
days may send her tidings to M e  farthest corners 
of the earth."5









"As to its commerce".
The commerce of Egypt was in an advantageous 
position because of the very communication 
mentioned above. Internally, the Pile provided 
the same facility for mobility.
"As to its [productions and commercial re sources " 
Baldwin calculated that the resources of the 
country could supply one thousand ships a year, 
"... with her superfluous productions".1 He 
went on to say: 11 She Is the magasine of all 
the trade of Yemen; the mart for all the coffeo 
and rich guns of that proud territory: she is
the magasine to all the interior parts of Africa 
producing gold dust, ivory, senna, drugs; she 
is the resort of all the traders of the world: 
it seems a common centre of universal commerce: 
the coin of all the world Is current here. "2
"As to its government".
Baldwin m s  highly aware of the state of the 
Egyptian government, and said of the country 
"It is neither a dependent or independent state.. 
He attributed the decline in rower of the Pasha 
and the evident importance of the nanlwkc to a 
simple historical fact: 'When Eultan Selim, the
conqueror of Egypt in tie early sixteenth century 
set up the government of Egypt, he was afraid 
that if he gave too much power to the Pasha, the 
wealth of the country and its distance from Con­
stantinople would be lost to the Porte by the 
rapacity of one governor; he therefore divided 
the power of the rulers. Baldwin did not see 
this as a wise move, for the "restive spirit" 
of the namluks seized the situation to further 
aggravate the political status cf the country.
Baldwin's opinion of the nanluhs was not a 




to be "their road to honour", and assassination 
"their title to power".” They were anarchic as 
a body, and had few principles or any kind of 
moral code to guide their actions. He did not 
put it beyond the Pasha to divide and rule his 
motley crew of beys. The best example he gave 
was of the revolt of *Ali Bey al-ICabir. Al­
though the Porte used 110 pressure to suppress 
him, he did manage to be extinguished an a short 
while. The very same power that brought on his 
rise to power also issued M s  downfall; it was 
his own mamluk, Muhammad Bey Abu} 1 Dhahab who 
seized his position.
Chapter 5* "As to its means of conquest".
Baldwin regarded Egypt a s an invincible power 
in comparison to its neighbours. Once again, 
he used the example of cAli Bey to illustrate 
his thesis, comparing him with any great warrior. 
"IJhen All Bey threw off the yoke, he marched to 
Mecca, and subdued it. He marched to Palestine, 
and subdued it. He inarched to Syria, and subdued 
Damascus, Sydon, and Tripoly. He could say, 
with Caesar, 'veni, vidi, yi.cl1 Although Dili’s 
conquests were short-lived, Baldwin did not 
consider it unlikely that Egypt would bo able to 
raise another conqueror similar in ability to him. 
Baldwin carefully noted, however, that the country 
would never need to go to war in order to conquer 
for its own needs; it would only do so for the 
sale of empire. "Their conquests should argue 
for the martial spirit of the people, as the sup­
plies do for the resources of the country: no
such thing! Ali Bey had made himself terrible 
by his severity at home; and as he marched out, 
nobody was prepared to encounter him. He owed 
his conquests to the exhausted state of the coun­
tries he assailed; for victories he gained none! 




Chapter S. "As to its present state, and aptibility to defence".
Because of the political instability of the country, 
it was completely defenceless to invasion. "Egypt 
is accessible on all sides, because of the ignor­
ance and want of discipline jn its present possess­
ors. All the avenues to it are open and unguarded. 
Baldwin then proceeded to describe the different 
ports of the country and which ones are liable to 
conquest by a fleet. The old port of Alexandria 
he saw as particularly good to land a foreign fleet. 
Finally, he voiced his opinion as to what an 
occupying- army would be faced with from the 
Egyptians. "The actual inhabitants would form 
to discipline, as the Indians, and be in a con­
dition to contribute to its defence. They are 
robust and pliant, inured to fatigue, and ^ ery 
indifferent as to their condition in life."^
Chapter 7. "As to the importance of this situation to Bngland, 
simply in subservience to her political and com­
mercial correspondence with India."
The importance of Egypt to England was a con­
stantly re-iterated theme in most of Baldwin's 
dispatches to Ion don, as well as having a separ­
ate heading in this treatise 011 Egypt. The com­
munication with India was, of course, the first 
point that he made. It would be a great asset 
to the merchants of Bengal who would have anew 
and considerable market in Sues for their pro­
ducts. It would also lessen the trade of the 
French, "... by talcing away the foundation of 
their trade".5 Host important of all, it would 
provide a speedy passage to British possessions 
in India; "... and. in the event of a sudden war, 
may enable us to conquer our rivals, and add their 
possessions to our own." But a much more pertin­
ent argument was one that he put forth in the 
next chapter.




Chapter 8. 11 As to the importance of Egypt to France".
Baldwin's views here were in regard to the 
vital Interest France would have in conquer jug 
Egypt. lie saw this as the greatest threat to 
Britain. After the independence of the Anerican 
colonies, it seened clear to Baldwin that France 
would turn to Egypt to further her dominions.
Hie innumerable advantages of Egypt to Franco 
were set down by Baldwin; it was close enough 
to France to male it worthwhile as an added 
dominion; its resources and wealth would 
siseably add to those of France; it was not 
subject to great physical upheavals such as 
earthquakes and hurricanes; it would be self- 
supporting to the French troops stationed there. 
He concluded thus; "England must now look with 
a jealous eye to the machinations of France ..."I
Chapter 9. "As to the conquest of Egypt by France".
This was a threat that Baldwin was ever-mindful 
of. It would be based on the collapsing state 
of the Ottomanbmpire, and on the weakness of 
the Egyptian government ■. "France, in possession 
of Egypt, would possess the master-key to all 
the trading nations of the earth. Enlightened, 
as the times are , in the general arts of navi­
gation and commerce, she might make it the em­
porium of the world; she might make it the awe 
of the Eastern world, by the facility she would 
command of transporting her forces thither, by 
surprise, in any number, and at any time; and 
England would bold her possessions in India 
at the mercy of France."2
h. Memorial Relating Id the Trade in Slaves Carried on in Egypt.
i. Remarks on the Use of Oil in the Plague. By Citlzen I)esgenettes,
Chief Physician to the Army of the East.
j. Essay on the Plague, supported by a variety of evidence in 
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